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土地征用中基层政府与农民的博弈行为分析
引用本文:卢玉玲,李松柏.土地征用中基层政府与农民的博弈行为分析[J].湖北农业科学,2012,51(8):1714-1717.
作者姓名:卢玉玲  李松柏
作者单位:西北农林科技大学人文学院,陕西杨凌,712100
摘    要:土地征用涉及多个利益主体,其中以基层政府与农民之间的博弈最为激烈.基层政府占据制度优势,在经济利益和政治利益驱动下进行征地;农民受资源和自身条件的限制在征地博弈中处于劣势地位.从基层政府与农民的行动目标出发,建立动态博弈模型,在博弈论视角下分析了两者在征地中的关系和行为,从土地制度、政府、农民3个角度提出了改革措施.

关 键 词:土地征用  基层政府  农民  博弈分析

Game Analysis between Government and Peasantry during the Process of Rural Land Acquisition
LU Yu-ling , LI Song-bai.Game Analysis between Government and Peasantry during the Process of Rural Land Acquisition[J].Hubei Agricultural Sciences,2012,51(8):1714-1717.
Authors:LU Yu-ling  LI Song-bai
Institution:(College of Humanities,Northwest A & F University,Yangling 712100,Shaanxi,China)
Abstract:Land acquisition involves multiple interests principal parts,in which the game between the government and peasantry are the most intense.Basic level government occupy the system advantages in China,and are driven by the economic and political interests to land acquisition.Peasantries are at a disadvantage place during the game process as a result of their limitations of resources and their own conditions.A dynamic game model based on the goals of local authorities and farmers during land acquisition respectively was built,and then the relationship and behaviors between them under the perspective of game theory were analyzed,finally some reform measures were proposed from the perspects of land system,government and peasantry.
Keywords:agricultural land acquisition  basic level government  peasantry  game analysis
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