后退耕时代退耕林管护激励机制研究——基于对陕北的实地调查

后退耕时代,陕北退耕区林木管护不足问题极为突出,不利于退耕还林工程的成果巩固.从农户和政府的契约视角探讨林木管护中行为主体的激励约束关系有利于该工程的成果巩固.运用多任务委托代理模型,构建一个政府和农户在林木管护中的双重任务委托代理模型,得出管护的收益风险变大和相对价值变小,使激励弱化,固定工资制导致双方总收益处于非帕累托最优状态,并提出了一些政策建议.

Study on the Mechanism of Encouraging the Management and Protection Behavior of Northern Shaanxi Forestry Returned from Farmland

In the post-age of returning farmland into forest,the shortage of management and protection of the forestry in Northern Shaanxi area becomes extremely serious.This goes against the strengthening of the achievement of the grain for green project.It makes contribution to consolidate the achievement of this project that discussing the incentive and restraint relationship of the behavioral agent in managing and protecting problem from the standpoint of the contact between the peasants and the government.A double-tasked principal-agent model of both the government and the peasants in managing and protecting forestry can be built by a multi-task principal-agent model.According to this model,a conclusion can be drawn that the encouragement to the peasants can be weaken because of the rising return risk and the diminishing relative value of the management and protection;fixed-wage system leads to the non Pareto optimality state of the total revenue of both sides.A series of policy advices can be given based on this conclusion.