Public perceptions of the transmission of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 from pigs and pork products in Australia

A cross-sectional study was conducted at the height of the pandemic influenza H1N1/09 outbreak in Australia in 2009. The objectives of the study were to evaluate public perceptions about transmission and prevention of the disease, to understand their concerns and preparedness to cope with the disease, and to investigate drivers influencing their behaviour. A questionnaire was designed and administered to 510 customers visiting 15 butcher shops in the Greater Sydney region between 26th June and 2nd August 2009. Data were analysed to estimate the proportion of people with certain perceptions and to evaluate the influence of these perceptions on two binary outcome variables: (1) whether or not people believed that avoiding pork would protect them from contracting H1N1/09, and (2) whether or not they actually made some changes to pork consumption after the outbreak. A majority of the respondents had perceptions based on fact about transmission and prevention of H1N1/09. As many as 96.8% of the respondents believed that washing their hands frequently was likely to protect them from contracting H1N1/09. Similarly, most believed that they could contract H1N1/09 by travelling on public transport with a sick person present (94.1%), by shaking hands with a sick person (89.2%), or by attending a community gathering (73.7%). Women were more likely than men to have factual perceptions about protective behaviours. Misconceptions regarding transmission of the disease were evident, with 21.7% believing that avoiding eating pork could protect them against H1N1/09, 11.1% believing that they could contract H1N1/09 by drinking tap water, 22.8% by handling uncooked pork meat and 15.6% by eating cooked pork. Approximately one third of respondents believed that working in a pig farm or an abattoir increased their likelihood of contracting H1N1/09 (36.9% and 32.3%, respectively). Younger people (<35 years old) were more likely to have these misconceptions than older people. Reduction in consumption of pork, ham or bacon was significantly associated with misconceptions regarding the risk of contracting H1N1/09 from eating pig meat products. It is recommended that in the event of a future disease emergency, communication activities providing factual information and targeting younger people should be used.     

A survey on biosecurity and management practices in Belgian pig herds

We surveyed Belgian pig herds to describe their biosecurity status and management practices. Our written questionnaire was sent to a stratified random sample of 609 pig farms. We achieved a 71.6% response, and 421/609 farmers (69.1%) returned questionnaires suitable for analysis. We used multiple-correspondence analysis followed by a two-step clustering procedure. Herd size, herd type and occupation (commercial or hobby herd) were used to describe different groups. We differentiated four biosecurity groups, which we interpreted as indicating low- to high-biosecurity status. Although we felt that most farms had acceptable biosecurity, few used measures such as showering (2.1%) and quarantine periods for people entering the premises (7.1%). We also found three management-practices clusters, although their interpretation was not straightforward. Despite the industrialised character of pig production in Belgium, 9.4% of pig herds were small, hobby herds that reported different biosecurity and management characteristics (such as the equipping pigs on pasture and feeding kitchen waste).     

Biosecurity practices in western Canadian cow-calf herds and their association with animal health

Biosecurity practices of beef cow-calf herds in western Canada have not been studied extensively nor is there a good understanding of their association with herd health. A survey was sent to 103 cow-calf producers of the Western Canadian Cow-Calf Surveillance Network. Eighty completed questionnaires were returned. Bulls were purchased for all herds during the 2014 to 2017 study period; 54% of herds purchased heifers and 42% purchased cows. The use of standard biosecurity practices was generally low with 30% of producers keeping purchased animals separate and 30% vaccinating new additions. None of the evaluated biosecurity practices were associated with reporting Johne’s disease. The purchase of > 10 bulls, the purchase of cows, not vaccinating animals bought into the herd, and use of community pasture were associated with a bovine respiratory disease outbreak. Outbreaks of calf diarrhea were associated with the purchase of 10 or more bulls, the use of a community pasture, and leasing or sharing bulls.     

Use of stakeholder analysis to inform risk communication and extension strategies for improved biosecurity amongst small-scale pig producers

Extension and communication needs amongst small-scale pig producers, described as pig producers with less than 100 sows, have been previously identified. These producers, who are believed to pose a biosecurity risk to commercial livestock industries, are characterized by a lack of formal networks, mistrust of authorities, poor disease reporting behaviour and motivational diversity, and reliance on other producers, veterinarians and family for pig health and production advice. This paper applies stakeholder identification and analysis tools to determine stakeholders' influence and interest on pig producers' practices. Findings can inform a risk communication process and the development of an extension framework to increase producers' engagement with industry and their compliance with biosecurity standards and legislation in Australia. The process included identification of stakeholders, their issues of concerns regarding small-scale pig producers and biosecurity and their influence and interest in each of these issues. This exercise identified the capacity of different stakeholders to influence the outcomes for each issue and assessed their success or failure to do so. The disconnection identified between the level of interest and influence suggests that government and industry need to work with the small-scale pig producers and with those who have the capacity to influence them. Successful biosecurity risk management will depend on shared responsibility and building trust amongst stakeholders. Flow-on effects may include legitimating the importance of reporting and compliance systems and the co-management of risk. Compliance of small-scale pig producers with biosecurity industry standards and legislation will reduce the risks of entry and spread of exotic diseases in Australia.     

Use of herd information for predicting Salmonella status in pig herds

Salmonella surveillance-and-control programs in pigs are highly resource demanding, so alternative cost-effective approaches are desirable. The aim of this study was to develop and evaluate a tool for predicting the Salmonella test status in pig herds based on herd information collected from 108 industrial farrow-to-finish pig herds in Portugal. A questionnaire including known risk factors for Salmonella was used. A factor analysis model was developed to identify relevant factors that were then tested for association with Salmonella status. Three factors were identified and labelled: general biosecurity (factor 1), herd size (factor 2) and sanitary gap implementation (factor 3). Based on the loadings in factor 1 and factor 3, herds were classified according to their biosecurity practices. In total, 59% of the herds had a good level of biosecurity (interpreted as a loading below zero in factor 1) and 37% of the farms had good biosecurity and implemented sanitary gap (loading below zero in factor 1 and loading above zero in factor 3). This implied that they, among other things, implemented preventive measures for visitors and workers entering the herd, controlled biological vectors, had hygiene procedures in place, water quality assessment, and sanitary gap in the fattening and growing sections. In total, 50 herds were tested for Salmonella. Logistic regression analysis showed that factor 1 was significantly associated with Salmonella test status (P = 0.04). Herds with poor biosecurity had a higher probability of testing Salmonella positive compared with herds with good biosecurity. This study shows the potential for using herd information to classify herds according to their Salmonella status in the absence of good testing options. The method might be used as a potentially cost-effective tool for future development of risk-based approaches to surveillance, targeting interventions to high-risk herds or differentiating sampling strategies in herds with different levels of infection.     

Knowledge and attitudes of Australian livestock producers concerning biosecurity practices

Biosecurity risks are a major threat to the profitability of the industry as well as impacting human and animal health. Livestock producers play a crucial role in biosecurity as the first to notice changes in the health or productivity of their stock and are generally responsible for implementing protective measures. However, uptake of biosecurity measures by producers is variable. We critically appraised the current literature regarding biosecurity practices in Australian livestock industries and highlight aspects that are well understood as well as those where further research or information is needed. Findings from 12 cross-sectional studies suggest that Australian producers' knowledge of biosecurity methods and importance might have a positive influence on their willingness to implement or incorporate biosecurity practices. There is moderate evidence supportive of biosecurity being well understood by livestock producers across Australia. Barriers to producers using biosecurity practices included lack of information or communication from agricultural, veterinary or government organisations. It was found that larger stock numbers were positively correlated with biosecurity implementation and that producers used veterinarians, government and industry agencies as resources for trusted information.     

Herd health status and management practices on 16 Irish suckler beef farms

Background

There have been few studies published internationally which document herd health management practices in suckler beef herds and no published Irish studies. The study objective was to document herd health status and management practices on sixteen Irish suckler beef herds over a two year period (2009–2010). The farms used in the study were part of the Teagasc BETTER farm beef programme. The mean (s.d.) herd size, stocking rate and farm size was 68 cows (27.6), 2.0 LU/ha (0.3) and 64.3 (21.6) adjusted hectares, respectively. Two questionnaires were designed; 1) a farmer questionnaire to collect information on farm background and current herd health control practices and 2) a veterinary questionnaire to collect information on the extent of animal health advice given by veterinarians to their clients and identification of any on-farm herd health issues.

Results

Dystocia, calf pneumonia, and calf diarrhoea, in that order, were identified as the primary herd health issues in these Irish suckler beef herds. In addition, substantial deficiencies in biosecurity practices were also identified on these farms.

Conclusions

The findings of this study may serve as the focus for future research in animal health management practices in Irish suckler beef herds.     

Descriptive clinical and epidemiological characteristics of influenza A H1N1 2009 virus infections in pigs in England

Infection of pigs with influenza A H1N1 2009 virus (A(H1N1)pdm09) was first detected in England in November 2009 following global spread of the virus in the human population. This paper describes clinical and epidemiological findings in the first English pig farms in which A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza virus was detected. These farms showed differences in disease presentation, spread and duration of infection. The factors likely to influence these features are described and relate to whether pigs were housed or outdoors, the age of the pigs, inter-current disease and the management system of the unit. Infection could be mild or clinically inapparent in breeding pigs with more typical respiratory disease being identified later in their progeny. Mortality was low where disease was uncomplicated by environmental stresses or concurrent infections. Where deaths occurred in pigs infected with A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza, they were mainly due to other infections, including streptococcal disease due to Streptococcus suis infection. This paper demonstrates the ease with which A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was transmitted horizontally and maintained in a pig population.     

Swine fever: classical swine fever and African swine fever.

Because of the clinical and pathologic similarity to common endemic diseases, introduction of CSFV or ASFV strains of moderate to low virulence represents the greatest risk to North American swine herds. Producers, veterinarians, and diagnosticians should increase their awareness of these devastating diseases and request specific diagnostic testing whenever they are suspected. Production practices that improve biosecurity will reduce the risk of introduction of CSF and ASF and limit the spread if an incursion occurs. Additional resources. The following Web sites contain excellent color photographs that will assist producers and practitioners in identifying clinical signs and gross lesions associated with CSFV and ASFV: http://www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/gray_book/FAD and http://www.pighealth.com. The latter Web site and the OIE Web site (http://www.oie.int) offer updated information on current worldwide epizootics of ASF and CSF and other swine diseases. Details of biosecurity procedures can be found at http://www.agebb.missouri.edu; see publication G2340.     

Prevalence of influenza viruses A-H1N1 and A-H3N2 in swine in The Netherlands

In the period December 1979-May 1980 a respiratory disease spread rapidly through pig herds in The Netherlands. Surveillance of 12 pig farms resulted in isolation of 22 influenza A-Swine-H1N1 (Hsw1N1) strains from 9 pig herds. The morbidity rate was high but the mortality rate was nil. Retardation in growth was observed. Sera collected from affected pig herds showed a fourfold increase in haemagglutination inhibition (HI) titre against A-Swine-H1N1 virus. Sera collected on five farms showed a geometric mean HI titre against the A-H3N2 virus above 100. A significant HI titre increase against this virus was found in sera collected on three farms. These findings indicated a recent infection by this virus. A-H3N2 virus was not isolated. The Dutch Swine-1980 isolates showed in the cross-HI test a distant antigenic relationship with the classical A/Swine/Iowa/30 (H1N1) virus and one-sided close antigenic relationship with A/New Jersey/76 (H1N1) virus.HI antibody to A/Swine/Nederland/80 (H1N1) virus was found in 4, 0, and 44%, to A/New Jersey/76 (H1N1) virus in 0.5, 0.4, and 42%, and to A/Swine/Iowa/30 (H1N1) virus in 0.5, 1, and 30% of pig sera collected in 1976, 1977, and 1980, respectively. HI antibody to A/Hong Kong/68 (H3N2) virus was detected in 36, 56, and 68%, and to A/Victoria/75 (H3N2) virus in 38, 73, and 68% of these sera, respectively.The results of this study indicate that pigs in The Netherlands, like those in North America, Southeast Asia, Japan, and Western Europe harbour A-Swine-H1N1 and A-H3N2 influenza viruses and are thus potential reservoirs for future human pandemics.     

Outbreaks of classical swine influenza in pigs in England in 1986

Serum samples from pig herds in Great Britain have been examined for antibodies to influenza virus since 1968. Antibodies to H3N2 virus strains have been found since 1968 and the serological data presented here suggests that H3N2 virus strains continue to persist in the pig population. An outbreak of acute respiratory disease occurred in a 400-sow unit. The outbreak was characterised by coughing, anorexia, fever, inappetence and loss of condition. The gilts and weaners were affected and the morbidity approached 100 per cent. An influenza A virus designated A/Swine/Weybridge/117316/86 (H1N1) was isolated from the herd and 28 paired serum samples from the affected animals showed increases in the haemagglutination inhibition titres to this isolate. Haemagglutinin and neuraminidase characterisation indicated that the virus is similar to H1N1 viruses isolated recently from pigs in Europe. A total of 91 herds experiencing respiratory disease were investigated, of which 42 gave positive reactions in the haemagglutination inhibition test. Antibodies to A/Port Chalmers/1/73 (H3N2) were also detected in some of the herds but it is not known whether this strain plays any role in the current respiratory disease problems in pigs.     

Surveyed attitudes, perceptions and practices in Norway regarding the use of local anaesthesia in piglet castration

The last two years piglet castration in Norway has been performed by veterinarians and with the use of anaesthesia. In order to evaluate this new policy, veterinarians and pig producers were asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding their experiences with the new castration practices. The answers showed that the piglets were most often castrated using a combination of subcutaneous and intratesticular administration of lidocaine with adrenaline at an average age of 10 days. The effect of the anaesthesia was regarded as good by 54% of the veterinarians and 19% of the producers. Post-operative complications were rare. The overall evaluation showed that two-thirds of the veterinarians, but only one-third of the pig producers were satisfied or very satisfied with the implemented policy. However, while two-thirds of the pig producer had a negative attitude to the policy before it was implemented, only one-third were dissatisfied after two years experience.     

An assessment of external biosecurity on southern Ontario swine farms and its application to surveillance on a geographic level

Risk-based surveillance is becoming increasingly important in the veterinary and public health fields. It serves as a means of increasing surveillance sensitivity and improving cost-effectiveness in an increasingly resource-limited environment. Our approach for developing a tool for the risk-based geographical surveillance of contagious diseases of swine incorporates information about animal density and external biosecurity practices within swine herds in southern Ontario. The objectives of this study were to group the sample of herds into discrete biosecurity groups, to develop a map of southern Ontario that can be used as a tool in the risk-based geographical surveillance of contagious swine diseases, and to identify significant predictors of biosecurity group membership. A subset of external biosecurity variables was selected for 2-step cluster analysis and latent class analysis (LCA). It was determined that 4 was the best number of groups to describe the data, using both analytical approaches. The authors named these groups: i) high biosecurity herds that were open with respect to replacement animals; ii) high biosecurity herds that were closed with respect to replacement animals; iii) moderate biosecurity herds; and iv) low biosecurity herds. The risk map was developed using information about the geographic distribution of herds in the biosecurity groups, as well as the density of swine sites and of grower-finisher pigs in the study region. Finally, multinomial logistic regression identified heat production units (HPUs), number of incoming pig shipments per month, and herd type as significant predictors of biosecurity group membership. It was concluded that the ability to identify areas of high and low risk for disease may improve the success of surveillance and eradication projects.     

Characterization of influenza a outbreaks in Minnesota swine herds and measures taken to reduce the risk of zoonotic transmission

Influenza A virus infections commonly cause respiratory disease in swine and can be transmitted between people and pigs, with potentially novel strains introduced into herds and spilling back into the human population. The goals of this study were to characterize influenza infections in Minnesota pigs and assess biosecurity measures used by swine workers. Veterinarians submitting influenza-positive swine samples to the University of Minnesota Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory between October 2007 and April 2009 were surveyed regarding disease-related information and biosecurity procedures at each farm. Influenza-positive samples were submitted year-round, peaking in spring and fall. H1N1 was the most commonly detected subtype (56%), followed by H3N2 (14%) and H1N2 (12%). Most positive submissions were associated with illness in growing pigs (median age 8.8 weeks, IQR 5-15). Median morbidity and mortality were 25% (IQR 10-48) and 2% (IQR 0.5-3.5), respectively. Vaccination of sows and growing pigs was conducted at 71% and 7.9% of the swine farms, respectively. Specialized footwear was reported as the most common form of protective equipment used by workers. Employee vaccination for seasonal influenza was 19%. The sow vaccination rate in this study is consistent with national data, although growing pig vaccination is lower than the national average. Seasonal and age trends identified here may provide diagnostic guidance when growing pigs experience respiratory disease. Inconsistent use of protective equipment and employee vaccination at swine farms indicates the need for further discussion and research of approaches to minimize interspecies influenza transmission on swine farms.     

Biosecurity in 116 Danish fattening swineherds: descriptive results and factor analysis

Biosecurity measures are important for the herd's protection against diseases and also to provide nationwide protection against the introduction of exotic diseases. In this paper, we describe the farmers’ choices and routines regarding biosecurity in Danish fattening herds.

Overall, 116 Danish swine fattening herds in three areas of different pig density were interviewed.

Of these herds, 78% purchased weaners from one sow herd only, whereas 10% purchased from >5 sow herds during 1 year. Large herds (>500 finishers) purchased weaners more often than smaller herds (≤500 finishers). Only two swine producers purchased weaners from a market. Almost all herds (95%) received weaners from one sow herd at one time, and only one herd received from >5 sow herds in one batch. Twenty-one percent did not use an effective barrier between the loading area and the stables when delivering pigs for slaughter. Entry rooms (in which clothing and boots are changed) were common at the farm, and the numbers of visitors were generally low (<10 visitors a year).

Factor analysis was performed to find underlying structures of the biosecurity measures in the herd; four factors were chosen (eigenvalue > 3.10). A site scoring high on factor 1 was a large SPF herd, which received weaners from a single source, had biosecurity requirements for the transport vehicles, and had a high level of biosecurity for visitors. A site scoring high on factor 2 was a multi-site farm, which had personnel working on more than one of the sites, only received weaners from one sow herd, had delivering herds placed close to the participating site, and transported animals themselves. A site scoring high on factor 3 was a site which hired commercial transport for slaughter, was situated far from the abattoir and had a high level of biosecurity when loading pigs. A production site scoring high on factor 4 was a large site, which used all-in/all-out management, washed and disinfected between each group, and purchased many weaners.     

The 2009 pandemic (H1N1) viruses isolated from pigs show enhanced pathogenicity in mice

Since the emergence of the 2009 pandemic (H1N1) virus (2009/H1N1) in April 2009, cases of transmission from humans to pigs have been reported frequently. In our previous studies, four 2009/H1N1 variants were isolated from pigs. To better understand the phenotypic differences of the pig isolates compared with the human isolate, in this study mice were inoculated intranasally with different 2009/H1N1 viruses, and monitored for morbidity, mortality, and viral replication, cytokine production and pathological changes in the lungs. The results show that all isolates show effective replication in lungs, but varying in their ability to cause morbidity. In particular, the strains of A/swine/Nanchang/3/2010 (H1N1) and A/swine/Nanchang/F9/2010 (H1N1) show the greatest virulence with a persisting replication in lungs and high lethality for mice, compared with the human isolate A/Liaoning /14/2009 (H1N1), which shows low virulence in mice. Furthermore, the lethal strains could induce more severe lung pathological changes and higher production of cytokines than that of other strains at an early stage. Amino acid sequence analysis illustrates prominent differences in viral surface glycoproteins and polymerase subunits between pig isolates and human strains that might correlate with their phenotypic differences. These studies demonstrate that the 2009/H1N1 pig isolates exhibit heterogeneous infectivity and pathogencity in mice, and some strains possess an enhanced pathogenicity compared with the human isolate.     

Efficacy of a pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus vaccine in pigs against the pandemic influenza virus is superior to commercially available swine influenza vaccines

In April 2009 a new influenza A/H1N1 strain, currently named "pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009" (H1N1v), started the first official pandemic in humans since 1968. Several incursions of this virus in pig herds have also been reported from all over the world. Vaccination of pigs may be an option to reduce exposure of human contacts with infected pigs, thereby preventing cross-species transfer, but also to protect pigs themselves, should this virus cause damage in the pig population. Three swine influenza vaccines, two of them commercially available and one experimental, were therefore tested and compared for their efficacy against an H1N1v challenge. One of the commercial vaccines is based on an American classical H1N1 influenza strain, the other is based on a European avian H1N1 influenza strain. The experimental vaccine is based on reassortant virus NYMC X179A (containing the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes of A/California/7/2009 (H1N1v) and the internal genes of A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (H1N1)). Excretion of infectious virus was reduced by 0.5-3 log(10) by the commercial vaccines, depending on vaccine and sample type. Both vaccines were able to reduce virus replication especially in the lower respiratory tract, with less pathological lesions in vaccinated and subsequently challenged pigs than in unvaccinated controls. In pigs vaccinated with the experimental vaccine, excretion levels of infectious virus in nasal and oropharyngeal swabs, were at or below 1 log(10)TCID(50) per swab and lasted for only 1 or 2 days. An inactivated vaccine containing the HA and NA of an H1N1v is able to protect pigs from an infection with H1N1v, whereas swine influenza vaccines that are currently available are of limited efficaciousness. Whether vaccination of pigs against H1N1v will become opportune remains to be seen and will depend on future evolution of this strain in the pig population. Close monitoring of the pig population, focussing on presence and evolution of influenza strains on a cross-border level would therefore be advisable.     

Investigation of exposure to swine influenza viruses in Ontario (Canada) finisher herds in 2004 and 2005

The epidemiology of influenza in the North American swine population has changed since the emergence of a triple-reassortant H3N2 influenza virus. Although seen previously in North America, the Ontario swine population had likely been free of viruses of the reassortant H3N2 lineage until 2005. The objective of this study was to investigate the frequency and distribution of exposure to H1N1 and H3N2 subtypes in the Ontario finisher pig population prior to and after the H3N2 outbreak that occurred in 2005. This included investigating prevalence and spatial distribution of positive herds, assessing proportion of random variation at different hierarchical levels, and evaluating selected demographic factors and management procedures as potential risk factors. In total, 919 and 978 sera collected in cross-sectional studies from 46 and 49 finisher herds in 2004 and 2005 were tested by a H1N1 subtype-specific and a H3N2 subtype-specific commercial ELISA. For the H1N1 subtype, the point prevalence of positive herds (>3 reactors) was 19.5% and 30.6% in 2004 and 2005, respectively. For the H3N2 subtype the point prevalence of positive herds (>3 reactors) was 6.5% and 40.8% in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Sera from 2004 that were positive on H3N2 ELISA did not cross-react with any of the H3N2 variants used as antigen on a sequential HI test. Only herds positive for H3N2 subtype in 2005 clustered in space (P<0.01). The H1N1 status in 2005 was associated with the H1N1 status in 2004, and with reported distance to the nearest herd. The H3N2 status in 2005 was associated with reported distance to the nearest herd and a type of replacement gilt source. For H3N2, distance seemed to be important even after controlling for type of gilt source. Most variability in seropositivity was between herds with little variability between pens. This study confirms that in 2005, the epidemic H3N2 subtype co-circulated with endemic H1N1 subtype in the Ontario finisher herds. We concluded that in Ontario, the endemic H1N1 subtype was likely maintained through circulation within herds and sites with common flow. Whereas the transmission of epidemic H3N2 subtype was attributed to local spread, which could include different modes of direct, indirect, and airborne transmission. We emphasize the importance of establishing routine monitoring systems that would allow using molecular tools, and maintaining serum banks as a useful resource for retrospective comparisons.