控制工程造价不是盲目压价

本文对工程造价管理角度进行了论述,从不同的角度分析了控制工程造价的方法,阐明如 何科学地控制工程造价。     

内蒙古赤峰市实行草地有偿承包的效果和经验

通过赤峰市多年来对草地有偿承包责任制的探索，阐述了草地有偿承包责任制的意义和重要性，总结了实行草地有偿承包责任制的基本做法和体会，提出了今后的设想。     

贯休、齐己与石霜庆诸——禅宗灯史上的一桩公案

研究市场需求和生产成本同时扰动时非线性需求供应链的最优应对策略.首先在稳定条件下提出供应链的收益共享协调合约；生产成本和需求扰动会导致原有的收益共享合约不再协调，提出了供应链在一体化决策时应对双因素同时发生扰动的最优策略；进一步提出了改进的收益共享合约协调分散化决策的供应链系统.最后运用数值实验对模型进行了验证.     

风险厌恶下的供应链收益共享契约协调模型研究

收益共享契约是实现供应链系统绩效改善或完美协调的一种机制.考虑了零售商与供应商分别具有风险厌恶决策偏好情况下，在随机市场需求下建立了由单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链的收益共享契约模型，并对模型进行了分析，揭示了供应商和零售商的风险厌恶决策偏好对收益共享契约参数的影响.研究结果表明：当销售商（供应商）的风险厌恶控制在一定程度内时，通过调整收益共享契约参数，可以保证供应链的协调.     

继承:农村土地承包经营权完善的重要内容

农村土地承包经营制度是我国在特定时期——土地公有的前提下制定的,农民可以依法取得土地的使用权和收益权,实现对土地的直接占用。由于我国现行法对农村土地承包经营权继承的规定不够明确,对土地承包经营权能否继承,学术界出现了两种对立的观点。文章立足于理论与实践的结合,在实地调查的基础上,从相关概念分析入手,对农村土地承包经营权能否继承及理由、现有的继承方式进行了分析,并阐述了在具体的实践操作中,应该注意的几类人群的继承问题。     

具有交易费用和马氏调制的均值-方差组合选择

研究了均值-方差准则下，最优投资组合选择问题.投资者为了增加财富它可以在金融市场上投资.金融市场由一个无风险资产和n个带跳的风险资产组成，并假设金融市场具有马氏调制，买卖风险资产时，考虑交易费用.目标是，在终值财富的均值等于d的限制下，使终值财富的方差最小，即均值-方差组合选择问题.应用随机控制的理论解决该问题，获得了最优的投资策略和有效边界.     

Analysis on Knowledge Sharing Under the Incomplete Information Condition

Knowledge sharing is the important way in which enterprises create organizational knowledge and obtain competition advantage.Scholars always have difference viewpoints about the motivators in knowledge sharing.This paper(analyzes) the incomplete information game and the choice of the motivators in knowledge sharing.If the knowledge(acceptant) offers motivators to the knowledge owner,knowledge sharing might make the participants obtain knowledge-sharing incomes.If knowledge-sharing incomes can make up the participants' costs,knowledge sharing can be caught through.Because the information of knowledge's value is incomplete,enterprises need knowledge managers and organizational additional motivators promote knowledge sharing.     

Contracts of risk sharing of the enterprise, the employee and the dealer

The output of the enterprise changes with the change of natural states, therefore it brings relatively great risk to enterprise. The enterprise hopes to reduce the same kind of risk through more contracts than one kind of contract of risk sharing. This paper presents a new method to disperse the same kind of risk in two kinds of ways. Basing on principal-agent theory, through the optimum contract of risk sharing, the Pareto-optimum solving is solved-the optimum contract of risk sharing. The employee shares some risks through the optimum contract of risk sharing between the enterprise and the employee-when the output is high, the employee's income increases; when the output is low, the income decreases. In order to reduce the risk of the enterprise further, the dealer also shares the risk. To maximize the utility of the enterprise, the Pareto optimum solving is given-another optimum contract of risk. The dealer offers following contract of risk sharing to the enterprise-when the output is high, the dealer receives the repayment; when the output is low, the enterprise is compensated. The enterprise, the employee and the dealer share the risk together, thus the risk of the enterprise is reduced to relatively great degree.     

Incentive Mechanism for Team Cooperation Based on Implicit Side Contract

Aiming at the free-riding problem in team incentive, this paper designs a dynamic incentive mechanism based on implicit side contract with dynamic game theory by introducing the reasonable assumption that there is horizontal monitor in team production. The theoretic analysis indicates that the dynamic incentive mechanism, in which a strict group incentive compatibility contract is taken at the first stage and an individual incentive compatibility contract is taken at the second stage, can implement team cooperation uniquely in the general condition of risk aversion and stochastic production by only two stage repeated game.