橄榄嫁接技术及其应用

橄榄是南方特有的亚热带常绿果树，以实生栽培较为普遍。俗话说：“桃三、李四、橄榄七”，意指实生橄榄树种植7年后才能投产。实生橄榄树冠高大，管理不便；而且种子具有多胚性，后代变异大，苗木品质混杂，低产、劣质植株比例占30％以上，有的甚至不开花、不结果，成为橄榄低产的主要原因之一。     

千分尺测量结果不确定度的计算

以用千分尺测量长度为L=45mm的工件为例,阐述了千分尺的测量不确定度的来源及计算方法,并给出用千分尺测量该工件的测量结果。     

母兔产后不食症的诊断与治疗

母兔“产后不食症”是由多种因素引起的一种临床症状。因此，在临床诊疗中要根据不同的发病原因，采取相应的治疗方法。     

宠物犬意外伤害的处置

1食道梗阻 犬食道梗阻大多由于吞食过猛、强吞强咽、进食过程中突然受到惊吓刺激以及啃咬异物等造成。梗阻部位多发生于咽腔之后至胸腔入口之前。患犬食道不完全阻塞表现为干呕和哽噎，摄食缓慢，吞咽小心。完全阻塞则头颈伸直，拒食，流涎，极度不安，搔抓颈部，甚至因阻塞物压迫呼吸道而窒息。     

犬不发情怎么办

吉林的一位读者说，他养的杂交犬12月龄，至今不发情，问怎么回事？我们请教了山东省犬业与宠物协会秘书长林振国高级兽医师（0531-2929214）后，答复如下.     

二阶拟线性椭圓型Euler方程组解的Pohozaev型恒等式及其应用

本文对于二阶椭圆型Euler方程组 -∑D_αF_(q_α~i)(x,u,Du)+F_(ui)(x,u,Du)=0得到了一些积分恒等式,利用这些恒等式证明了某些方程组非平凡解的不存在性。     

普通番茄与秘鲁番茄杂种后代的形态,亲和性及抗性表现

继获得普通番茄‘北京早红’与秘鲁番茄杂交种后,本试验着重于对杂种后代的形态、亲和性及抗性表现的观察,杂种的多数性状为双亲中的显性性状或双亲的中间型,但也表现了一些奇异性状,如果实的颜色和花序的形状与排列通过株间的“杂交”克服了杂种的高度自交不亲和性,从而顺利得到杂种的自交后代;杂种各世代均高抗TMV 0株系和1株系,并有部分选系抗TMV 1·2株系,由此判断秘鲁番茄亲本可能具有TM~a_2基因;用南京地区CMV厥叶株系和强株系分别接种,各世代表现部分抗病或耐病。     

Imperfect Competition and Common Resource Exploitation—An Analysis of Renewable Resource Management with Non—use Values

This article analyzes the importance of non-use values in the management of natural resources with a model of imperfect competition.By constucting a framework of duopolistic exploiters.the incorporation of non-use values based on self-interest and altruistic motives appears to be significant for determining the degree of inefficiency caused by the problem of common property at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.It is found that when the non-use value placed by the altruist exploiter is bounded by that placed by the pure selfinterest exploiter,the effect of market power is dominated by the effect of common exploitation.In this case,the exploiters‘ harvesting strategy will response in the same direction to the change of each other‘s harvesting at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.In contrast,when the non-use value placed by the altruist is substantially larger or smaller than that placed by the self-interest exploiter,one exploiter‘s increase in harvesting will lead to a decrease in harvesting of the other exploiter at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.