| 健康保险契约的性质 |
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| 引用本文： | 史新和,刘东.健康保险契约的性质[J].金陵科技学院学报,2009,25(4):1-4. |
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| 作者姓名： | 史新和 刘东 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 金陵科技学院商学院,江苏,南京,211169;南京大学经济学院,江苏,南京,210093
2. 南京大学经济学院,江苏,南京,210093 |
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| 基金项目： | 金陵科技学院科研项目基金资助，江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目，江苏省博士后科研资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 在信息对称的情况下,当参保人U12<0时,则健康保险契约会是一种超额保险,同时低风险参保人得到的保险覆盖将比高风险参保人低;反之则反是.在信息不对称的情况下,保险人若设计的是分离型健康保险契约,当低风险参保人的健康损失不高于某个临界值,而高风险参保人不低于另一个临界值时,他们会接受分离型契约;保险人若设计的是混同型健康保险契约,则对于高风险和低风险参保人而言,健康保险契约的激励相容条件自然得到满足,健康保险契约达到混同均衡的充分条件是L≥PA+I以及U12<0.
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| 关 键 词： | 健康保险 分离契约 混同契约 激励可行 |
Properties of Health Insurance Contract |
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| SHI Xin-he,LIU Dong.Properties of Health Insurance Contract[J].Journal of Jinling Institute of Technology,2009,25(4):1-4. |
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| Authors: | SHI Xin-he LIU Dong |
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| Institution: | SHI Xin-he1,2,LIU Dong2(1.Jinling Institute of Technology,Nanjing 211169,China,2.Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China) |
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| Abstract: | In the case of symmetric information,if U12for policyholders is less than zero,the health insurance contract is a kind of excess insurance,and policyholders with low risk are provided a smaller insurance coverage than that for those with high risk,and vice versa.In the case of asymmetric information,if the health insurance contracts are separating ones,the incentive compatibility condition is that the health loss of policyholders with low risk is no more than a certain critical value while that of those wit... |
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| Keywords: | health insurance separating contract pooling contract incentive feasibility |
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