| 新型农村养老保险基金双重委托代理关系分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 崔良峰. 新型农村养老保险基金双重委托代理关系分析[J]. 黑龙江八一农垦大学学报, 2013, 0(5): 94-98 |
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| 作者姓名： | 崔良峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 黑龙江八一农垦大学会计学院,大庆,163319 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托专业基金投资运营公司对新型农村养老保险基金进行市场化投资运营是学界共识，但委托过程中由于主体间拥有的信息不对称，很容易发生道德风险。对新农保基金市场化运营管理过程中所涉及的委托代理关系进行深入分析，探求道德风险产生的内因，建立新农保基金双重委托代理激励模型。
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| 关 键 词： | 新农保基金 委托代理 道德风险 |
Double Principal-agent Relationship Analysis of the New Rural Endowment Insurance Fund |
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| Cui Liangfeng. Double Principal-agent Relationship Analysis of the New Rural Endowment Insurance Fund[J]. journal of heilongjiang bayi agricultural university, 2013, 0(5): 94-98 |
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| Authors: | Cui Liangfeng |
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| Affiliation: | Cui Liangfeng (College of Accounting, Heilongjiang Bayi Agricultural University, Daqing 163319 ) |
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| Abstract: | There was an academic consensus that the professional fund investment operating company was commissioned for new rural endowment insurance fund to invest in the form of the marketization operation, but in the process of commission the moral hazard were likely to happen because information of the subjects was asymmetric. Principal-agent relationship involved of the process of new rural insurance fund marketization operation was analyzed to explore the intenlal cause of moral hazard and establish incentive model of new rural insurance fund of double principal-agent. |
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| Keywords: | new rural insurance fund principal-agent moral hazard |
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