| 公共利益的博弈与中国的选择 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵思思. 公共利益的博弈与中国的选择[J]. 山东省农业管理干部学院学报, 2006, 22(5): 107-108 |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵思思 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖北大学,湖北,武汉,430062 |
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| 摘 要： | 中国的法律制度和世界贸易组织的规则安排各有自已的逻辑起点。入世后,如果二者相和,则有利于双赢的达成;如果逻辑起点相左,则冲突不断。本文从对公共利益的界定入手,以博弈论的囚徒困境理论为基础,假设了中国行政法制度安排与WTO规则二者的公益基础的四次博弈,并提出了中国的最佳选择以及实施策略。
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| 关 键 词： | 公共利益 WTO规则 行政法制度 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-7540（2006）05-0107-02 |
Public Welfare Game and the Choice of China |
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| Zhao Sisi. Public Welfare Game and the Choice of China[J]. Journal of Shandong Agricultural Administrators' College, 2006, 22(5): 107-108 |
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| Authors: | Zhao Sisi |
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| Abstract: | Logic arrangements of China’s legal system and the rules of the World Trade Organization have their own starting point. Upon joining the WTO, and if they are harmonious, it is conducive to win-win; If the logic of starting our viewpoints are in conflict, the conflicts continue. Based on prisoners plight theory of game theory, This article assumes four game of welfare arrangements of Chinese administrative system with WTO rules, and put forward the best choice and the implementation strategy of China. |
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