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合作社农户非合作行为的博弈分析及机制设计
引用本文:刘秀玲,朱文涛.合作社农户非合作行为的博弈分析及机制设计[J].福建农业大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014(6):22-26.
作者姓名:刘秀玲  朱文涛
作者单位:福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350108
基金项目:福州大学科技发展基金资助项目(社科类)(12SKQ09).
摘    要:从农户合作与非合作行为的经济动机角度切入,运用博弈分析方法,对农户入社前动机与入社后的道德风险进行分析,发现农户间合作对于提高农户收益具有正效益,而入社后农户产生违约的道德风险则很大程度上源于合作社约束和激励机制的不足,最后提出通过约束机制和激励机制的建立促使农户间形成稳定合作关系.

关 键 词:合作社  博弈  道德风险  机制

Game analysis and mechanism design of noncooperating behavior of the farmer cooperatives
LIU Xiu-ling,ZHU Wen-tao.Game analysis and mechanism design of noncooperating behavior of the farmer cooperatives[J].Journal of Fujian Agricultural University(Social Science Edition),2014(6):22-26.
Authors:LIU Xiu-ling  ZHU Wen-tao
Institution:( School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fttjian 350108, China )
Abstract:Game analysis is applied to analyze farmers' motives before joining and moral risks after joining from the perspective of farmers' economic motives of cooperating and noneooperating behaviors. It is discovered that the cooperation between farmers exerts the positive effect on increasing income , and the moral risk of farmers default after joining is caused mostly by the deficiency of diseipline and encouragement systems in the cooperative. So, it is necessary to consolidate the cooperating relationship between farmers through discipline and encouragement systems.
Keywords:cooperative  game  moral risk  mechanism
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