林业企业实施森林认证行为的博弈分析 |
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引用本文: | 黄晓玲,杨建州,谢志忠. 林业企业实施森林认证行为的博弈分析[J]. 勤云标准版测试, 2009, 29(21) |
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作者姓名: | 黄晓玲 杨建州 谢志忠 |
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作者单位: | 福建农林大学 |
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基金项目: | 林业企业实施森林认证的动力机制研究 |
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摘 要: | 鉴于森林认证的迅速发展以及在中国的起步态势,建立林业企业实施森林认证的动力机制的囚徒困境、古诺模型及离散型贝叶斯博弈模型,对林业企业实施森林认证行为的进行博弈分析。认为对于实施森林认证的林业企业而言,其类型应属于强类型,即在林产品贸易过程中同林产品的需求者的讨价还价占据优势地位。相对而言保持强势的价格谈判姿态有利于实施森林认证的林业企业在林产品的经营过程中获取更高的利润。
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关 键 词: | 林业企业 森林认证 博弈分析 林产品贸易 |
A Game Analyzes on the Forestry Enterprises to Carry out Implementation of Forest Certification Behavioral |
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Abstract: | Abstract: In view of the rapid development of forest certification, as well as the starting situation in China, to set up forestry enterprises’ implementation of forest certification power mechanism’s Prisoner''s Dilemma, Cournot model and discrete Bayesian game model, mainly by game analyzes the forestry enterprises to carry out implementation of forest certification behavioral. It concluded that for the implementation of forest certification of forestry enterprises, its type should be strongly typed, that is, in the course of trade in forest products with the demand for forest products are dominated by the status of bargaining. Relatively speaking, the price of maintaining a strong stance in favor of negotiating the implementation of forest certification of forestry enterprises operating in the process of forest products to obtain higher profits. |
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Keywords: | forestry enterpriseszz forest certificationzz game analysiszz forest products tradezz |
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