陕西省一起野禽H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情紧急流行病学调查

2021年6月9日,陕西省神木市红碱淖国家级自然保护区发生一起野禽H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情。为了解该起疫情的发生经过、可能来源、内部传播方式以及对外扩散风险,组织开展了流行病学调查。现场调查发现：5月27日该保护区的黑颈??种群开始发病死亡,28日保护区工作人员发现后上报疫情,经国家禽流感参考实验室确诊为H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情;截至6月26日,累计死亡黑颈??5 486只,未见其他鸟类及周边家禽异常死亡。采样检测发现,野禽环境中病毒污染面较小,家禽中未检出病原,家禽H5亚型禽流感免疫抗体水平较高。调查认为：疫情由迁徙候鸟感染禽流感病毒传入引起,发病局限于野禽;因红碱淖水质碱性较强,病毒存活时间较短,疫情经湖水传播的风险性较小。疫情确诊前,保护区已采取了无害化处理病死禽、消毒、人车管控等措施,当地农业农村部门对周边家禽开展了禽流感紧急疫情排查和强化免疫。因此,结合现场调查和实验室检测结果,推断疫情由野禽向家禽扩散风险很低。本次疫情提示,应多部门密切协作,持续做好高致病性禽流感疫情监测工作,做到疫情早发现,果断处置,以降低疫情扩散风险。     

一起野禽H5N8亚型禽流感疫情的处置与思考

2021年1月,江苏省连云港市云台山景区云台街道西隅水库发生一起疑似野禽H5N8亚型禽流感疫情,共17只鸳鸯、大雁感染死亡。江苏省动物疫病预防控制中心迅速组织相关人员,指导连云港市按照国家相关方案和规范要求,开展现场调查、实验室诊断和应急处置工作。经江苏省动物疫病预防控制中心初诊,国家禽流感参考实验室确诊,诊断为H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情。同时,指导当地政府划定疫点、疫区和受威胁区,封锁相关区域,开展应急监测、紧急流行病学调查、全面消毒等应急处置工作。经果断处置,疫情得到了有效控制,未造成扩散和蔓延。本次疫情提示：野禽疫情的早期发现和及时控制对于降低疫情扩散风险至关重要;林业和农业农村部门的沟通协作要继续加强,日常的禽流感监测力度需要进一步加大,家禽的禽流感疫苗免疫要更加科学,群众的禽流感防控意识要持续提高。     

辽宁省一起野禽H5N6高致病性禽流感疫情的紧急流行病学调查

2021年4月6日,辽宁省沈阳市和平区长白岛森林公园内饲养的10只黑天鹅和1只大雁死亡,袭击率为3.8%(11/291)。经现场调查和临床剖检诊断,市级和省级疫病控制中心实验室检测,诊断为疑似H5亚型高致病性禽流感。随后,经国家禽流感参考实验室确诊为H5N6亚型高致病性禽流感。4月12日,农业农村部公布了该起疫情。在接到疫情报告后,辽宁省农业农村厅立即组织紧急流行病学调查组,采用现地察看、座谈、问卷调查、实验室检测等方式,对疫情发生情况进行调查,追溯疫情来源,追踪疫情扩散风险,并提出针对性防控措施。经综合判定,疫情由迁徙候鸟带毒传入引发的可能性较大;未开展禽流感免疫接种,未建立起有效的免疫保护屏障,是此次疫情发生的内因。经科学处置,疫情被扑灭,扩散风险低。疫情启示,扎实做好公园、动物园等观赏野禽饲养相关场所的禽流感强制免疫工作,切实筑牢野禽及家禽禽流感免疫保护屏障,对降低禽流感疫情发生风险具有重要意义。     

近期全球H5N8亚型禽流感疫情分析

近期H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情相继在欧洲、亚洲和大洋洲部分地区的14个国家暴发。其中,欧洲疫情呈现出传播迅速、野禽传染家禽的特点。分析发现,此次流行的H5N8亚型禽流感病毒属于第2.3.4.4分支,与2014—2015年在全球流行的H5N8病毒属于同一个分支,但病毒已发生了较大变异;此次在欧洲开始暴发的H5N8疫情主要由野生鸟类引起,候鸟在此次禽流感病毒环球传播中起主要作用。伴随着候鸟迁徙和周边国家的疫情形势,我国家禽发生禽流感疫情的风险较大,提示应做好疫苗的免疫工作,加大对家禽和野鸟的监测力度,提高养殖场的生物安全防护水平。     

辽宁省锦州市动物园一起孔雀H7N9流感疫情的紧急流行病学调查

2019年3月18日,辽宁省锦州市动物园报告其饲养的孔雀接连两天出现急性发病死亡。经专家组现场临床诊断,市级、省级兽医实验室检测,诊断为疑似H7N9流感疫情;经国家禽流感参考实验室进行鸡胚接种分离病毒、亚型鉴定和基因测序分析,确诊为高致病性H7N9流感疫情。为追溯疫情的可能来源、分析疫情的扩散风险,继而提出针对性的防控建议,采用现场勘察、访谈、问卷调查等形式,结合实验室检测,对该起疫情进行了紧急流行病学调查。调查发现:该起疫情袭击率为4.5%(9/200),由迁徙候鸟带毒引入可能性较大;未及时开展免疫,导致抗体水平不达标是引起疫情暴发的内在因素。经过科学处置,疫情未发生扩散。本起疫情提示,必须扎实做好禽流感免疫相关工作,高度重视家禽饲养场以及其他场所观赏鸟类的免疫,确保筑牢免疫屏障,以降低疫情发生风险。     

山西省平陆县野生大天鹅H5N8高致病性禽流感疫情紧急流行病学调查

2020年11月,山西省平陆县三湾大天鹅景区发现2只野生大天鹅不明原因死亡,经山西省动物疫病预防控制中心初诊,国家禽流感参考实验室确诊,诊断为H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情.为查明疫情起因,摸清疫情情况,按照国家相关技术规范,组织相关部门开展了紧急流行病学调查和疫情处置工作,查找疫情的可能来源和扩散路径,研判疫情扩散风...     

2021国内第一起！山东东营发生H_5N_8禽流感疫情

正近日,农业农村部新闻办公室发布,山东省东营市黄河三角洲自然保护区发生野生天鹅H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情。这也是2021年来,我国发生的第一起禽流感疫情。2021年1月19日,农业农村部接到中国动物疫病预防控制中心报告,经国家禽流感参考实验室确诊,     

邵阳市一起H5N1禽流感疫情后的紧急流行病学调查和疾病风险评估

2020年1月邵阳市双清区发生了一起H5N1亚型高致病性禽流感疫情,为进一步加强邵阳市H5N1亚型禽流感防控工作,全面强化疫情排查和掌握免疫抗体水平监测,科学评估禽流感疫病发生风险和流行趋势,针对全市开展了H5N1亚型禽流感紧急流行病学调查和免疫抗体监测。     

西藏拉萨市发生一起高致病性禽流感疫情

记者从农业部新闻办公室获悉．西藏拉萨市堆龙德庆县乃琼镇色玛村2月6日发生的疑似禽流感疫情．2月17日经国家禽流感参考实验室确诊为H5N1亚型高致病性禽流感疫情。此次疫情共死亡家禽132只．扑杀家禽7698只。目前．疫情已得到有效控制。疫情发生后．农业部和西藏自治区人民政府按照有关应急预案要求．及时组织开展各项疫情应急处置工作。     

疫情

正台湾发生2起H5N8和1起H5N2亚型高致病性禽流感疫情5月5日,台湾"农委会"通报,台南市归仁区发生2起H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情,109只家禽死亡;关庙区发生1起H5N2亚型高致病性禽流感疫情,3 583只家禽死亡。自2015年1月以来,台湾在台南市等10个地区发生308起H5N8亚型高致病性禽流感疫情,在屏东县等13个地区发生560起H5N2亚型高致病性禽流感疫情。     

Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1 in Mute swans in the Czech Republic

In order to determine the actual prevalence of avian influenza viruses (AIV) in wild birds in the Czech Republic extensive surveillance was carried out between January and April 2006. A total of 2101 samples representing 61 bird species were examined for the presence of influenza A by using PCR, sequencing and cultivation on chicken embryos. AIV subtype H5N1 was detected in 12 Mute swans (Cygnus olor). The viruses were determined as HPAI (highly pathogenic avian influenza) and the hemagglutinin sequence was closely similar to A/mallard/Italy/835/06 and A/turkey/Turkey/1194/05. Following the first H5N1 case, about 300 wild birds representing 33 species were collected from the outbreak region and tested for the presence of AIV without any positive result. This is the first report of highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 in the Czech Republic. The potential role of swan as an effective vector of avian influenza virus is also discussed.     

Molecular characterization of H5N2 avian influenza viruses isolated from South African ostriches in 2006

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N2 reemerged in ostriches in South Africa during 2006, and a low-pathogenic AI H5N2 virus was also isolated. Molecular and phylogenetic characterization was performed to determine whether the outbreak strains were genetically derived from the supposedly eradicated Eastern Cape ostrich outbreak HPAI H5N2 strain of 2004. It was demonstrated that although the 2004 and 2006 South African H5N2 strains shared a common ancestor, the two outbreaks were not related. Not only were extensive reassortments with wild bird viruses involved in the evolution of the 2006 strains, but the precursor HA molecule HA0 cleavage site sequence of the 2006 HPAI H5N2 virus also contained fewer basic amino-acid insertions. Multiple transmission events occurred from wild birds to ostriches in 2006, and it appears that a reservoir of H5N2 with pathogenic potential for poultry is established in the South African wild duck population.     

Investigation of H7N2 avian influenza outbreaks in two broiler breeder flocks in Pennsylvania, 2001-02

An avian influenza (AI) outbreak occurred in meat-type chickens in central Pennsylvania from December 2001 to January 2002. Two broiler breeder flocks were initially infected almost simultaneously in early December. Avian influenza virus (AIV), H7N2 subtype, was isolated from the two premises in our laboratory. The H7N2 isolates were characterized as a low pathogenic strain at the National Veterinary Services Laboratories based on molecular sequencing of the virus hemagglutinin cleavage site and virus challenge studies in specific-pathogen-free leghorn chickens. However, clinical observations and pathologic findings indicated that this H7N2 virus appeared to be significantly pathogenic in meat-type chickens under field conditions. Follow-up investigation indicated that this H7N2 virus spread rapidly within each flock. Within 7 days of the recognized start of the outbreak, over 90% seroconversion was observed in the birds by the hemagglutination inhibition test. A diagnosis of AI was made within 24 hr of bird submission during this outbreak using a combination of virus detection by a same-day dot-enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay and virus isolation in embryonating chicken eggs. Follow-up investigation revealed that heavy virus shedding (90%-100% of birds shedding AIV) occurred between 4 and 7 days after disease onset, and a few birds (15%) continued to shed virus at 13 days post-disease onset, as detected by virus isolation on tracheal and cloacal swabs. AIV was not detected in or on eggs laid by the breeders during the testing phase of the outbreak. The two flocks were depopulated at 14 days after disease onset, and AIV was not detected on the two premises 23 days after depopulation.     

全球高致病性禽流感风险评估

H5N1高致病性禽流感暴发的风险管理需要对不同的风险因素进行综合评估,这些因素影响不同地理区域传染病的传播和持续时间。禽流感灾害风险评估的关键是制定风险路径,然后用它来发展一种定性或定量的风险评估模型。本文建立在风险分析模型框架基础之上,利用FAO、WHO以及OIE等国际组织和有关国家政府可公开获得的数据和信息,利用ArcGIS对H5N1高致病性禽流感进行风险评估,并对野生鸟类和家禽贸易在H5N1高致病性禽流感传播中的重要性进行分析。     

Experimental infection and pathology of clade 2.2 H5N1 virus in gulls

During 2006, H5N1 HPAI caused an epizootic in wild birds, resulting in a die-off of Laridae in the Novosibirsk region at Chany Lake. In the present study, we infected common gulls (Larus canus) with a high dose of the H5N1 HPAI virus isolated from a common gull to determine if severe disease could be induced over the 28 day experimental period. Moderate clinical signs including diarrhea, conjunctivitis, respiratory distress and neurological signs were observed in virus-inoculated birds, and 50% died. The most common microscopic lesions observed were necrosis of the pancreas, mild encephalitis, mild myocarditis, liver parenchymal hemorrhages, lymphocytic hepatitis, parabronchi lumen hemorrhages and interstitial pneumonia. High viral titers were shed from the oropharyngeal route and virus was still detected in one bird at 25 days after infection. In the cloaca, the virus was detected sporadically in lower titers. The virus was transmitted to direct contact gulls. Thus, infected gulls can pose a significant risk of H5N1 HPAIV transmission to other wild migratory waterfowl and pose a risk to more susceptible poultry species. These findings have important implications regarding the mode of transmission and potential risks of H5N1 HPAI spread by gulls.     

"Constanze": a trinational project on avian influenza in wild birds at Lake Constance

When highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) arrived at Lake Constance in February 2006, little was known about its ecology and epidemiology in wild birds. In order to prevent virus transmission from wild birds to poultry, the adjacent countries initiated the tri-national, interdisciplinary research program ?Constanze? to investigate avian influenza infections in water birds at Lake Constance. In collaboration with government agencies scientists examined the prevalence of AI virus in the region of Lake Constance for a period of 33 months, compared the effectiveness of different surveillance methods and analysed the migration behaviour of water birds. Although virus introduction from regions as far as the Ural Mountains seemed possible based on the migration behaviour of certain species, no influenza A viruses of the highly pathogenic subtype H5N1 (HPAIV) was found. However, influenza A viruses of different low pathogenic subtypes were isolated in 2.2 % of the sampled birds (swabs). Of the different surveillance methods utilised in the program the sampling of so called sentinel birds was particularly efficient.     

Virological and molecular epidemiological investigations into the role of wild birds in the epidemiology of influenza A/H5N1 in central Thailand

A serological and virological surveillance program to investigate the HPAI H5N1 virus in wild bird populations was undertaken from February 2007 to October 2008. The purpose of the survey was to investigate the infection status in free ranging wild birds in Banglane district, Nakhon Pathom province, central Thailand. Samples from wild birds were collected every two months. Choanal and cloacal swabs, serum and tissue samples were collected from 421 birds comprising 44 species. Sero-prevalence of the virus tested by H5N1 serum neutralization test (using a H5N1 virus clade 1; A/chicken/Thailand/vsmu-3-BKK/2004) was 2.1% (8 out of 385 samples; 95% CI 0.7, 3.5). Species that were antibody positive included rock pigeons (Columba livia), Asian pied starling (Gracupica contra), spotted dove (Streptopelia chinensis), oriental magpie robin (Copsychus saularis), blue-tailed bee-eater (Merops philippinus), myna (Acridotheres spp.), and pond heron (Ardeola spp.). Prevalence by H5N1 virus isolation was 0.5% (2 out of 421 samples; 95% CI 0.0, 1.1); the two H5N1 virus-positive samples were from Asian pied starling (Gracupica contra) and white vented myna (Acridotheres grandis). Positive virological samples were collected in June 2007 while all positive serology samples were collected between May and August except for one sample collected in December 2007. No positive samples were collected in 2008. Molecular studies revealed that the wild bird H5N1 viruses were closely related to poultry viruses isolated in other parts of Thailand. However, there was no poultry H5N1 prevalence study performed in the study site during the time of this wild bird survey. Interpretation of source of virus isolates would include spill-over of H5N1 viruses from contaminated sources due to movement of domestic poultry and/or fomites from other areas; or infection of wild birds within the outbreak locations and then translocation by wild bird movement and interaction with wild birds inhabiting distant locations.     

Legislation for the control of avian influenza in the European union

In the light of experience gained with avian influenza (AI) outbreaks in Europe and elsewhere in the world, the European Union (EU) legislation has recently been updated. The strategy to control the introduction and spread of AI relies on rapid disease detection, killing of infected birds, movement restrictions for live birds and their products, cleaning and disinfection and vaccination. Measures are not only to be implemented in case of outbreaks of highly pathogenic AI (HPAI), but are now also directed against occurrence of low pathogenic AI of H5 and H7 (LPAI) subtypes in poultry, albeit in a modified manner proportionate to the risk posed by these pathotypes. Enhanced surveillance in poultry holdings and wild birds, as well as preventive vaccination, has also been introduced. EU Measures are flexible and largely based on risk assessment of the local epidemiological situation. The occurrence of HPAI H5N1 of the Asian lineage in the EU and its unprecedented spread by wild migratory birds necessitated the adoption of additional control measures. Although HPAI H5N1 has affected wild birds and poultry holdings in several EU Member States, EU legislation and its implementation in Member States has so far successfully limited the impact of the disease on animal and human health.     

Highly pathogenic or low pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H7N1 infection in chicken lungs: small differences in general acute responses

ABSTRACT: Avian influenza virus can be divided into two groups, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAI) and low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAI) based on their difference in virulence. To investigate if the difference in clinical outcome between LPAI and HPAI in chickens is due to immunological host responses in the lung within the first 24 hours post infection (hpi), chickens were infected with LPAI or HPAI of subtype H7N1. Virus was found in the caudal and cranial part of the lung. With LPAI, virus was localised around the intrapulmonary bronchus and secondary bronchi. In sharp contrast, HPAI was detected throughout the whole lung. However, based on viral RNA levels, no quantitative difference was observed between LPAI and HPAI infected birds. In infected areas of the lungs, an influx of CD8α+ cells as well as KUL01+ macrophages and dendritic cells (DC) occurred as fast as 8 hpi in both infected groups. No major difference between LPAI and HPAI infected birds in the induction of cytokines and interferons at mRNA level in lung tissue was found.In conclusion, the differences in lethality for chickens infected with LPAI or HPAI could be ascribed to difference in location of the virus. However similar amounts of viral RNA, similar cytokine mRNA levels, and similar influxes of CD8α+ and KUL01+ macrophages and DC were found between HPAI and LPAI in the lungs. A cytokine storm at mRNA level as described for mammals was not observed in the lungs of HPAI infected birds within 24 hpi.