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Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information
作者姓名:ZHENG Hai-lei  PU Yong-jian
摘    要:Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.

关 键 词:asymmetric  information  private  information  information  revelation  strategic  market  game
修稿时间:2004/7/15 0:00:00

Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information
ZHENG Hai-lei,PU Yong-jian.Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information[J].Storage & Process,2004(12):149-151.
Authors:ZHENG Hai-lei  PU Yong-jian
Abstract:Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.
Keywords:asymmetric information  private information  information revelation  strategic market game
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