Forest carbon offsets and carbon emissions trading: Problems of contracting |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Tennessee, United States;2. Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University, United States;3. Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, United States |
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Abstract: | The process of monitoring and measuring the carbon fluxes associated with forestry is complex and costly, and the process is subject to asymmetric information, perverse incentives and inadequate institutions. The upshot is that any trade in forestry related carbon credits is likely to involve unwarranted acts of faith. This means that, since carbon credits are a de facto fiat currency, their exchange value is likely to be unstable. Contracting requires good governance, which is often lacking. Meanwhile, parties to a contract to provide offsets for sale in carbon markets have misaligned incentives in addition to asymmetric information. This leads to a principal-agent problem that delays successful contracting and quite often leads to incompatible claims regarding the creation of carbon offsets. At worse, it results in corruption. |
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