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农村金融市场资金供给问题的博弈分析
引用本文:单海东,刘亚相.农村金融市场资金供给问题的博弈分析[J].浙江农业学报,2014,26(2):0.
作者姓名:单海东  刘亚相
作者单位:西北农林科技大学 理学院,陕西 杨凌 712100
基金项目:教育部2011年度长江学者和创新团队发展计划基金资助项目(IRT1176)
摘    要:农村金融市场资金供给不足已成为我国农村经济发展的主要制约因素。运用博弈理论分析发现正规金融的传统业务和政府补贴扶持相结合的供给模式无法从根本上解决农村金融的可持续供给,而参与人为大型商业银行和新型农村金融机构,即村镇银行、农村资金互助社和贷款公司的非对称性鹰鸽博弈模型结果显示,二者在资金、农户信息两方面综合非对称强度越大,二者选择合作供给的可能性越大,且合作系统内存在进化稳定的混合策略纳什均衡。因此,为确保我国农村金融市场资金可持续供给,应积极合理地引导国内外大型商业银行与我国新型农村金融机构合作,促进我国农村金融多元化发展。

关 键 词:农村金融  合作供给  非对称性  鹰鸽博弈  进化稳定性  

Games analysis on funds supply problems in rural financial markets
SHAN Hai dong,LIU Ya xiang.Games analysis on funds supply problems in rural financial markets[J].Acta Agriculturae Zhejiangensis,2014,26(2):0.
Authors:SHAN Hai dong  LIU Ya xiang
Institution:College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, China
Abstract:Insufficient capital supply in rural financial markets has restricted the development of Chinas rural economy. By game analysis, we found rural financial institutions cant solve the sustainable funds supply with governments subsidies. But, asymmetric Hawk Dove game results showed that the greater of the asymmetric intensity between large commercial banks and new rural financial institutions (game participants), the more they will tend to cooperate. For them, the capital and the farmers information was asymmetric. We found the cooperative supply probability is positively related to the synthetic asymmetry of game participants. And it has evolutionary stability for the participants to select cooperation with the probability. Therefore, we must rationally promote the cooperation between large commercial banks and new rural financial institutions in order to ensure the sustainable development of rural financial markets.
Keywords:rural finance  cooperative supply  asymmetry  hawk dove game  evolutionary stability  
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