Probability of introduction of exotic strains of bluetongue virus into the US and into California through importation of infected cattle

Strategies designed to minimize the probability of bluetongue virus (BTV) introduction to new areas should be based on a quantitative assessment of the probability of actually establishing the virus once it is introduced. The risk of introducing a new strain of bluetongue virus into a region depends on the number of viremic animals that enter and the competency of local vectors to transmit the virus. We used Monte Carlo simulation to model the probability of introducing BTV into California, USA, and the US through importation of cattle. Records of cattle and calf imports into California and the US were obtained, as was seroprevalence information from the exporting countries. A simulation model was constructed to evaluate the probability of importing either a viremic PCR-negative animal after 14-day quarantine, a c-ELISA BTV-antibody-negative animal after 28-day quarantine, or an untested viremic animal after 100-day quarantine into California and into the US. We found that for animals imported to the US, the simulated (best to worst scenarios) median percentage that tested positive for BTV-antibody ranged from 5.4 to 7.2%, while for the subset imported to California, the simulated median percentage that tested positive for BTV-antibody ranged from 20.9 to 78.9%. Using PCR, for animals imported to the US these values were 71.8–85.3%, and for those imported to California, the simulated median that test positive ranged from 74.3 to 92.4%. The probability that an imported animal was BTV-viremic is very low regardless of the scenario selected (median probability = 0.0%). The probability of introducing an exotic strain of BTV into California or the US by importing infected cattle was remote, and the current Office International des Epizooties (OIE) recommendation of either a final PCR test performed 14 days after entry into quarantine, a c-ELISA performed 28 days after entry into quarantine or a 100-day quarantine with no testing requirement was adequate to protect cattle in the US and California from an exotic strain of BTV.     

Global trade in ornamental fish from an Australian perspective: the case for revised import risk analysis and management strategies

Over 1 billion ornamental fish comprising more than 4000 freshwater and 1400 marine species are traded internationally each year, with 8-10 million imported into Australia alone. Compared to other commodities, the pathogens and disease translocation risks associated with this pattern of trade have been poorly documented. The aim of this study was to conduct an appraisal of the effectiveness of risk analysis and quarantine controls as they are applied according to the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement in Australia. Ornamental fish originate from about 100 countries and hazards are mostly unknown; since 2000 there have been 16-fold fewer scientific publications on ornamental fish disease compared to farmed fish disease, and 470 fewer compared to disease in terrestrial species (cattle). The import quarantine policies of a range of countries were reviewed and classified as stringent or non-stringent based on the levels of pre-border and border controls. Australia has a stringent policy which includes pre-border health certification and a mandatory quarantine period at border of 1-3 weeks in registered quarantine premises supervised by government quarantine staff. Despite these measures there have been many disease incursions as well as establishment of significant exotic viral, bacterial, fungal, protozoal and metazoan pathogens from ornamental fish in farmed native Australian fish and free-living introduced species. Recent examples include Megalocytivirus and Aeromonas salmonicida atypical strain. In 2006, there were 22 species of alien ornamental fish with established breeding populations in waterways in Australia and freshwater plants and molluscs have also been introduced, proving a direct transmission pathway for establishment of pathogens in native fish species. Australia's stringent quarantine policies for imported ornamental fish are based on import risk analysis under the SPS agreement but have not provided an acceptable level of protection (ALOP) consistent with government objectives to prevent introduction of pests and diseases, promote development of future aquaculture industries or maintain biodiversity. It is concluded that the risk analysis process described by the Office International des Epizooties under the SPS agreement cannot be used in a meaningful way for current patterns of ornamental fish trade. Transboundary disease incursions will continue and exotic pathogens will become established in new regions as a result of the ornamental fish trade, and this will be an international phenomenon. Ornamental fish represent a special case in live animal trade where OIE guidelines for risk analysis need to be revised. Alternatively, for countries such as Australia with implied very high ALOP, the number of species traded and the number of sources permitted need to be dramatically reduced to facilitate hazard identification, risk assessment and import quarantine controls.     

长颈鹿检疫设施设计与使用方法

2010年9月,北京野生动物园自南非进口3只长颈鹿,根据进口动物的检疫要求,所有来自南非的偶蹄类动物要严格检疫。为了完成对3只进口长颈鹿检疫任务,我们通过学习北京顺义的经验,在他们的基础上,进行改进,设计了适用于北京野生动物园的长颈鹿检疫设施。根据设计图纸,我们使用了1周的时间,动管部职工配合园区维修人员自己动手搭建了长颈鹿检疫长廊。2010年9月14日和10月5日,经过我们的实际应用,长颈鹿检疫设施虽然存在一些小缺陷,但使用效果很好,对长颈鹿2次5只的检疫采血操作顺利完成。     

关于进口动物产品检疫证书确认标准的探讨

作者根据《中华人民共和国进出境动植物检疫法》第十一、十二条对输出国官方出具检疫证书的规定,通过对文锦渡口岸进口动物产品随附检疫证书进行收集、分析、探讨,提出输出国官方检疫证书的确认制度和官方有效检疫证书的确认标准。并由此引发到进口动物产品检疫管理的探讨,提出加强进口动物产品检疫的五方面工作。     

2018年进口奶牛检疫情况分析

随着十多年的超速发展,我国奶牛业已由单一品种的散养方式逐步转变为高产品种的规模化、集约化养殖方式。然而,我国奶牛整体遗传素质不高,多为进口高产奶牛与地方奶牛的低代次改良品种,以致原奶质量参差不齐,严重制约了我国奶业的健康发展。因此,大规模引进高品质的奶牛品种,已成为我国优化奶牛基因、推动畜牧业产业化发展的重要抓手,但同时也为检疫工作带来了挑战。本文通过分析2018年我国进口奶牛数量、来源国、疫病检出、进境口岸及隔离检疫场分布等数据,结合各来源国的疫病防控特点,有针对性地提出检疫要点,为我国全面提升进口奶牛的检疫水平、切实做好奶牛群体遗传改良计划、加快推进畜牧业转型升级提供参考。     

Quarantine, exports and animal disease in Australia 1901-2010

The Constitution forming the Australian Commonwealth Government on 1 January 1901 provided that animal and animal products imported into and exported from Australia would be under the authority of the national government. By mutual agreement, the Quarantine Act 1908 provided for the states to continue the delivery of services under contract until 1995 when the Commonwealth took back full responsibility for quarantine services. In the 1940s, 50s and 60s there were world pandemics of livestock diseases and Australia ceased the import of many species. By the 1970s, the livestock industries sought relaxation of import restrictions to gain access to diversified genetic stock. By the use of new technologies, many species can now be imported into Australia through tight importation protocols. With the advent of the World Trade Organization and implementation of the Sanitary Phytosanitary Agreement, Australia has developed a risk-based framework to support the development of import conditions for animals and animal products. Australia's 'Acceptable Level of Protection' has been set to provide a low likelihood of disease entry. Being an island continent, Australia can apply strong controls over imports and exports of all commodities and relatively few outbreaks of exotic animal diseases have occurred by breach of quarantine, but the outbreaks of rinderpest in 1923 and equine influenza in 2007 were notable exceptions.     

Survey of gastrointestinal parasitic infections in quarantined dogs in Taiwan

Intestinal helminth and protozoan infection in the quarantined dogs in Taiwan were examined using fecal examination between January to December, 2004. Of the 376 dogs imported from 11 countries, 63 (16.8%) were found to be infected with at least one species of intestinal parasite. The parasites detected were oocysts of Isospora canis and eggs of Toxocara canis, Trichuris vulpis and hookworms. Of the 63 infected dogs, 11 were found to have a mixed infection of two different species of parasites. This paper illustrates that parasites are transmitted from one country to another through the transport of animals. Moreover, there is also a possibility of parasitic infection among quarantined dogs as well as the zoonotic potential for quarantine officers during the quarantine period.     

Biosecurity practices of beef cow-calf producers

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate biosecurity practices of cow-calf producers. DESIGN: Cross-sectional survey. SAMPLE POPULATION: 2,713 cow-calf operations were used in phase 1 of the study, and 1,190 cow-calf operations were used in phase 2. PROCEDURE: Producers were contacted for a personal interview between Dec 30, 1996 and Feb 3, 1997 regarding their management practices. Noninstitutional operations with 1 or more beef cows were eligible to participate in the study. Producers who participated in the first phase of the study and who had > or = 5 beef cows were requested to continue in the study and were contacted by a veterinarian or animal health technician who administered further questionnaires. All contacts for the second phase of the study were made between Mar 3, 1997 and Apr 30, 1997. Additional data on use of various vaccines, testing of imported cattle for brucellosis, Mycobacterium paratuberculosis, bovine viral diarrhea, and tuberculosis as well as potential for feed contamination were collected during the second phase of the study. RESULTS: Producers commonly engaged in management practices that increased risk of introducing disease to their cattle such as importing cattle, failing to quarantine imported cattle, and communal grazing. Producers inconsistently adjusted for the increased risk of their management practices by increasing the types of vaccines given, increasing the quarantine time or proportion of imported animals quarantined, or increasing testing for various diseases in imported animals. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Cow-calf herds are at risk for disease exposure from outside sources when cattle are introduced to the herd, and producers do not always adjust management practices such as vaccination schedules and quarantine procedures appropriately to minimize this risk. Veterinary involvement in education of producers regarding biosecurity risks and development of rational and economical biosecurity plans is needed.     

用固定细胞阻断酶联免疫吸附试验鉴别诊断猪传染性胃肠炎病毒和猪呼吸道冠状病毒的感染

用固定细胞阻断酶联免疫吸附试验（ＥＬＩＳＡ）对来自丹麦猪的１８０份血清进行了猪传染性胃肠炎病毒（ＴＧＥＶ）和猪呼吸道冠状病毒（ＰＲＣＶ）感染的鉴别诊断，共检出了ＰＲＣＶ抗体阳性血清１０７份（５９．４％），ＴＧＥＶ抗体阳性血清０份。同时也检测了一些来自国内不同ＴＧＥＶ感染类型的猪场血清。该鉴别诊断方法在我国的建立和应用为从ＰＲＣＶ阳性国家进口猪的ＴＧＥ的检疫提供了一条有效途径。     

Procedures utilized for primate import quarantine at the International Center for Gibbon Studies.

The intent of the Foreign Quarantine requirements (42 CFR 71.53) for nonhuman primates (NHPs) is to prevent the importation of potentially serious infectious diseases that are not endemic to the United States. In 1990, prompted by an outbreak of Ebola (Reston) hemorrhagic fever at an (NHP) quarantine facility, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) initiated unannounced inspections of all NHP importers' quarantine facilities. During the inspections, the majority did not meet the required infection control and containment standards. Numerous discrepancies were identified in infection control and NHP quarantine protocols. Zoos should have knowledge of CDC requirements and recommendations for the importation of NHPs into the United States. Zoos planning to import NHPs should register with the CDC and have their NHP quarantine facility and protocols inspected and approved by CDC's Division of Quarantine. Specific areas addressed must include protocols for in-transit shipping and handling, transport to the quarantine facility, biocontainment procedures (transfer of NHPs from shipping containers to quarantine cages, entering/exiting the quarantine room, routine daily and emergency procedures, protective clothing, infection control, infectious waste disposal), occupational health, and employee training. Here, we provide information on the approved protocols used for import quarantine at a single registered importer facility specializing in importation of gibbons (Hylobatidae) for species conservation purposes. These procedures are site specific and are not intended to be applicable to the needs of all NHP import facilities.     

基质辅助激光解析电离飞行时间质谱在动物病原菌检测中的应用

应用基质辅助激光解吸电离飞行时间质谱（MALDI-TOF-MS）技术,对厦门口岸进口的1000多份动物及其产品的样品进行致病菌的检测和鉴定,共检出20多种致病菌,并对这些菌株同时用传统生化鉴定方法进行确认。结果表明MALDI-TOF-MS对未知细菌进行鉴定,较传统方法更加快速、准确,而且可以进行高通量检测,可以广泛应用于口岸动物检疫以及微生物检验实验室的日常检验。此外,将国内分离鉴定的各种参考菌株建立的常见致病菌MALDI-TOF-MS数据库与布鲁克公司的MALDI Biotyper数据库进行病原菌鉴定的比较,结果表明,实验室自建的MALDI-TOF-MS数据库可以取得更加准确地结果。     

鸵鸟鼠伤寒沙门氏菌的分离鉴定

２只进口鸵鸟在检疫隔离期间先后发病,临床表现为急性死亡,病理变化主要在肝脏,表现为局部坏死。从肝脏分离出２株鼠伤寒沙门氏菌,且证明２株分离菌有较强的致病性。     

Canine leishmaniasis–United Kingdom update

Over a wide area of the warmer parts of the world the dog is the principal reservoir of human visceral leishmaniasis (kala-azar), a serious and widespread protozoal disease. Following recent reports of canine leishmaniasis in the United Kingdom, this clinically vague, relapsing disease is being recognized more frequently in imported dogs. After reviewing clinico-pathological and epidemiological aspects of the disease, this paper discusses practical problems such as the availability and relatively low efficacy of chemotherapeutic agents, mandatory serological testing of dogs in quarantine, the legal aspects of diagnosis in quarantine and the use of imported drugs. The public health risks inherent in the management of a relapsing zoonosis potentially capable of infecting man in the absence of the insect vector are evaluated.     

《家禽屠宰检疫规程》中有关问题分析

《家禽屠宰检疫规程》在规范家禽的屠宰检疫,加强家禽产品的检疫活动管理,保障动物源食品安全方面发挥了重要作用。本文概述了《家禽屠宰检疫规程》关于家禽屠宰场所定义、规程适用动物、检疫对象、检疫合格标准的判定等方面存在的问题,特别是针对家禽产品入库贮藏后才出厂如何出具检疫合格证明,提出可采取贮藏后继续调运或分销的检疫方式出具检疫证明这一解决方案。这提示在今后工作中扩大屠宰检疫的适用范围及检疫对象,进一步修订和完善屠宰检疫规程,提升屠宰检疫技术水平。     

Detection of clade 2 equine influenza virus in an adult horse recently imported to the USA

A 4‐year‐old Warmblood mare presented to the William R. Pritchard Veterinary Medical Teaching Hospital, School of Veterinary Medicine, University of California at Davis with bilateral mucoid nasal discharge and pyrexia. The mare had recently been imported from Germany, arriving at a quarantine holding facility 72 h prior to presentation. Based on clinical presentation and culture results of tracheal fluid, the mare was diagnosed with bacterial bronchopneumonia secondary to equine influenza. The equine influenza virus (EIV) identified in the imported mare displayed 99.1% nucleotide homology of the HA1 gene to the prototype Florida sublineage clade 2 isolate A/equine/Richmond/1/2007 (H3N8). This case illustrates the risk of introducing a clade 2 EIV in North America.     

Lateral transmission of equine arteritis virus among Lipizzaner stallions in South Africa

REASONS FOR PERFORMING STUDY: A serological study conducted in 1995 revealed that 7 stallions at the Lipizzaner Centre, Gauteng, South Africa, were seropositive for antibody to equine arteritis virus (EAV). A Lipizzaner stallion imported into South Africa from Yugoslavia in 1981 had previously (1988) been confirmed to be an EAV carrier. Despite being placed under life-long breeding quarantine, EAV had been transmitted between stallions at the Lipizzaner Centre. OBJECTIVES: To investigate the phylogenetic relationships between the strain of EAV shed in the semen of the original carrier stallion and strains recovered from the semen of 5 other stallions; and to investigate the means whereby lateral transmission of EAV occurred among 7 in-contact, nonbreeding stallions at the Centre. METHODS: EAV was isolated from semen collected from the seropositive stallions using RK-13 cells. Viral RNA was reverse transcribed and amplified by polymerase chain reaction using ORF 5-specific primers, subjected to sequence and phylogenetic analysis. RESULTS: Phylogenetic analysis of strains of EAV recovered from the semen of 6 persistently infected stallions confirmed that all viruses were closely related and probably derived from a common ancestor, i.e. the stallion imported from Yugoslavia. Lateral transmission subsequently occurred among 7 in-contact, nonbreeding stallions at the Centre. It is speculated that these stallions may have been exposed to virus from bedding or fomites contaminated with semen. CONCLUSIONS: These data confirm that lateral transmission of EAV can occur from shedding stallions to susceptible, in-contact horses, including other stallions, which may become persistently infected with the virus. POTENTIAL RELEVANCE: The findings are consistent with lateral spread of a single, unique strain of EAV among a group; and suggest that transmission of EAV may be initiated by infection of one or more stallions with virus on bedding or other fomites contaminated with EAV- infected semen.     

The risks of translocating wildlife. Pathogenic infection with Theileria sp. and Elaeophora elaphi in an imported red deer

It is well known that the translocation of wild animals poses risks of the introduction of pathogens into populations, and regulations and recommendations regarding quarantine and screening protocols for wild animals do exist. Less is known about the infection of imported animals with local endemic pathogens. A red deer stag that had been imported from Germany was found recumbent and died from hemolytic anaemia and a process of exertional myopathy. Infection with Theileria sp. was detected in thin blood smears and confirmed by PCR and sequencing. In addition, massive parasitation by Elaeophora elaphi, a parasite endemic to Iberian red deer, was detected. Sequence comparison between the 18S rRNA gene sequence determined that the Theileria strain involved in this case had a 99.7% identity with a Theileria sp. strain obtained from sika-deer, and 95.3% identity with T. cervi. Using sequence distance analysis, the strain from red deer grouped with isolates from Cervus spp. as opposed to isolates from Odocoileus spp. and bovines. Both detected parasites are of little pathogenicity to local red deer, but were pathogenic for the imported red deer from Northern Europe. This case demonstrates that local endemic pathogens may pose naive translocated animals at risk, and illustrates the need for thorough examination and planification of translocation protocols.     

入境肉种鸡检出衣原体阳性及其处理

目的随着加入世界贸易组织,我国海关检疫压力增大,为了维护国家主权和国际声誉,加强出入境检验检疫势在必行。衣原体病是一种重要的人畜共患病,也给养禽业带来巨大的经济损失,必须给予足够的重视,鹦鹉热衣原体对多种动物宿主有广泛的寄生性引起不同动物的多症候群疾病,是世界动物卫生组织动物名录疾病。方法对入境的一批肉种鸡进行抽样检验,按照中华人民共和国出入境检验检疫行业标准用间接血凝检测鹦鹉热衣原体病,做出试验报告。结果经检测出现阳性,肉鸡携带有衣原体病毒。结论根据中华人民共和国进出境动植物检疫法第二章进境检疫第十六条检出二类传染病、寄生虫病的动物,退回或者扑杀,同群其他动物在隔离场或者其他指定地点隔离观察。     

The isolation of salmonellae, Newcastle disease virus and other infectious agents from quarantined imported birds in Canada.

Necropsy and culture results are presented for 269 consignments of imported birds (mainly psittacine and passerine species) examined between January 1977 and August 1980. Consignments were submitted for diagnosis of clinical illness or deaths occurring among these birds while they were in quarantine before entry into Canada. Enteritis and injury were the most frequent diagnoses. Pathogens or potential pathogens were isolated from 77% of consignments. Newcastle disease virus was isolated nine times, and Chlamydia psittaci was isolated once. Escherichia coli (from 113 consignments) and salmonellae (from 49) were the most common bacteria isolated, and reoviruses (from 22) and paramyxoviruses other than Newcastle disease virus (from 22) were the most common viruses. Salmonella typhimurium was the most common Salmonella serovar. Salmonella hadar was isolated from turkey poults imported from Great Britain. The possible public health significance of the role of imported birds in the introduction of exotic Salmonella serovars, or of serovars resistant to several antimicrobials is discussed.     

1株牛传染性鼻气管炎病毒的分离鉴定

在对进口种用奶牛隔离检疫期间,从1头IBRV中和抗体阳性奶牛中分离出1株病毒。该分离株表现类似于IBRV特征的细胞病变,细胞圆缩,聚集成葡萄串样群落,在单层细胞上形成空洞。用特异性抗IBRV阳性血清与其进行中和试验,发现IBRV标准阳性血清对分离株的中和抗体滴度为27,与IBRV标准株的中和抗体滴度相差不到1个滴度。用OIEV推荐的IBR特异性引物对分离病毒进行PCR扩增,获得与设计基因片段大小一致的特异性条带,表明分离到的病毒为IBRV。