| An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention |
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| 引用本文： | HE Shou - kui,FU Hong - yuan. An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention[J]. 保鲜与加工, 2006, 0(6): 106-110 |
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| 作者姓名： | HE Shou - kui FU Hong - yuan |
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| 作者单位： | 1. College of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, P. R. China ; 2. Chongqing Jiaotong Uni- versity, Chongqing 400074, P. R. China |
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| 摘 要： | Each party in engineering project faces different quality risk in different stage,and each adopts different management decision against quality risk.Firstly,from the new classic economics angle,an economic explanation to the management decision against engineering quality risk according to the different benefits for contractor and owner.The owner and contractor of a construction project,the government and projection legal person find their economic ties in an asymmetric information supply,or in an imperfectly assigned contract.The rules and characteristics of entrust-agency relation are analyzed from the economics and information economics angle,an economic explanation of engineering quality risk is given according to entrust-agency relation.The measures of controlling quality risk have been put forward from the angle of the economics.
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| 关 键 词： | quality risk new classic economics economic explanation asymmetric information risk control |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-05-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-05-12 |
An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention |
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| HE Shou - kui,FU Hong - yuan. An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention[J]. Storage & Process, 2006, 0(6): 106-110 |
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| Authors: | HE Shou - kui FU Hong - yuan |
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| Affiliation: | 1. College of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, P. R. China ; 2. Chongqing Jiaotong Uni- versity, Chongqing 400074, P. R. China |
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| Abstract: | Each party in engineering project faces different quality risk in different stage,and each adopts different management decision against quality risk.Firstly,from the new classic economics angle,an economic explanation to the management decision against engineering quality risk according to the different benefits for contractor and owner.The owner and contractor of a construction project,the government and projection legal person find their economic ties in an asymmetric information supply,or in an imperfectly assigned contract.The rules and characteristics of entrust-agency relation are analyzed from the economics and information economics angle,an economic explanation of engineering quality risk is given according to entrust-agency relation.The measures of controlling quality risk have been put forward from the angle of the economics. |
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| Keywords: | quality risk new classic economics economic explanation asymmetric information risk control |
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