合欢枯萎病菌的生物学特性研究

通过组织分离法获得合欢枯萎病纯茵种，并以常规方法对合欢枯萎病病茵的生物学特性进行了研究，其结果表明，该茵可在PDA、PSA以及合欢的根、茎、叶培养基上生长，在PDA及PSA上的生长情况基本一致，且茵丝旺盛，而在合欢根、茎、叶培养基中的生长情况稍差；该茵的生长温度为5～32℃，最适生长温度为23—29℃；孢子在葡萄糖培养...     

土地流转制度与当代农村社会秩序的重建

文章通过介绍传统土地制度对农村社会秩序的影响,重点对在土地流转制度影响下当代农村社会秩序的重建进行了试探性分析,指出在我国当前农村实际情况下,必须充分发挥土地流转制度的维系功能,帮助农民培养其内生性力量,促进和引导农民个体社会化,从而实现我国农村社会秩序的重新建构。     

甘蓝型油菜雌性不育突变体FS1花器官形态结构研究

植物界中雌性不育现象普遍存在，迄今已在小麦、水稻、苎麻、油松、桔柑等作物中发现了雌性不育突变体^[1~5]，并对雌性不育的机理、遗传、应用进行了研究^[6~11]。1996年我们在油菜育种圃甘蓝型黄籽油菜宁油10号株系中发现了3株异常株，每株只结几个角果，角果肥大且角粒数只有1~5个，后来研究证实为雌性不育突变体，定名为FS1。雌性不育系作父本与母本混播，应用于杂交油菜制种可缩小父、母本间传粉距离，增加母本播种量，从而提高制种产量和纯度。初步研究表明，FS1天然授粉、套袋自交、剥蕾自交结角率为3%左右，平均每角粒数为1.30-2.07粒，其雌性不育性可以遗传，花粉育性正常，体细胞染色体数正常，为2n=38，花粉母细胞减数分裂正常（有关研究另文报道）。为了解甘蓝型油菜雌性不育突变体FS1的雌性不育机制，本文从形态结构方面做了初步研究。     

Existence of an Arbitrage about Portfolio in an Unequilibrium Market

This article has discussed the problem of an arbitrage about an portfolio in an unequilimarket and got a determinable theorem about existence of an arbitrage about an portfolio. According to this theorem,an arbitrage about portfolio is not existing if there exists a respect martignal measure.A structural result about existence of arbitrage about an portfolio in a market is gotten. All results represent the existence of an arbitrage about an portfolio is related closely to the type of market.     

Conditional Value-at-Risk and Its Use in Credit Risk Measurement of Banks

Credit risk, the major risk of bank, is more and more intense during the period of economic restructuring in China. In view of the flaw of present risk measurement system, Conditional Value-at-Risk is used for the credit risk measurement which is better than Value-at-Risk. This paper creates the model ,while gives the method and procedure for solving it. So CVaRof credit combination is produced, which is just the early warning value of credit risk. At last, it is concluded that the CVaRrisk measurement is too difficult to use widely at present in china, then some advice is provided.     

Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information

Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.     

Incentive Mechanism for Team Cooperation Based on Implicit Side Contract

Aiming at the free-riding problem in team incentive, this paper designs a dynamic incentive mechanism based on implicit side contract with dynamic game theory by introducing the reasonable assumption that there is horizontal monitor in team production. The theoretic analysis indicates that the dynamic incentive mechanism, in which a strict group incentive compatibility contract is taken at the first stage and an individual incentive compatibility contract is taken at the second stage, can implement team cooperation uniquely in the general condition of risk aversion and stochastic production by only two stage repeated game.