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地方政府、涉农正规金融机构行为博弈分析
引用本文:马凤才,李恩会. 地方政府、涉农正规金融机构行为博弈分析[J]. 黑龙江八一农垦大学学报, 2009, 21(6): 94-96
作者姓名:马凤才  李恩会
作者单位:黑龙江八一农垦大学经济管理学院,大庆,163319;黑龙江八一农垦大学经济管理学院,大庆,163319
基金项目:黑龙江省农垦总局项目 
摘    要:在农村金融市场的信贷体系中,正规金融机构与地方政府存在着相异利益诉求,但是地方政府的行政权力占优于正规金融机构,结果导致地方政府经常对地方正规金融机构施加影响,从而改变农贷资金方向;正规金融机构一方面要应付地方政府的"干预",另一方面又要拓展自己的业务空间,从而形成了地方政府与正规金融机构之间的利益博弈。由于正规金融机构处于博弈的次优状态,因此,正规金融机构只有凭借相关法律制度与地方政府进行博弈,博弈的实质进而演变为地方政府与中央政府之间的博弈。

关 键 词:地方政府  正规金融机构  博弈

The Analysis of Behavior Gambling Between Local Government and Agriculture Regular Financial or Ganization
Ma Fengcai,Li Enhui. The Analysis of Behavior Gambling Between Local Government and Agriculture Regular Financial or Ganization[J]. journal of heilongjiang bayi agricultural university, 2009, 21(6): 94-96
Authors:Ma Fengcai  Li Enhui
Affiliation:(College of Economics anti Management, Heilongjiang Bayi Agricultural University, Daqing 163319)
Abstract:In rural finance credit system,the regular financial organization and the local government have different demand about benefit. Because of the stronger administrative power of local government and the influence on the regular financial organization,the agricultural loan direction is often changed. The regular financial organization must develop their service space while they deal with the intervention from the local government. It is this action that formed the benefit gambling between the local government and regular financial organization. Because the regular financial organization is at poor condition of gambling,the regular financial organization have to gamble with the local government rely on the related legal. The gambling between regular financial organization- and local government became gambling between local government and Central government.
Keywords:local government  regular financial organization  gambling
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