农村精英与农村公共产品供给研究

基于集体行动理论和社会资本理论,将社会资本引入农村精英与村民公共产品供给博弈分析,建立了农村精英与普通村民关于公共产品效用的收益模型,研究了社会资本对农村精英与村民的激励与相互影响。由模型得出3大推论:精英促成集体合作前提是其具有"好声誉";精英在公共产品中的"好声誉"可以降低农民"搭便车"动机;精英在公共产品中发挥组织作用,能节约集体行动过程中的交易成本。并以广州番禺顺河村为案例,对这一模型进行了解释。得出了重建社区信用、发挥农村精英在农村公共产品供给中的作用的政策建议。

The Rural Elite and the Supply of Public Goods in Rural Areas

Based on the theory of collective action and social capital theory,social capital is introduced into the game analysis of the supply of public goods between the rural elite and ordinary villagers.I establish the income model of public goods utility concerning the rural elite and ordinary villagers;research the incentive of social capital for the rural elite and villagers,and impact of social capital on the rural elite and villagers.Three inferences can be drawn from the model: the precondition for the elite to prompt the collective cooperation is having "good reputation";"good reputation" of the elite in the supply of public goods can abate farmers’ motive of "free rider";the role of the elite in organizing the supply of public goods can save the transaction costs in the process of collective action.Taking the case of Shunhe Village,Panyu District,Guangzhou City,I explain this model.Finally,some policy recommendations are put forth as follows: rebuilding the community credit;giving full play to the role of the rural elite in the supply of public goods in rural areas.