| 国家激励机制中的制度设计——兼评《宪政与承诺:17世纪英国公共选择治理制度的变迁》 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 赵平平. 国家激励机制中的制度设计——兼评《宪政与承诺:17世纪英国公共选择治理制度的变迁》[J]. 信阳农业高等专科学校学报, 2005, 15(3): 22-23,39 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 赵平平 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,陕西西安,710061 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 1989年诺斯和温加斯特发表了《宪政与承诺:17世纪英国公共选择治理制度的变迁》。本文试图以此为基础,从国家激励机制的制度设计角度分析英国17世纪革命,并以宪政的制度安排为核心,论述从不可信承诺到可信承诺之间的纳什均衡转变及其所带来的积极效应。
|
| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 宪政 承诺 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-4916（2005）03-0022-02 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-06-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-06-02 |
The institutional design of state incentive mechanism: also a review to Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing public choice in seventeeth-century England |
| |
| ZHAO Ping-ping. The institutional design of state incentive mechanism: also a review to Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing public choice in seventeeth-century England[J]. Journal of Xinyang Agricultural College, 2005, 15(3): 22-23,39 |
| |
| Authors: | ZHAO Ping-ping |
| |
| Abstract: | In 1989, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast released Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. Based on that, this paper tries to analyze the GloriousRevolution happened in Seventeenth-Century England with a view to the institutional design of state incentive mechanism. Taking the institutional design of constitutions as its core, it also explains the shift of Nash Equilibrium, rom incredible commitment to credible one, and the positive results due to it. |
| |
| Keywords: | incentive mechanism constitutions commitment |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
