Facing nuclear reality

Nuclear weapons that are safe and secure, reliable, survivable, and effective will be a critical element of this nation's deterrent for the foreseeable future. The existence of these weapons reflects the tension that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear test bans will not reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons or this tension. Imprudent nuclear test bans, however, could impair the viability of this vital element of U.S. security. New, more restrictive test limitations would not enhance our national security. They do not address the two most important issues-namely, major reductions in strategic and conventional forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and a widespread lessening of tension between our two countries. In fact, it is conceivable that the diversion of political attention from arms reduction efforts and the distrust generated by test-ban verification problems could actually increase tensions between the two countries. We believe that more restrictive test limitations or a nuclear test ban should be considered only as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to arms control. We must reduce the numbers of the most destabilizing weapons and the overall size of the strategic arsenals through negotiations. A restrictive test ban may be a proper last step in our quest for nuclear arms control and a stable peace, but it would, in our opinion, be an imprudent first step. Further test limitations will be consistent with increased stability and decreased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union only if they are instituted after major stabilizing reductions are made in the strategic nuclear and conventional forces of both countries.     

A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing

Our foregoing analysis of the role of a comprehensive test ban leads us to the following conclusions. 1) A CTB by itself will have little direct effect on the arms race between the superpowers. It would not hinder their nuclear arms production and deployment nor would it necessarily present a significant obstacle to the development of new nuclear weapons systems, despite limiting the development of new nuclear warhead designs. It can hardly make a dent in the destructive capability of the superpowers or in their ability to step up the pace of the arms race. 2) The chief merits of a CTB reside in the political sphere. It would help promote detente and could help to escalate interest in arms control agreements of broader scope. But in neither of these effects would it be as significant as a successful SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) agreement. The CTB also lingers as a piece of unfinished business since the signing of the LTB in 1963. The question can be and has been raised, "If the superpowers are serious about arms control, why have they not accepted the CTB, which is simple in concept and in form and is also free of serious military risks?" Such doubts about the sincerity of the superpowers' willingness to limit their own arms development will persist as long as there is no CTB. Substantial agreement at SALT would lessen some of this effect too, but would not eliminate it completely. 3) Recent progress in seismic identification has been impressive, and other means of obtaining technical intelligence about nuclear testing have probably also improved greatly. In addition, research on the technical means of on-site inspection has demonstrated its limited effectiveness. Therefore, the role of on-site inspections as an added deterrent to cheating on a CTB has diminished substantially. This is not to say that detection and identification of all nuclear tests is possible now, or ever, but only that on-site inspection would add very little to the other technical means now available for verification. 4) It will become increasingly difficult in the United States to oppose the CTB on the basis of risks that accompany possible Soviet evasion of a treaty that does not include the right of onsite inspection. The opposition to a CTB is now likely to shift to the more direct argument that nuclear testing is important to keep pace with continuing worldwide technical and military developments. The justification for U.S. testing is only in part because of advances in Soviet nuclear technology per se. Those opposing a CTB may argue that it makes little sense, and may even be courting danger, to freeze nuclear technology alone and that banning nuclear tests should await an agreement that copes with all military research and development and all qualitative improvements in weapons systems. This directly confronts the argument that the unique virtue of a CTB is that it provides a simple and feasible first step in the very complicated problems of controlling military technology. 5) The mutual deterrence of the superpowers will not be compromised if a CTB agreement is reached and one side or the other clandestinely violates such an agreement. The state of nuclear technology in both countries is mature, and the destructive capability of their nuclear arsenals can be easily maintained. Whatever small improvements can come as a consequence of clandestine testing would hardly affect the strategic balance. 6) It seems unlikely that China and France will agree to stop testing in the near future. These countries refused to join the nonproliferation treaty, which did not affect their nuclear programs, and it is doubtful that, proceeding from military considerations alone, they would join a CTB. Their nuclear programs are still not mature, and a CTB would freeze their positions of inferiority with respect to the superpowers. There may, however, be wider political and security arrangements to induce them to participate. Cessation of tests by the other nuclear powers might serve as an inducement to China and France to refrain from testing. 7) The key near-nuclear powers, such as Japan, India, and Israel, are much more concerned with the military activities of their neighbors than they are with those of the superpowers. The modest nuclear restraints that a CTB imposes on the superpowers are hardly likely to have a direct impact on the approach of these countries to their own security. However, for these critical near-nuclear countries a CTB may be much more acceptable than the nonproliferation treaty. A CTB would not prohibit the production of fissionable material, the development of nuclear weapons technology short of testing, nor the stockpiling of untested nuclear weapons, and is therefore less restrictive. Consequently, these powers may be willing to ratify a CTB, but not the nonproliferation treaty. On the other hand, the CTB may provide them with a ready excuse for not succumbing to the pressure to ratify the nonproliferation treaty, if indeed they need excuses or would bow to such pressure. 8) A CTB is of very little added, direct significance to other nonnuclear powers who have already ratified or are about to ratify the nonproliferation treaty. It may only lessen their pique about the treaty's being highly discriminatory-the treaty imposes no restraints on the nuclear weapons programs of the nuclear powers, while the CTB restricts all parties to the agreement. 9) Peaceful nuclear explosions do not now show great promise and significance for economic development. What can be done with peaceful explosions can often be done by other means, although possibly at a slightly higher cost. On the other hand, making allowance for peaceful explosions greatly complicates a CTB. A useful approach to the problem of banning military tests but not foregoing indefinitely the use of peaceful explosions might, therefore, be to ban all nuclear explosions for a period of several years and to stipulate in the agreement that in that time there would be negotiations on how peaceful explosions may be controlled in a way that would not jeopardize the CTB.     

An upheaval in u.s. Strategic thought

Early this year, the U.S. land-based force of nuclear missiles became vulnerable to a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union, as the Soviets deployed a large number of highly accurate warheads on their own missiles. They first demonstrated this capability in 1977. Since then, U.S. missile vulnerability has come to assume great importance in superpower relations. Western observers have portrayed the Soviet achievement as a sign of aggression, and made missile vulnerability into a symbol of declining American military strength. The government has proposed a vast military buildup of nuclear weapons, supposedly made necessary by this new threat. But the public is increasingly skeptical, and support for some form of arms control is growing. The first article in this series examines how the United States learned of the Soviet accuracy, and why it caused such great alarm. The next article will examine the Reagan Administration's response to this threat.     

Deep seismic sounding with nuclear explosives in the soviet union

A large geophysical program of exploration that uses deep seismic sounding has been under way in the Soviet Union for decades. Underground nuclear explosives have been used as strong seismic sources since 1971. The wide spacing between these seismic sources-for example, 500 kilometers-has permitted seismic exploration of inaccessible areas in traverses up to 3000 kilometers in length. During the same time an ultra-deep drilling program has also been under way. The data gathered have been used to elucidate details of the crust as well as to describe layering and inhomogeneities in the underlying mantle. By Soviet account, deep seismic sounding has been instrumental in confirming the existence of numerous sedimentary structures containing oil and gas fields in western and eastern Siberia.     

SAVING KYOTO: Can the Kyoto Climate Treaty Be Saved From Itself?

The climate treaty being hammered out this month at The Hague may be doomed to failure, as numerous observers say the United States simply won't ratify any treaty that requires such wrenching reductions in carbon emissions, and if the United States bails out, the protocol is in very deep trouble. Some policy analysts think that by tweaking the rules, the United States could eventually sign on, but if they are tweaked too much, other countries may balk. The key, some say, will be keeping the treaty going now and rethinking its controversial goals later.     

Nuclear Pulse (II): Ensuring Delivery of the Doomsday Signal

Defense strategists today assume that a single Soviet warhead detonated 200 miles above Nebraska would knock out unprotected communications equipment all across the United States. The reason is electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a by-product of high-altitude nuclear explosions that blankets huge tracts of the earth with peak fields of 50,000 volts per meter. The first installment of this three-part series described how EMP was discovered and why its potentially chaos-producing effects were overlooked for more than a decade. The second part examines the ongoing debate in the Pentagon over how to cope with the EMP threat. The third part will discuss questions EMP raises about waging a limited nuclear war.     

桩端下伏溶洞顶板稳定非概率可靠性分析方法

国外对于银行体系宏观压力测试的研究已较为系统，全球金融危机进一步凸显了压力测试对于银行体系宏观审慎监管的重要作用。为加强银行的宏观审慎监管，增强金融稳健性，美国和欧盟相继开展了银行体系的压力测试工作，在压力测试范围、压力情景设置、测试方法等方面积累了一定的经验。对比我国商业银行体系压力测试情况，我国应从加强应用研究、完善银行体系宏观审慎监管数据库、提高压力测试效率和透明度、强化测试结果应用等方面改进压力测试工作。     

Verification and arms control

Verification of arms control agreements has become a matter of widespread interest in the scientific community; the methods used by signatories to ensure compliance and the past record of compliance by the United States and the Soviet Union are being vigorously debated. Science has asked two experts in arms control, Manfred Eimer and Sidney Drell, to respond to questions about the means of verification, the current verifiability of agreements, and the future outlook.     

Japanese research and technology policy

Until recently the Japanese did not spend much on research and what they did spend was concentrated on the commercial development of technology. As a result there have so far been few Japanese breakthroughs in either science or technology. Dramatic changes have recently occurred, however, and Japan now trails only the United States and the Soviet Union in research spending. Beyond this, Japanese policy-makers are making a determined effort to overcome Japan's social and institutional barriers to scientific creativity.     

Physicists find windows of opportunity in plasmas

The 1500 physicists from Europe, the United States, the Pacific Rim, and the former Soviet Union who gathered in Minneapolis from 7 to 11 November had many messages but one medium: plasmas. As the presentations at the meeting of the American Physical Society's division of plasma physics showed, the windows that laboratory plasmas can provide into space, turbulent liquids, and matter-antimatter interactions are opening wider than ever.     

A siting policy for an acceptable nuclear future

A nuclear siting policy leading to a few, large concentrated sites, it is argued, is preferable in the long run to the present policy which could lead to many dispersed sites. Such a policy could be implemented incrementally if requirements for new nuclear generating capacity were met by adding reactors to the existing 100-odd sites. Such a concentrated nuclear siting policy would, to some extent, isolate nuclear activities while augmenting the strengths of the institutions responsible for managing them. Additionally, it would confer an element of permanence on the sites and thereby open new options fer managing low level wastes and reactor decommissioning. These actions may improve the public acceptability of nuclear energy in the United States as well as lead to a more rational contained nuclear system in the long run.     

Atmospheric Circulation from Fission-Product Radioactivity in Surface Air

The beta-activity of fission products in surface air are analyzed in a diagram, with latitude and time as coordinates. Spring-season maxima and spread of new debris are readily discerned. Debris from 1961 Soviet testing, traveling by way of the upper troposphere or the stratosphere, arrived at 16 degrees to 35 degrees S more than a month before debris transported through the troposphere. A maximum lateral-diffusion coefficient of about 4 x 10(5) m(2) sec(-1) is implied for the tropical troposphere, and a much larger value in middle and high latitudes. Debris in the troposphere from United States testing at 2 degrees N spread mostly into the southern hemisphere.     

浅析欧共体／欧盟统一大市场

二战后的西欧为了突破美国的控制和苏联的威胁,同时为了恢复和发展经济,以应对日益激烈的国际竞争,逐渐走向经济一体化。统一大市场的形成促进了欧洲经济的发展,同时,它存在的问题不能忽视,成员国间的利益冲突还时常存在。     

Population dynamics of the United States and the Soviet Union

Population growth in the United States and the Soviet Union is slowing. Since the 1970s, labor force growth in both countries is slowing even more than population growth, and both countries are aging. Economic effects of slowing growth can be compensated for by increased participation in the labor force and increased productivity and by adjustments in the military forces. Economic flexibility and policy choices will determine how successfully the trend to slower population growth will be accommodated.     

欧盟、美国农产品可追溯系统对吉林省的启示

目前,欧盟和美国的农产品可追溯系统走在世界前列,在识别、预警、限制、召回、管理等方面均有许多值得借鉴之处.分析欧盟和美国实施农产品可追溯系统的成功经验和做法,对指导吉林省建设农产品可追溯系统具有重要意义.     

Solar structure and terrestrial weather

If there is indeed an effect of the variable sun on the weather, the physical cause for it remains quite elusive (12). We should keep in mind the possibility that there may be several causes and several effects. The situation may change through the 11-year sunspot cycle and the 22-year solar magnetic cycle, as well as on longer time scales. Work is proceeding at a lively pace at the institutions mentioned in this article and at many others around the world. The Soviet Union has long had considerably more workers interested in this field than has any other country. A bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States has considerably increased the interactions between workers interested in this subject, including an exchange of extended visits between the two countries. A detailed knowledge of solar causes of geomagnetic activity is only now beginning to emerge after many years of scientific efforts. This suggests that a possible successful solution to the sun-weather problem will require a similar magnitude of effort. We look forward with interest and optimism to the results of the next few years.     

新疆北部地区(北疆)苜蓿属植物秋眠性的研究

以紫花苜蓿栽培品种为对照,对新疆北部地区(北疆)28份四倍体苜蓿属植物种群即紫花苜蓿(Medicago sativa)、黄花苜蓿(M.falcata)、多变苜蓿(M.varia)的秋眠性进行了研究.结果表明,北疆苜蓿属植物种群和国内紫花苜蓿种群相对秋眠性等级值水平为1～3级,其中野生种群表现为极秋眠性(1级),反映了中国苜蓿种质资源蕴藏着较强的抗寒性种质.针对我国苜蓿属植物资源研究现状和国际研究趋势,提出了加强秋眠性研究的建议.     

论全球食糖生产及其政策

食糖是全球最受政策扭曲的农产品之一。欧盟和美国是主要实施食糖政策扭曲生产和贸易的经济体。随着“多哈议程”谈判的进行，发展中国家要求欧盟和美国改革食糖政策的呼声越来越高。改革食糖政策有利于增进全球福利。最近的研究认为，采用多边方式的改革食糖政策的获益最大，全球取消食糖政策保护1年可获得47亿美元的福利。欧洲和美国每年增加1500万t食糖，可使发展中国家增加上百万个就业机会。本文就全球食糖生产和一些国家的食糖政策作了较为全面的介绍和分析，使我们对世界农产品生产和贸易及政策有比较准确的了解。     

Scientific communication and national security in 1984

The federal government's concern about maintaining the lead of the United States over the Soviet Union and its allies in militarily critical technology has led it to attempt to control unwanted technology transfer. Its attempts have extended to control of open scientific communication as well as the transfer of physical devices and blueprints. In 1982, the Corson Panel (an independent ad hoc committee) reviewed the evidence on the costs and benefits of controls and suggested guiding principles for government policy. This article examines the major policy developments since the Corson Panel completed its work. The stringency and the reach of government restrictions, either proposed or in force, go considerably beyond the panel's recommendations.