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生态旅游项目开发与环境保护——基于损失规避的博弈分析
引用本文:洪开荣,黄启斌,蔡晓晶.生态旅游项目开发与环境保护——基于损失规避的博弈分析[J].中南林业科技大学学报,2020(4):140-148.
作者姓名:洪开荣  黄启斌  蔡晓晶
作者单位:中南大学商学院;中南林业科技大学
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(70871122);中南大学2013年博士生创新基金项目(2013ZZTS005);中南林业科技大学青年科学研究基金重点项目(2015QZ006)。
摘    要:【目的】生态旅游项目开发与环境保护之间的关系具体体现为项目开发投资者与环保保护相关利益者之间的关系,促进两者关系的和谐发展有利于实现双方利益的最大化。【方法】本研究基于损失规避理论进行生态旅游项目开发与环境保护利益相关者的博弈分析,在建立生态旅游项目开发与环境保护博弈模型相关假设基础上,确定投资者与环境保护相关利益者的博弈策略,在考虑投资者的行为偏好后,引入损失规避效用函数,建立损失规避偏好投资者的环境保护博弈模型。【结果】博弈模型的均衡结果显示出不同环境因素成本下各自的均衡解。损失规避偏好显著影响了博弈的均衡解,影响其做出相关决策。但损失规避偏好并非能让博弈方规避损失,而是也可能导致其承担更大的损失。【结论】如果想引导投资者在生态旅游项目开发施工和建设过程中保护环境而非破坏生态环境,要提高项目建设与运营过程中的生态环境保护技术和设备的投入,适当提高生态旅游项目开发投资者破坏生态环境的处罚力度,当然,也可以对生态环境保护成本较高且社会利益较高的生态旅游项目,进行适当的环保投入补贴。

关 键 词:生态旅游项目  环境保护  损失规避  博弈分析

Eco-tourism project development and environmental protection:Game analysis based on loss aversion
HONG Kairong,HUANG Qibin,CAI Xiaojing.Eco-tourism project development and environmental protection:Game analysis based on loss aversion[J].Journal of Central South Forestry University,2020(4):140-148.
Authors:HONG Kairong  HUANG Qibin  CAI Xiaojing
Institution:(Business College of Central South University,Changsha 410083,Hunan,China;Central South University of Forestry and Technology,Changsha 410004,Hunan,China)
Abstract:【Objective】The relationship between eco-tourism project development and environmental protection is embodied in the relationship between project development investors and stakeholders of environmental protection.The harmonious development of promoting the relationship between the two sides benefits to maximize their interests.【Method】This paper analyzes the game between the stakeholders of eco-tourism project development and environmental protection based on loss aversion theory.Based on the relevant hypothesis of eco-tourism project development and environmental protection game model,the game strategy between investors and environmental protection stakeholders is determined.After considering the behavioral preference of investors,the loss aversion utility function is introduced;the game model of environmental protection for investors with loss aversion preference is established.【Result】The equilibrium results of the game model show the equilibrium solutions of different environmental factors.The results show that loss aversion preference significantly affects the equilibrium solution of the game and its decision-making.However,loss aversion preference does not enable game players to avoid losses,but may also lead to greater losses.【Conclusion】If we want to guide investors to protect the environment rather than destroy the ecological environment during the development and construction of eco-tourism projects,we should increase the investment in eco-environmental protection technology and equipment during the construction and operation of the projects,appropriately increase penalties for eco-tourism project developers who damage the ecological environment,of course,and properly subsidize the eco-tourism projects with higher cost of ecological and environmental protection and higher social benefits.
Keywords:eco-tourism project  environmental protection  loss aversion  game analysis
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