美国农业部认可世界动物卫生组织确定的疯牛病风险地区名单

<正>美国农业部10月7日通知,决定认可世界动物卫生组织确定的疯牛病风险地区名单。该名单中疯牛病风险可忽略的地区包括奥地利、比利时、巴西、哥伦比亚、以色列、意大利、日本、荷兰、新加坡、斯洛文尼亚,疯牛病风险可控地区包括保加利亚、哥斯达尼加、克罗地亚、尼加拉瓜、台湾。世界动物卫生组织将疯牛病风险     

疯牛病监控技术发展动态

疯牛病是公认的对人类经济社会和公共卫生安全具有严重破坏力的一种人畜共患病,严重威胁着食品安全,同时制约着国际畜产品贸易,各国均有必要严格监控国内的疯牛病安全风险,限制疯牛病病原体在全球范围的扩散,降低疯牛病对人类社会的潜在危害。当前,仍无法直接确诊活体牛患有疯牛病,兽医病理学家主要通过检测牛尸体脑部组织或检测牛尸体脑组织中的变异朊蛋白进行疯牛病确诊。     

行业动态

我国禁止进口美国牛肉等疯牛病高风险产品农业部兽医工作新闻发言人、国家首席兽医师贾幼陵7月1日宣布,针对目前美国再次发生疯牛病的情况,农业部将会同有关部门,采取严格措施,继续禁止从美国进口牛及牛肉等疯牛病高风险动物产品。贾幼陵介绍,美国这次发生的疯牛病,是继2003年12华盛顿州发现1例疯牛病以来,发生的第2例疯牛病。农业部早在2003年12月就会同有关部门及时发布了对美动物检疫禁令,防止疯牛病传入中国。去年9月,根据世界动物卫生组织有关规定,农业部会同有关部门及时解除了对从美国等发生疯牛病的国家进口牛精液、胚胎等低风险动…     

行业和政府动态

我国获得世界动物卫生组织（OIE）疯牛病风险可忽略认证 2014年5月27日，世界动物卫生组织（OIE）第82届大会第三次全体会议讨论认可我国内地达到疯牛病风险可忽略标准，5月29日，OIE主席施瓦本博尔博士和总干事瓦拉特博士向中国代表团颁发证书，并表示祝贺。这意味着国际社会对我动物疫病防控体系和能力的认可，标志着我国疯牛病防范工作达到国际先进水平，对保障我国动物源性食品安全和公共卫生安全、促进牛肉国际贸易具有重要意义。     

养殖场动物卫生的风险评估管理

正畜产品质量安全监管的重点和动物卫生风险的源头都在养殖环节,加强养殖场管理是控制动物卫生风险的最有效措施之一。为有效降低动物卫生安全风险,保障畜牧产业健康发展和畜产品质量安全,陕西省宝鸡市结合实际,制定了动物卫生风险评估工作方案,并在陇县进行了试点,取得了成功。一、动物卫生风险评估概述1.指导思想、原则和目标。(1)指导思想。依照《动物防疫法》和《动物检疫管理办法》等有关规定,遵循源头监管、风险控制,     

我国获得世界动物卫生组织(OIE)疯牛病风险可忽略认证

<正>2014年5月27日,世界动物卫生组织(OIE)第82届大会第三次全体会议讨论认可我国内地达到疯牛病风险可忽略标准,5月29日,OIE主席施瓦本博尔博士和总干事瓦拉特博士向中国代表团颁发证书,并表示祝贺。这意味着国际社会对我动物疫病防控体系和能力的认可,标志着我国疯牛病防范工作达到国际先进水平,对保障我国动物源性食品安全和公共卫生安全、促进牛肉国际贸易具有重要意义。商务部网站将同时公     

欧盟考虑取消饲料禁用动物副产品禁令

由于世界粮食价格上涨,欧盟食品安全局主席建议欧盟取消在饲料中禁止使用动物源性副产品的禁令,以降低饲料成本和食品生产成本。欧盟是在1996年英国出现疯牛病后全面禁止在饲料中使用动物源性产品,欧盟有关人士指出,从科学评价和风险评估来讲,使用是安全的,但要看消费者的反应以及要等欧盟做出最后决定。     

加拿大牛海绵状脑病防控状况简介

2005年世界动物卫生组织（OIE）将各国发生牛海绵状脑病（BSE）的风险划分为BSE风险可忽略国家,BSE风险可控制国家,BSE风险不确定国家,2007年5月OIE认定加拿大为疯牛病风险可控制国家。文章结合实地考察情况和相关文献资料,从牛和牛产品的进口政策、BSE监测、饲料禁令、特殊风险物质的去除、牛身份识别体系以及目前加拿大的牛和牛肉贸易状况等方面介绍了加拿大疯牛病防控措施。     

要闻

<正>我国获得世界动物卫生组织疯牛病风险可忽略认证5月27日,世界动物卫生组织(OIE)第82届大会第三次全体会议讨论认可我国内地达到疯牛病风险可忽略标准。5月29日,OIE主席施瓦本博尔和总干事瓦拉特向中国代表团颁发证书,并表示祝贺。这意味着国际社会对我国动物疫病防控体系和能力的认可,标志着我国疯牛病防范工作达到国际先进水平,对保障我国动物源性食品安全和公共卫生安全、促进牛肉国际贸易具有重要意义。国家兽药产品追溯信息系统试点工作进展良好对兽药产品实施追溯管理是农业部2014年兽药管理的一项重要工作,自2月开展国家兽药产品追溯信息系统(以     

国内外主要国家疯牛病防疫策略比较

前言疯牛病的发生给许多国家在贸易上带来了的摩擦,许多疯牛病发生国家从本国的利益出发,要求其他国家进口他们的活牛和牛产品或含有牛羊源性物质的产品。同时,世界动物卫生组织(OIE)陆生动物法典疯牛病章节也在不断被修改,风险评估方面由过去的以疯牛病发病率为主改     

Risk assessment as an indicator for the distribution of BSE in the world

For a long time, BSE was considered a problem of the UK exclusively. Even after the detection of BSE cases in countries outside the UK, the risk of having BSE was categorically denied by many other countries. Only after the introduction of active surveillance did several "BSE free" countries detect BSE in their country. However, before the detection of the first cases in several of these countries, a risk assessment (GBR) conducted by the Scientific Steering Committee of the EU showed that a risk could be present. There remain many countries with an unknown BSE risk. In order to minimise import risks from these countries, further risk assessment is needed to evaluate the real BSE distribution worldwide.     

Alternative BSE risk assessment methodology for beef and beef offal imported into Japan

The Food Safety Commission (FSC) of Japan, established in July 2003, has its own initiative to conduct risk assessments on food stuffs known as "self-tasking assessment". Within this framework, the FSC decided to conduct a risk assessment of beef and beef offal imported into Japan from countries with no previous BSE reports; thus, a methodology was formed to suit to this purpose. This methodology was partly based on the previous assessments of Japanese domestic beef and beef imported from U.S.A./Canada, but some modifications were made. Other organizations' assessment methods, such as those used for BSE status assessment in live cattle by the OIE and EFSA's GBR, were also consulted. In this review, the authors introduce this alternative methodology, which reflects (1) the risk of live cattle in the assessed country including temporal risks of BSE invasion and domestic propagation, with the assessment results verified by surveillance data, and (2) the risk of beef and beef offal consisting of cumulative BSE risk by types of slaughtering and meat production processes implemented and the status of mechanically recovered meat production. Other possible influencing factors such as atypical BSE cases were also reviewed. The key characteristic of the current assessment is a combination of the time-sequential risk level of live cattle and qualitative risk level of meat production at present in an assessed country.     

Where does BSE in the Netherlands come from?

It is only in the last 5 years that the Netherlands has been confronted with cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The cases diagnosed to date have not been clearly linked to imports from the United Kingdom. This article describes the various possible explanations for the Dutch cases. The risk factors involved, have either a connection with imported BSE, local origin of BSE, or both. These factors can also be divided into introductory risk and propagation risk, terms that were also used in an EU risk assessment study. Research at ID-Lelystad since the early 1990s and at IKC-Ede has tried to assess the relative importance of the various risk factors, the results of which are discussed in this paper. The paper does not deal with the specifics of the cases diagnosed to date, because of the absence of an in-depth epidemiological investigation, but provides a general assessment of the risk factors that might have played a role. Important factors have been, in addition to the initial imports of cattle and meat and bone-meal from the UK, the continuing imports from other countries with covert BSE and the cross-contamination within the animal feed production lines. Emphasis is on the period of the early and mid-1990s, the period in which most calves with diagnosed BSE were born.     

Risk analysis of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Korea

The occurrence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, so called mad cow diseases) that was first identified in England in 1986 was considered as being limited to only European countries, including England. However, the outbreak in Asia as well as North America since 2001 has amplified the fear that there isn't any nation in the world that is a safe area. In order to assess the risk of BSE outbreak in each country, the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) and EU have respectively established criteria, where OIE has set 5 levels and EU has set 4 levels. The Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) of the European Commission conducted a Geographical BSE Risk(GBR) assessment for 64 nations, such as the United States, etc., as of April 29, 2003. However, as of July 1, 2005, the duty of GBR assessment is expected to be transferred to a newly established body called EFSA (European Food Safety Authority, located in Parma, Italy). As Korea has not undergone a GBR assessment up to now, this study analyzed the risk of BSE outbreak in Korea by reviewing BSE prevention measures, etc., that have been put in place. This study shall be a barometer for estimating the GBR assessment level of Korea.     

Epidemiologic aspects of scrapie and BSE including an analysis of risk factors

After a discussion of the different hypotheses about the causative agent of prion diseases, various aspects of the two most important animal prion diseases, i.e. BSE and scrapie are described. This thesis focuses on the search for a preclinical diagnosis. A major breakthrough was the discovery of a new technique for detecting the disease-associated protein in tonsillar biopsies from scrapie-infected sheep long before clinical signs appeared. Another essential part of the studies described in this thesis concerned a risk analysis for BSE in a country like the Netherlands. Major risk factors were assessed, including an assessment of the efficacy of Dutch rendering procedures in the inactivation of the agents of scrapie and BSE.     

Targeted surveillance to assess the presence of BSE in the age risk population of cattle slaughtered in Bursa, Turkey: preliminary results of an immunohistochemical detection study for the 2004-2005 period

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a member of the transmissible spongiform encepahlopathies, has been a notifiable disease in Turkey since 1997. In 2002, the BSE status of Turkey was assessed by the EU Scientific Steering Committee as "it is likely but not confirmed".This study presents the results of a targeted surveillance study to assess the presence of BSE in the age risk population of Bursa, Turkey. In the assessment procedure, the immunohistochemical detection of protease-resistant prion protein (PrP-Sc) was aimed at and applied to 420 brain tissues of cattle slaughtered in Bursa at an age of 30-months and older. None of the samples were positive for BSE.     

Big decisions based on small numbers: lessons from BSE.

The epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has been the most expensive disaster ever to have befallen farming in the UK. It is believed to have led to a new form of spongiform encephalopathy in humans and as yet there is no way of knowing how many people will die of this disease. In order to curtail the BSE epidemic major decisions had to be made, often on the basis of inadequate scientific data. These data may have been derived from experiments using small sample numbers. Here we review some examples of where this has happened, sometimes with a beneficial outcome and sometimes with a misleading outcome. The identification of BSE as a new disease depended on precise neuropathological observation of a small number of cases rather than the obvious occurrence of large numbers of sick animals. Similarly, the recognition that BSE may have led to disease in humans was based on the neuropathological and clinical picture of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) rather than on an increase in the number of cases of CJD in the UK. Early in the BSE epidemic the possibility that disease could be maternally transmitted from cow to calf was raised, mainly because of a belief that such transmission occurs in scrapie disease of sheep. But, we argue, the evidence for maternal transmission of scrapie, collected in the 1960s, was based on small numbers and is inadequate. Subsequent research has shown a very substantial genetic component in scrapie and epidemiological data show no excess risk in the offspring of affected ewes relative to the risk in the offspring of affected rams. An experiment to determine whether maternal transmission occurs in BSE was flawed and was unable to distinguish between maternal transmission and genetic susceptibility to environmental contamination. An assessment of the risk of BSE to humans depends on determining the levels of infectivity in tissues and transmissibility across species. Data on both of these are deficient, so it is not possible to predict how many people in the UK or elsewhere will become affected with new variant CJD in the next fifty years. The assessment of whether BSE could be transmitted to sheep and whether sheep therefore pose a risk to humans is hampered by a serious lack of evidence about the epidemiology of scrapie in the UK and elsewhere. The UK has paid a heavy price for the BSE epidemic but lessons should be learned from the experience. Every country should have a Specified Offals Ban even if it has no cases of BSE because, by the time it has, it will be too late. Furthermore, the occasional case of BSE should not be regarded as insignificant since it may be the harbinger of an epidemic in the making.     

Big decisions based on small numbers: Lessons from BSE

Summary

The epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has been the most expensive disaster ever to have befallen farming in the UK. It is believed to have led to a new form of spongiform encephalopathy in humans and as yet there is no way of knowing how many people will die of this disease. In order to curtail the BSE epidemic major decisions had to be made, often on the basis of inadequate scientific data. These data may have been derived from experiments using small sample numbers. Here we review some examples of where this has happened, sometimes with a beneficial outcome and sometimes with a misleading outcome. The identification of BSE as a new disease depended on precise neuropathological observation of a small number of cases rather than the obvious occurrence of large numbers of sick animals. Similarly, the recognition that BSE may have led to disease in humans was based on the neuropathological and clinical picture of new variant Creutzfeldt‐Jakob disease (CJD) rather than on an increase in the number of cases of CJD in the UK. Early in the BSE epidemic the possibility that disease could be maternally transmitted from cow to calf was raised, mainly because of a belief that such transmission occurs in scrapie disease of sheep. But, we argue, the evidence for maternal transmission of scrapie, collected in the 1960s, was based on small numbers and is inadequate. Subsequent research has shown a very substantial genetic component in scrapie and epidemiological data show no excess risk in the offspring of affected ewes relative to the risk in the offspring of affected rams. An experiment to determine whether maternal transmission occurs in BSE was flawed and was unable to distinguish between maternal transmission and genetic susceptibility to environmental contamination. An assessment of the risk of BSE to humans depends on determining the levels of infectivity in tissues and transmissibility across species. Data on both of these are deficient, so it is not possible to predict how many people in the UK or elsewhere will become affected with new variant CJD in the next fifty years. The assessment of whether BSE could be transmitted to sheep and whether sheep therefore pose a risk to humans is hampered by a serious lack of evidence about the epidemiology of scrapie in the UK and elsewhere. The UK has paid a heavy price for the BSE epidemic but lessons should be learned from the experience. Every country should have a Specified Offals Ban even if it has no cases of BSE because, by the time it has, it will be too late. Furthermore, the occasional case of BSE should not be regarded as insignificant since it may be the harbinger of an epidemic in the making.     

Risk assessment and surveillance for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Argentina

An assessment was made of the risks of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) occurring in Argentina. Most of the factors associated with the origin and development of the BSE epidemic in the UK are essentially absent. For example, Argentina's large sheep and cattle industries are based on low-cost production systems using grass. Concentrated feeds are not used for sheep, rarely for beef cattle and to a comparatively modest extent for dairy cows. Particularly important are the facts that scrapie (and BSE) has never been reported in Argentina—very small amounts of waste tissues from sheep are rendered to produce meat and bone meal (MBM)—and MBM is not used in concentrated feeds for cattle. We conclude that Argentina has an exceptionally low risk of BSE due to scrapie. There is a very small risk of BSE having been introduced via live animals imported from countries with BSE, but this could only give rise to isolated cases because MBM is not fed to cattle.

A surveillance programme has been carried out based largely on a histological examination of brains from three categories of old dairy cows: animals reported on the suspicion of having neurological disease; animals in poor condition at slaughter; healthy animals randomly selected in the abattoir. No evidence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy was seen in several sections from each of a total of 1019 brains. We conclude that, for most practical purposes, Argentina may be considered to be free from BSE.     

Analysis and prediction of the BSE incidence in Ireland

Our purpose was to report the statistical methodology that was used to describe the nature of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) propagation in the Irish cattle population, to predict the number of future cases and to assess the risk to humans in terms of the number of infected animals that were processed. We used a nonlinear Poisson-regression model for the available birth-cohort data and an iterative method to compute the parameter estimates. Standard errors for the estimates were computed from the nonlinear model and these were validated using a bootstrap procedure.

We illustrated the use of the model for prediction and risk assessment using the BSE incidence data between 1981 and 2000. The change in case ascertainment or reporting level was a crucial parameter that determined the observed pattern of clinical BSE. Significant propagation risk was detected from 1985 onwards, with peaks in 1986 and 1994. The trough in the propagation risk in 1990 coincided with a ban of the use of meat-and-bone meal for ruminant feed. Excluding the newly adopted active surveillance method in 2001, the predicted and observed data were comparable.