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生态林工程建设内部控制主体行为的动态博弈分析
引用本文:赵亚蕊,杨冬梅,王爱民. 生态林工程建设内部控制主体行为的动态博弈分析[J]. 农业科技管理, 2010, 29(1): 10-12,43
作者姓名:赵亚蕊  杨冬梅  王爱民
作者单位:河北农业大学商学院,保定,071001
摘    要:在生态林工程建设中,由于建设主体与投资主体所追求的利益不同,导致双方在生态林工程建设内部控制过程中表现出不同的行为特征。利益的驱使使内部控制过程中始终贯穿着建设主体与投资主体间的博弈。加强生态林工程建设内部控制,提高资金使用效率和效益的关键是使可能出现的博弈困境实现有效的均衡。其中,引入合理的控制惩处和激励机制,是加强生态林投资内部控制的关键。

关 键 词:生态林  内部控制  博弈

Game Theoretic Analysis on Behavior of Internal Control Subjects in Construction of Ecological Forest Engineering
Zhao Yarui,Yang Dongmei,Wang Aimin. Game Theoretic Analysis on Behavior of Internal Control Subjects in Construction of Ecological Forest Engineering[J]. Management of Agriculture Science and Technology, 2010, 29(1): 10-12,43
Authors:Zhao Yarui  Yang Dongmei  Wang Aimin
Affiliation:Collage of Business/a>;Hebei Agricultural University/a>;Baoding/a>;071001 China
Abstract:In construction of ecological forest engineering,difference of benefits which the subjects of construction and investment pursued lead both sides showing the different characteristics of behavior in internal control process.The benefits made the game between the subjects of construction and investment went through the process of internal control all the time.The key point for enhancing internal control and improving the efficiency and the benefits of use of funds is to make game dilemmas which possibly appe...
Keywords:Ecological forest  Internal control  Game  
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