政府渔业补助政策与博弈

渔业补助政策是政府为弥补市场经济缺陷而采取的重要措施，本文应用博弈论对政府与渔民的互动博弈展开研究，并确立了混合策略模型下的政府和渔民各自最佳选择概率，达到纳什均衡，这对于解释当前政府渔业补助政策内涵与指导修订补助政策有参考意义。     

Gene genealogies support Fusarium oxysporum f. sp. ciceris as a monophyletic group

Fusarium oxysporum f. sp. ciceris (Foc), the causal agent of fusarium wilt of chickpea, consists of two pathotypes (yellowing and wilting) and eight races (races 0, 1B/C, 1A and 2–6) of diverse geographical distribution. Six Foc isolates, one each of races 0, 1B/C, 1A, 4, 5 and 6, representing the two pathotypes and the geographical range of the pathogen, showed identical sequences in introns of the genes for translation elongation factor 1α ( EF1 α), β-tubulin, histone 3, actin and calmodulin. Eleven additional Foc isolates representative of all races, pathotypes and geographical range, and three isolates of F. oxysporum (Fo) nonpathogenic to chickpea were further analysed for sequence variation in the EF1 α gene. All isolates pathogenic to chickpeas shared an identical EF1 α gene sequence, which differed from that shared by the three Fo isolates nonpathogenic to chickpea. EF1 α gene sequences from the 17 Foc isolates and the three Fo isolates were compared with 24 EF1 α gene sequences in GenBank from isolates of 11 formae speciales of F. oxysporum by parsimony analysis. Foc isolates formed a grouping distinct from other formae speciales and nonpathogenic isolates. These results indicate that F. oxysporum f. sp. ciceris is monophyletic.     

贯休、齐己与石霜庆诸——禅宗灯史上的一桩公案

研究市场需求和生产成本同时扰动时非线性需求供应链的最优应对策略.首先在稳定条件下提出供应链的收益共享协调合约；生产成本和需求扰动会导致原有的收益共享合约不再协调，提出了供应链在一体化决策时应对双因素同时发生扰动的最优策略；进一步提出了改进的收益共享合约协调分散化决策的供应链系统.最后运用数值实验对模型进行了验证.     

国防工业发展中的三方博弈分析

利用博弈论的方法对国防工业发展中已进入国防工业的企业群、待进入国防工业的企业群和政府的对策进行分析，并得出结论：政府首先要指导已进入国防工业的企业群合理定位；其次要考虑制定多大程度的保护政策来保护已进入国防工业企业的发展和利益；最后政府需要对军工企业的诉讼制定合理的支持标准，使已进入国防工业企业始终处于竞争环境良性发展.当然政府作出以上决策的主要依据是在保证本国安全的前提下使国防工业企业的利润实现最大化.     

达乌尔黄鼠线粒体Cyt b基因序列特征及其系统进化分析

在甘肃省天祝藏族自治县采集12只达乌尔黄鼠(Spermophilus dauricus),PCR产物直接测序获得Cyt b基因1140bp序列,采用Clustal X 1.84、MEGA 6.0、Dna SP 5.0等生物信息学软件进行了序列特征和系统地位分析。结果显示,达乌尔黄鼠Cyt b基因含116个多态信息位点,群体中多态位点类型有转换、颠换,Cyt b基因T,C,A,G碱基含量分别为33.7%,25.9%,27.6%,12.9%。基于Kimura双参数的遗传距离显示,属内种间大黄鼠(Spermophilus major)与新疆黄鼠(Spermophilus fulvus)间遗传距离最小(0.034),高加索黄鼠(Spermophilus musicus)与达乌尔黄鼠最大(0.172),达乌尔黄鼠群体内遗传距离为0.140,种群分化较大,基于NJ法构建的系统进化树符合传统分类标准,研究为达乌尔黄鼠Cyt b基因标记的种群遗传学应用提供了参考。     

The Economic Significance of Hunting Tourism in East Lapland,Finland

Uses of game resources are under constant debate. One such debate focuses on hunting tourism and its contributions to rural economics. To prioritize future investment and inform policy decisions, it is necessary to identify the full economic consequences of the operation of hunting tourism companies in rural areas. However, the true economic significance of these typically small-scale companies is not apparent when examined on an industrial scale. These companies may nevertheless serve as a sustainable solution to local-scale rural challenges. In this article, the regional economic significance of hunting tourism is estimated for the East Lapland sub-region of northern Finland through the use of Computable General Equilibrium simulation models. Although these models are known to effectively evaluate short- and long-term regional economic effects of industries such as tourism, they have not previously been applied to evaluate hunting tourism.     

Analysis on Knowledge Sharing Under the Incomplete Information Condition

Knowledge sharing is the important way in which enterprises create organizational knowledge and obtain competition advantage.Scholars always have difference viewpoints about the motivators in knowledge sharing.This paper(analyzes) the incomplete information game and the choice of the motivators in knowledge sharing.If the knowledge(acceptant) offers motivators to the knowledge owner,knowledge sharing might make the participants obtain knowledge-sharing incomes.If knowledge-sharing incomes can make up the participants' costs,knowledge sharing can be caught through.Because the information of knowledge's value is incomplete,enterprises need knowledge managers and organizational additional motivators promote knowledge sharing.     

Analysis of the Game Model of Supervision on Swindle in the Securities Market

Swindle exists commonly in any securities markets, where swindle has led to serious influences on regulations and the normal development of our securities market. The paper attempts to develop a game model of supervision on swindle in the securities market so as to investigate the relationship between supervisor and supervisee from the microcosmic aspect, and analyze the microcosmic mechanism resulting to swindle in the securities market, and enlighten our securities supervision as to swindle in the securities market.     

The Problem of Real Option and Its Frontier Commentary

The method of real option has already become an important tool in the fields of enterprises value evaluation, company finance, strategy investment management, investment decision, finance analysis, corporation merger and acquisition and so on. But there is a lot of problems in both theory and practical application for the method of real option. This article will analyze the research frontier problem of real option and indicate the further research direction.     

Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information

Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.