论WTO框架下我国渔业补贴问题

WTO框架下的渔业补贴谈判正在进行中。渔业补贴规则的任何变动,都势必对我国渔业国际竞争力产生冲击。本文介绍各种渔业补贴的界定。分析了当前我国渔业补贴的特征,在此基础上提出相应的渔业补贴政策调整方向。     

国际渔业补贴问题研究

渔业补贴是一个备受争议的概念。WTO虽然在主持渔业补贴纪律的谈判,但是目前没有给出一个广为接受的渔业补贴定义。渔业补贴在国际社会被广泛运用,作为扭曲贸易流动的重要因素,应当予以规制。有害的渔业补贴应当予以禁止,取消或限制使用渔业补贴是WTO成员的共识。我国应积极参与WTO渔业补贴新纪律的谈判,表达我国的立场与关切。     

渔业补贴及WTO的对策研究

海洋法公约中确定了专属经济区制度,肯定了各沿海国在此区域内的渔业资源主权。许多国家都制定了自己的渔业政策,包括实施各种渔业补贴措施。但是渔业补贴却可能损害渔业资源的可持续发展、妨碍有效的渔业管理、扭曲贸易。只凭单个国家的力量去减少和消除补贴收效甚微,多哈部长会议正式授权对渔业补贴进行“澄清和改进”,但却一直进展缓慢。表面上因为淡判各方利益冲突意见相左,深层次原因则是为WTO的授权范围所限。     

泰国质疑WTO的渔业补贴规则

WTO（世贸组织）实施渔业补贴的初衷是希望发达国家在购买发展中国家的水产品时,可以通过一定的补贴形式（价格、关税或其它贸易待遇）,帮助发展中国家进一步发展渔业生产。但这一补贴规则在实际操作中却遭到了泰国等发展中国家的质疑,其主要质疑点有3个：（1）对是否是在EEZ（专属经济海域）所捕鱼类的认证应由产地国认定;（2）对EEZ水域的水质环境和所捕鱼品的质量标准应达到国际上多数国家都可接受的水平;     

欧盟指出渔业补贴导致过度捕捞

正近日,欧盟呼吁世界贸易组织(WTO)讨论渔业补贴问题,以避免世界渔业资源进一步枯竭。世界各地的许多国家都对渔业捕捞活动进行补贴,这种方式导致过度捕捞。欧盟提议解决两个最不合理的补贴:(1)增加捕捞船队捕鱼能力,大约60%的补贴导致过度捕捞。(2)对渔民非法捕捞、不受监管捕捞以及隐瞒捕捞进行的补贴。该提案已经被欧盟成员国通过了,并将提交给所有WTO成员方。     

WTO解决渔业补贴问题前景

渔业部门一直是国际贸易中一个相当重要的领域,但在现存的关贸总协定(GATT)第一、第三条款中一般责任中找不到;在WTO责任中,对于把GATT/WTO纪律应用于渔业补贴领域方面,也缺乏明确的规定。显然,签约各方无意使渔业部门服从于新纪律并在“农业协议”中承担削减补贴的义务。在最近对渔业补贴作了一次大规模调研后,WTO的委员们开始认识到补贴问题的严重性,因此,WTO委员们认为,既然渔业补贴问题没有列入“农业协议”中,那就应该受到更为严格的“补贴与补偿尺度协议”(简称“双补尺度协议)的纪律约束。     

大力发展渔业互助保险 促进渔业安全和谐发展

渔业互助保险是有中国特色的保险模式,2008年、2009年国家连续两年投入1000万元用于渔业互助保险保费补贴试点项目。国家为什么要对渔业互助保险保费进行补贴？补贴有什么意义？渔业互保协会作为渔业互助保险事业的主要推动者,其在开展工作过程中遇到什么难题？采取了什么措施？就此类问题本刊记者对中国渔业互保协会秘书长孙颖士进行了专访。     

走进WTO,我国渔业在国际范围的结构调整与转移

<正> 1995年1月1日世界贸易组织(WTO)的成立,为世界外贸经济活动构筑了一个具有开放性和规范性运作的框架。关贸总协定(GATT)及其他规则和协定提供了全球经济交往的法律基础和组织基础。WTO使世界多边贸易体制得到加强,遏制了贸易保护主义,必将促进世界范围内的水产品自由贸易进一步发展,推动了各国渔业经济全球化进程。 目前,随着我国加入WTO进程的加快,面对挑战与机遇,笔者认为应尽可能早地调整我国渔业结构,适应国际环境的变化,使我国渔业能在国际领域稳步发展。     

谈加入WTO及渔业发展的对策

WTO，是世界贸易组织的简称，是一个由130个多个国家和地区组成的世界上最大的多边贸易组织，被视为“世界经济联合国”。加入WTO标志着我国经济进入了一个新的发展阶段，我国渔业发展面临新的挑战和机遇，无论是水产品的国际贸易还是国内的生产活动都必肌适应WTO规则的要求，就机遇来说，世贸组织一些有关发展农业的规定为我国渔业提供了难得的发展空间；挑战在于，我国的渔业生产大部分还是分散经营，单门独户的家庭生产，面对国际大市场的竞争难以与之搞衡，因此面对入关，在政策和策略上，一是用好用足WTO对我国们有利规则，保护好渔业发展，二是要加强对渔业的支持，提高渔业的生产率，从根本上提高我国渔业的竞争力。     

合理运用渔业补贴促进我国渔业经济的发展

一、补贴和渔业补贴的概述WTO的《补贴与反补贴协议》对补贴的概念和范围是从形式和效果两个方面来界定的。补贴就其形式来说有两种:(1)政府或任何公共机构提供的财政捐助;(2)任何形式的收入或价格支持。但具备这两种形式并不一定构成补贴,构成补贴还要求上述两种政府行为的结果是使有关企业或个人获得利益。而这种利益是正常商业条件下,企业或个人无法获得的。《协议》根据补贴对国际贸易的扭曲程度将补贴分为三类:不可申诉补贴、可申诉性补贴和禁止性补贴。学者们用交通中的红、黄、绿灯的规则作比喻,将上述三类补贴分别形象的称为“绿…     

Panel data analyses to examine effects of subsidies to fishery productions in OECD countries

An econometric analysis, known as a panel data analysis, was conducted to understand the nature and the magnitude of the effect caused by subsidies to fishery productions. Published data on government financial transfers for OECD member countries from 1996 to 2002 were used for this purpose. The result of the panel data analysis indicated that certain financial transfers have brought small but positive influences to economic indicators on fisheries of aggregated OECD countries, while either no or negative effects were recognized in other financial transfers. Different magnitudes of influences were observed according to the types of the transfers. Also, there are cases where two types of financial transfers provide offsetting effects to a single economic indicator. Specifically, the total volume of fishery production for OECD countries is positively influenced by government direct payment programs, but negatively affected by the amount of general services provided by the governments. This study can be regarded as a useful first attempt to examine the empirical link between productions and subsidies of the fishery sectors.     

渔业PPMs与海洋生态系统

所有捕捞活动都会对海洋生态系统造成影响。渔业PPMs作为一项有贸易影响的环境措施应运而生并普遍存在,并成为GATT/WTO下诸多贸易争端的焦点。GATT/WTO争端解决机构在大量实践中逐渐的调整着自己的态度。国际立法也对负责任渔业行为中的渔业PPMs作了很多有益规定,如渔具选用、渔业管理措施等。但是如何科学完善渔业PPMs,保护海洋生态系统仍是一项长期和复杂的任务。     

A time-series data analysis to examine effects of subsidies to fishery productions in Japan

A cointegration analysis is conducted to examine the effect of fishery subsidies on fisheries production using data compiled over more than 30 years in Japan. The results illustrate that one fishery production indicator (production value per fishermen) shows a positive relationship with one particular group of government financial transfer (GFT) (that is, government general service expenditures including cost for fishery managements, scientific researches, and other administrative activities). No other tested results between GFTs and fishery indicators showed a real relationship. Although further scrutiny is awaited, this study could provide an empirical basis for an argument that, under an effective fishing management system, fisheries subsidies do not necessarily cause production increases or negative impact on fishing stocks.     

The impact of subsidies upon fisheries management and sustainability: the case of the North Atlantic

This paper provides both an estimate and assessment of subsidies in fisheries in the North Atlantic. The subsidies are estimated, on the basis of data taken from an OECD study and the Sea Around US Project database, to be in the order of US$ 2.0–2.5 billion per year. The assessment of the impact of the subsidies upon resource management and sustainability requires an examination of the underlying economics of subsidies in fisheries. There is general agreement, to which we subscribe, that fisheries subsidies do great harm by exacerbating the problems arising from the ‘common pool’ aspects of capture fisheries. Many economists, however, believe it that, if the ‘common pool’ aspects of a fishery could be removed by, for example, establishing a full‐fledged property rights system, the negative impact of fisheries subsidies would prove to be trivial. This paper demonstrates that the aforementioned comfortable belief is unfounded. Fisheries subsidies can be seriously damaging, even if the ‘common pool’ aspects of the fishery are removed. There is also a widely held belief among economists and government officials that subsidies used for vessel decommissioning schemes, far from being harmful, actually have a beneficial impact upon resource management and sustainability, or are at worst, neutral. About 20% of the fisheries subsidies in the North Atlantic are directed towards these purposes. In this paper, we argue that these seemingly beneficial subsides can, in fact, be highly negative in their impact.     

Fuelling the fisheries subsidy debate: Agreements, loopholes and implications

There is a general consensus that most subsidies to fisheries, particularly fuel subsidies, are harmful to both the economy and the environment. As the World Trade Organization struggles to come to an agreement on fisheries subsidies, understanding the position of the negotiating countries is crucial. As we move toward more sustainable regulations, we must ensure that no loopholes exist for countries to evade binding regulations. In this note, we use the example of the United States to illustrate how arguments for exemptions can lead to such loopholes. The United States provides interesting insight, as it appears that their support for a ban on fisheries subsidies may be contingent upon a legal pun, which would allow them and other countries to carry on subsidizing fuel to their fishing fleets into the future.     

农业多边贸易谈判的困境及原因分析

在回顾WTO／GAIT农业多边贸易谈判历史进程的基础上,重点描述了多哈农业谈判一波三折的艰难历程;分析了农业多边贸易谈判艰难的原因。其基本原因是农业的特殊性导致各国普遍实行对农业的高度保护,农业贸易自由化十分困难;主要原因是农业谈判议题的复杂性导致各国利益相互交织,农业谈判中利益交换十分敏感;关键原因是谈判力量的均衡性导致发展中成员与发达成员的严重对抗,农业谈判艰难持久。尽管农业谈判步履维艰,但仍在自由化轨道上缓慢推进,只要各方有诚意和耐心,多哈回合农业多边贸易谈判定能成功。     

休闲渔业内涵界定及其市场特性论析

休闲渔业作为21世纪水产业的“朝阳产业”,已普遍而又深刻地融入到世界上许多国家的渔业发展规划之中。尽管如此,许多学者在休闲渔业一些理论问题上,仍然观点纷呈,认识各异。文章首先对休闲渔业的内涵进行界定,并引出其概念特征;其次,对休闲渔业赋予应有的定位,进而重新审视其发展形态;再次,对休闲渔业的市场特性进行论析;最后,对休闲渔业的发展动因进行剖析。     

Reforming the European Common Fisheries Policy: a case for capacity and effort controls

I summarize the total allowable catch (TAC) fishery management system, which forms part of the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) as complicated, inaccurate and ineffective. Total allowable effort (TAE), i.e. limits on fishing capacity and days‐at‐sea, provides a simpler, readily enforceable control to protect all species affected by a fishery. Fishing capacity of vessels in each region‐gear fleet could be capped through limits on engine power, gear, crew, and fittings, and/or reducing allowances of days‐at‐sea for large, powerful vessels. Two basic, fishery‐dependent indicators are put forward to assess sustainability of a fishery dependably even in the absence of fishery‐independent data. One is socio‐economic, the other is ecological. Fishery working groups within each marine region would recommend a TAE to sustain their fishery while also protecting the most critically affected species or processes. Regional working groups would supervise a consistent approach across the different fisheries in their region. A pan‐European group would set policy, implement external agreements, set rules for trading TAE if necessary and harmonize fishing opportunities across regions. To ease negotiations on TAEs with the fishing industry when an ecosystem needs to recover, I propose compensation payments funded by re‐direction of existing CFP subsidies that promote fishing.