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基于动态理论的食品行业监督博弈分析——以“三鹿事件”为例
引用本文:李蕾,宋志国,顾亮.基于动态理论的食品行业监督博弈分析——以“三鹿事件”为例[J].安徽农业科学,2010,38(3):1513-1515,1569.
作者姓名:李蕾  宋志国  顾亮
作者单位:1. 桂林电子科技大学管理学院,广西桂林,541004
2. 汕头大学商学院,广东汕头,515063
摘    要:把“三鹿事件”模型化为一个鲜奶供应者、企业和政府的3方动态博弈。在特定的假设条件下,分析了各博弈方在不同情形下的支付,并指出不同情形下各博弈方的最优策略:在各博弈方最优策略的说明下,结合现实,说明了出现这一问题的根本原因和解决建议。并从“三鹿事件”个例上升到整个食品行业,分析食品行业的监督博弈。

关 键 词:三鹿事件  博弈  信用

Food Industry Monitoring Game Analysis Based on Dynamic Theory
LI Lei et al.Food Industry Monitoring Game Analysis Based on Dynamic Theory[J].Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences,2010,38(3):1513-1515,1569.
Authors:LI Lei
Institution:School of Management;Guilin University of Electronic Technology;Guilin;Guangxi 541004
Abstract:"Sanlu incident" was modeled into three participants as a supplier of fresh milk,the company and the government's dynamic game.In the specific assumptions,the payment in different circumstances of the game was analyzed,and the game's optimal strategies under different circumstances were pointed out.Under the interpretation of these optimal strategies and combined with reality,the root causes and solutions for the case were discussed.Finally,monitoring game on food industry was analyzed from "Sanlu incident"...
Keywords:Sanlu incident  Game  Honour  
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