首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

“畜产品龙头企业+养殖户”合同交易的博弈分析
引用本文:韩雯雯,贾永全. “畜产品龙头企业+养殖户”合同交易的博弈分析[J]. 中国牛业科学, 2010, 36(2): 40-45
作者姓名:韩雯雯  贾永全
作者单位:黑龙江八一农垦大学动物科技学院,黑龙江,大庆,163319
摘    要:此文将一次博弈作为分析的起点,研究了畜牧业产业链中畜产品龙头企业和养殖户行为主体间在一次博弈、重复博弈中的战略选择,并研究了在有中介组织介入后的博弈关系。分析表明:如果畜产品龙头企业和养殖户进行一次博弈,毁约便成为两者的理性选择;如果两者进行有限次重复博弈,其结果是一次性博弈均衡结果的简单反复;如果两者之间进行无限次重复博弈,就能够得到最优的帕累托均衡点,选择(履约,履约)是最优策略,两者将形成良性的合作关系;如果中介组织介入后,并且监督设计合理,就可以有效地促使双方合作,使履约的几率增加,最终实现了利益的最大化。

关 键 词:畜产品龙头企业  养殖户  一次博弈  重复博弈  中介组织

Game Analysis of Transaction ContractLeading Enterprises+Livestock Farmers
HAN Wen-wen,JIA Yong-quan. Game Analysis of Transaction ContractLeading Enterprises+Livestock Farmers[J]. China Cattle Science, 2010, 36(2): 40-45
Authors:HAN Wen-wen  JIA Yong-quan
Affiliation:College of Animal Science and Technology;HeiLongjiang August First Land Reclamation University;DaQing;Heilongjiang 163319 China
Abstract:This article analyzes a game as a starting point to study the animal husbandry industry chain enterprises and farmers leading actors in a game,repeated game of strategic choices,and to study the involvement of intermediary organizations in the post game relations.Analysis showed that: if the livestock enterprises and farmers conducted a game,breach of contract would become a rational choice between the two.If the two repeated games with limited times,the result was a balanced one time game results of the si...
Keywords:Livestock Enterprises  Farmers  A game  Repeated Games  Intermediary Organizations  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《中国牛业科学》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《中国牛业科学》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号