首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

农产品质量安全的博弈分析
引用本文:罗敏,李旭. 农产品质量安全的博弈分析[J]. 安徽农业科学, 2010, 38(24): 13474-13477
作者姓名:罗敏  李旭
作者单位:贵州大学管理学院,贵州贵阳,550025
摘    要:在概述国内相关学者研究成果的基础上,介绍了农产品质量的信息不对称的表现形式,分析了农产品质量安全问题中各利益相关者的博弈。结果表明,只要生产者与消费者、生产者与生产者、生产者和政府之间存在农产品质量信息不对称,就会导致生产者生产低质量农产品,从而导致全社会的农产品质量安全下降;信息不对称的常态化要求政府必须强化监管,干预生产者的信息披露。

关 键 词:农产品  信息不对称  博弈分析  利益相关者

Game Analyses of Agro-product Quality Safety
LUO Min et al. Game Analyses of Agro-product Quality Safety[J]. Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences, 2010, 38(24): 13474-13477
Authors:LUO Min et al
Affiliation:LUO Min et al (Management School,Guizhou University,Guiyang,Guizhou 550025)
Abstract:Based on summarizing the research results of the related scholars in China,the expression forms of the information asymmetry of agricultural product quality were introduced. The game of stakeholders in the agricultural product quality safety problem was analyzed. The results showed that the information asymmetry of agricultural product quality between producer and consumer,producer and producer,producer and government would lead to the production of Low-quality agricultural product and the agricultural prod...
Keywords:Agricultural product  Information asymmetry  Game analysis  Stakeholder  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号