基于回购契约的农产品质押融资研究

为了分析面临资金约束的农产品需求方和采用回购契约的农产品供应商组成的供应链的融资和运营决策问题,在市场需求随机、完全信息环境下,通过设计一个由银行、农产品需求方和供应商组成的供应链金融系统,探究了农产品需求方的最优订货数量、银行的最优贷款利率和供应商的最优回购率.在此基础上算例验证了各决策变量间的关系,并验证了理论分析的结果.结果表明:供应商回购契约的引入降低了农产品需求方的违约风险,可以为整个系统创造新价值.     

The impact of subsidies upon fisheries management and sustainability: the case of the North Atlantic

This paper provides both an estimate and assessment of subsidies in fisheries in the North Atlantic. The subsidies are estimated, on the basis of data taken from an OECD study and the Sea Around US Project database, to be in the order of US$ 2.0–2.5 billion per year. The assessment of the impact of the subsidies upon resource management and sustainability requires an examination of the underlying economics of subsidies in fisheries. There is general agreement, to which we subscribe, that fisheries subsidies do great harm by exacerbating the problems arising from the ‘common pool’ aspects of capture fisheries. Many economists, however, believe it that, if the ‘common pool’ aspects of a fishery could be removed by, for example, establishing a full‐fledged property rights system, the negative impact of fisheries subsidies would prove to be trivial. This paper demonstrates that the aforementioned comfortable belief is unfounded. Fisheries subsidies can be seriously damaging, even if the ‘common pool’ aspects of the fishery are removed. There is also a widely held belief among economists and government officials that subsidies used for vessel decommissioning schemes, far from being harmful, actually have a beneficial impact upon resource management and sustainability, or are at worst, neutral. About 20% of the fisheries subsidies in the North Atlantic are directed towards these purposes. In this paper, we argue that these seemingly beneficial subsides can, in fact, be highly negative in their impact.     

随机需求下双渠道供应链的改进回购契约协调

考虑市场需求是非线性随机的且受零售商努力影响的一般情形,建立由一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,研究设计协调双渠道供应链的引入努力成本分担系数的改进回购契约,结果表明,只要引入努力成本分担系数的改进回购契约参数取值恰当,双渠道供应链就能够实现协调.研究结论具有一定的理论与现实指导意义.     

一种基于无线传感器网络能量均衡路由算法

在报童模型的基础上,以一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链为研究背景,把公平关切引入到回购契约的研究中,并根据Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,通过建立效用函数模型,研究了公平关切对回购契约的影响.研究发现,公平关切不会影响回购契约的协调性,公平关切程度也不会影响零售商的最优订购量,进而可以得出,即使供应商在不知道零售商对公平偏好的程度下,依然可以通过制定合适的批发价格和回购价格来做出使自己效用最大化的最优决策.另外,通过灵敏度分析发现,在公平关切时,零售商的最优订购量会随着产品单位生产成本的增加而增加.