Economic Analysis of Administrative Monopoly and Its Solution

Administrative monopoly in China is analyzed with microeconomics tools such as rent-seeking theory, comparative advantage theory and game theory. A rent seeking model is given to study administrative monopoly. Futhermore, the authors propose that the barriers brought by administrative monopoly not only increase consumers burden, but also make enterprises run with high cost and low efficiency, and optimal resource distribution can not be done. Administrative monopoly can not be eliminated unless administrative monopoly is regulated within anti-monopoly law and its legal liability is enhanced, which is proved with game theory. In order to solve administrative monopoly, China should construct a law system concluding anti-monopoly law and administrative law as a reinforce.     

Under Dissymmetrical Information the Game Theoretical Analysis about the Investment Financing Behavior of the Enterprises

The authors use the ideas and methods of the game theory to reveal that, under the condition of dissymmetrical information, it can't form an effective cooperative relationship among supervisor organization, the shareholders and the enterprises. In the capital market, we explain the cooperative conditions and determinants researched. Only through strengthening the force of punishment towards providing the false information and increasing the benefit received by providing the real information, the enthusiasm of the founders' providing the false information drops, and the necessity of the supervisor organization's checking decreases. Finally, we give some suggestions about the construction and consummating of the capital market of the enterprise.     

Electricity Pricing Regulation in Demand Side Management

Time of use(Tou) price is one of the most efficient measure for modern demand side management(DSM).But a scientifically pricing is based on understanding the function of pricing mechanism and comprehensive analysis to social benefit.The authors develop a pricing model by game theory based on analysis of consumer's response to the time of-use price and analyze the pricing regulation of government for maximum social benefit.A conclusion is drawn,which suggests that government should let the electricity corporation to pricing, but just give a regulation on the average price level.     

Analysis of the Effect of Industrial Difference on the Level of Cooperation

The models of static game and repeated game in which industrial difference is considered are built. The degree of the industrial difference's effects on the level of optimal cooperation and the change of other factor's effect on the level of the optimal cooperation with the change of the industrial difference are analyzed. Some profound results on cooperation are obtained. These results are momentous current significance to explaining some recent economic behavior of Chinese enterprise and leading them to further deepen reform.     

Research on Comtruclion Mechanism of Rural Information Service Station

农村信息服务站是实现农村信息化的关键节点,其发展的最突出问题是建设资金不足。目此。探讨农村信息服务站的建设机制成为首要任务。该文在博弈论的基础上,分析政府与企业2类参与主体的行为,确定影响机制的关键因素为政府减税比例,并根据博弈模型求解出纳什均衡状态和最佳减税比例,可为建立一套有效的农村信息服务站建设机制提供思路。     

Pollutant discharge permit trading based on equilibrium theory

Pollutant discharge permit trading is an effective economic means to realize equilibrium development between pollutant treatment and water quality improvement. On the basis of summarizing the study characteristics of pollutant discharge permit trading at home and abroad, we present the study framework making treatment cost minimizing and the risk of low water quality minimizing as objective functions. Combining the application scope of the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-Ⅱ(NSGA-Ⅱ), Young Bargaining Theory (YBT)and Initial Discharge Permit Allocation model (IDPA), we construct Discharge Permit Trading model (DPT) considering the related factors of watershed pollutant treatment. By virtue of nonzero-sum game and theoretical framework of trading model, we describe the calculation process of optimization model. We choose typical watershed as a realistic example to test the efficiency and applicability of methodology for developing pollutant discharge permit trading. Finally, we give the perfection suggestion and application prospect forecastin.     

药品指导价下三类利益主体间的博弈分析

市场经济条件下,政府对某些商品实行指导价造成的一个常见后果是：政府和市场中各利益主体之间的博弈,而这种博弈带来的结果走向并不一定是消费者所期望看到的.政府实行药品指导价能否解决消费者买药贵的问题？药品生产者以及零售商又会对政府的行为作出何种回应？运用供求理论以及博弈模型,对政府实行药品指导价后药品市场上各利益主体的反应以及相互间的博弈行为进行分析,发现各利益主体并未出现政府预期的积极反应.     

经营者信誉资本与会计契约履行的博弈分析

会计契约的缔约主体包括企业经营者和具有其它信息需求的利益相关者，由于契约的不完全性及双方不可避免的利益冲突，企业经营者和利益相关者之间就会计契约的履行进行着博弈。经营者信誉资本的存在给经营者带来了可置信的惩罚空间，因而使得会计契约能够有效地履行。     

信任博弈与订单农业的运行风险防范

订单农业的发展,可以推进农业产业化的进程,但近几年订单农业发展缓慢,出现了很多问题,其中订单农业的风险无法合理预期是造成主体双方合同的签订和履行难以实现的根本原因．通过建立订单农业的简单信任博弈,用来分析农户和公司之间信任的实现机制,可以消除不信任威胁的产生,只有增加农户和公司双方的信任,减少不信任的威胁,提高合同的履约率,才能有效地防范订单农业的运行风险．     

基于利益主体理论的观光果园旅游开发研究--以迁西杨家峪板栗园为例

不同利益主体之间的关系是影响景区发展重要的因素。观光果园作为农业旅游的一种典型形式,其利益主体的合作与冲突成为影响其发展的突出因素,由此可以引发各种旅游地发展中出现的弊病。本文采用利益主体理论的研究方法,以旅游开发商和当地居民的博弈分析为重点,分析杨家峪板栗园在旅游开发中在利益主体合作的前提下进行开发项目的选择,提出观光果园旅游开发中的动力协调机制,从而推动该类景区持续健康的发展,保障旅游开发商的利益和当地居民的长远利益。