农机作业服务外包业务中的委托代理关系分析

根据委托代理理论,模型化农机作业服务外包业务中农机作业服务外包方与农机作业服务提供方之间的委托代理关系,分析了农机作业服务外包业务中由于信息不对称而产生的道德风险问题及其激励机制设计问题。并通过对农机作业服务外包方代理成本和农机作业服务提供方激励报酬强度系数影响因素的进一步分析,指出设计农机作业服务提供方激励机制必须反映农机作业服务提供方的特质、外部环境条件的变化以及外包方代理成本等因素的影响。

Analysis on the Principal-agent Relationship between Agricultural Machinery Outsourcer and Agricultural Machinery Operation Service Provider

According to principal-agent theory, the paper analyzes the principal-agent problems in the agro-machinery outsourcing such as moral hazard and incentive mechanism designing owing to the asymmetric information, and gives the model of principal-agent relationship between the outsourcer and the agricultural machinery service provider. Furthermore, the papers analyzes the agent costs of outsourcer and incentive remuneration intensity coefficient of provider and points out that the designing of incentive mechanism for provider must reflect the influences of provider' specialty, the change of external environment and the agent costs of outsourcer.