| 信息不对称与森林资源管理 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈晓兰.信息不对称与森林资源管理[J].安徽农业科学,2013,41(10):4424-4426,4430. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈晓兰 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京大学环境科学与工程学院,北京,100871 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国森林资源管理体系以森林采伐限额管理制度为核心,但是长期以来存在严重的超限额采伐问题。文章利用委托—代理模型对这种现象进行了分析,发现林业采伐限额制度在不对称信息下根本无法起到遏制森林过量采伐的势头,而且对于一线生产部门提供森林的生态服务功能的激励无效。同时,当地方林业主管部门存在寻租行为时,这种资源危机更加严重。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 委托—代理 森林管理 |
Asymmetric Information and Forest Management |
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| CHEN Xiao-lan.Asymmetric Information and Forest Management[J].Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences,2013,41(10):4424-4426,4430. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Xiao-lan |
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| Institution: | CHEN Xiao-lan ( School of Environmental Science and Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 ) |
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| Abstract: | The core of China＇s forest resources management system is forest cutting quota policy. However, over-limit harvesting has been found as a very serious problem for a long time. By using the principal-agent model, the phenomenon was analyzed. The results showed that the forest cutting quota system cannot stop over-harvesting under asymmetric information, it also failed to provide enough incentives to the production unit, and thus the production unit won＇t be interested in ecosystem services supplying. Existing of rent-seeking behavior among the local forestry departments will aggravate the problem. |
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| Keywords: | Asymmetric information Principal-agent model Forest management |
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