Air force takes aim at a big bird

Early this year, the U.S. land-based force of nuclear missiles became vulnerable to destruction in a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union. The Air Force has worried about this situation for a long time, searching high and low for a better place to put both the existing silo-based missiles and a new missile, the MX. The first article in this series examined the reasons that U.S. officials became alarmed about missile vulberability, and the second examined the short-term plan to put missiles into silos. This article explores the Ait Force's least favourite long-term basing mode. Subsequent articles will explore the alternatives.     

Carter's Plan for MX Lives On

Early this year, the U.S. land-based force of nuclear missiles became vulnerable-on paper-to destruction in a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union. The Air Force has worried about this problem for a long time, searching high and low for a better place to put both the existing, silo-based Minuteman missiles and a new missile, the MX. Under the Carter Admnistration, the Air Force agreed to a missle basing plan known as MPS, for multiple protective shelters. The Reagan Administration has ostensibly dropped this plan in favour of several alternatives. Previous articles in this series explored why U.S. officials became alarmed about missile vulnerability; the genesis of a short-term plan to put more missiles into silos; continuing Air Force opposition to a plan for missiles on constantly roving aricraft; and a bizare plan to bury missiles deep underground.     

Erratum

In R. Jeffrey Smith's News and Comment article "Antisatellite weapon sets dangerous course" (14 Oct., p. 140), a remark on page 141 (column 3) by Richard Garwin about the usefulness of rockets, balloons, and aircraft to supplant U.S. photoreconnaissance and meterological satellites was inadvertently attributed to Robert Buchheim. And a characterization on page 141 (column 2) of the Soviet antisatellite weapon, or ASAT, was actually made by General Lewis Allen, the former Air Force chief of staff, not by General David Jones, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, a footnote on page 142 should have identified the Patriot as an air-to-air missile, not an air-to-ground missile.     

Planetary Contamination II: Soviet and U.S. Practices and Policies

The accompanying article of Horo witz et al. concluded with the view that the COSPAR recommendations re garding Mars should be adjusted to re flect new environmental information. Specifically, it was concluded that viable terrestrial microorganisms which are transported to Mars inside solid components in sealed spaces have a low probability of being released to the sur face or atmosphere, and that, if any are released, they are not likely to in fect the planet. We suggest, in addition, that both the COSPAR recommenda tions and U.S. planetary quarantine policy should be altered to take into account past and continuing Soviet prac tice regarding the. exploration of Mars and Venus. No amount of analysis by COSPAR, or of costly, self-imposed restrictions by the U.S. on its own planetary exploration program, can reduce the probability of contamination of either Venus or Mars below what the Soviets have already made it, or will make it as they continue their large planetary effort. All that U.S. policy can accomplish is to insure that U.S. efforts do not significantly increase the probability above that level. Any rec ommended policy which would require the U.S. to apply significantly more stringent restrictions is illogical in that, in effect, the U.S. would be asked to increase greatly the cost and complexity of its planetary program without achieving any significant reduction in the probability of actual contamination. There exists some parallelism be tween the problem of planetary quaran tine and that of radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing, al though the desirable solution to the quarantine problem is not merely to stop all activity. Both are multilateral problems, and individual national policy necessarily must reflect the policy of other nations. Thus, the real questions that must be faced by COSPAR, and by the U.S., are, (i) What is the prob able number of viable terrestrial micro organisms alreadyr transported to Venus and to Mars? and (ii) What is the to tal number to be expected in the next decade or so from foreseeable Soviet efforts alone? Then COSPAR can rec ommend, and the U.S. can decide, that the total U.S. contribution should be equal to some specified fraction of the total present and future Soviet contribu tion. This approach in turn suggests that every effort should be made to induce the Soviets to supply additional de tails on the Zond 2 and Venus 3 mis sion and trajectory and, particularly, on the procedure used for sterilizing the components and assembly of both space craft. With such information, the proba ble number of viable terrestrial microor ganisms deposited on Venus and Mars could be estimated well enough to per mit a. realistic quantitative analysis of what U.S. policy and practice should be. However, if more complete informa tion on Soviet practice cannot be ob tained, then, it seems to us, the U.S. has no logical alternative but to per mit greater engineering freedom in lander delivery technique and to ac cept gaseous and other nonthermal sterilization procedures, where neces sary, in its own program. By relying on the demonstrated U.S. spacecraft reliability to insure that the U.S. con tribution to planetary contamination will remain significantly less than the Soviet contribution, we could reduce significantly the cost and time required to carry out serious scientific investiga tions of the surfaces of Venus and Mars.     

Military uses of uranium: keeping the u.s. Energy accounts

Present accounts of U.S. energy consumption are incomplete in two ways: they include neither the direct military uses of nuclear energy nor the mostly military, nonfuel uses of uranium. Preliminary estimates indicate that significant distortions are created in the data on U.S. nuclear energy consumption patterns as a result of these omissions.     

Radioactive wastes: a comparison of u.s. Military and civilian inventories

Contrary to widespread belief, the accumulated inventory of fission products generated by the still small U.S. civilian nuclear power industry may already be comparable to that generated in the past by U.S. military nuclear programs. Although the volumes of the military wastes are very large, they are on the average almost 100 times more dilute than projected commercial high-level wastes.     

Facing nuclear reality

Nuclear weapons that are safe and secure, reliable, survivable, and effective will be a critical element of this nation's deterrent for the foreseeable future. The existence of these weapons reflects the tension that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear test bans will not reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons or this tension. Imprudent nuclear test bans, however, could impair the viability of this vital element of U.S. security. New, more restrictive test limitations would not enhance our national security. They do not address the two most important issues-namely, major reductions in strategic and conventional forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and a widespread lessening of tension between our two countries. In fact, it is conceivable that the diversion of political attention from arms reduction efforts and the distrust generated by test-ban verification problems could actually increase tensions between the two countries. We believe that more restrictive test limitations or a nuclear test ban should be considered only as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to arms control. We must reduce the numbers of the most destabilizing weapons and the overall size of the strategic arsenals through negotiations. A restrictive test ban may be a proper last step in our quest for nuclear arms control and a stable peace, but it would, in our opinion, be an imprudent first step. Further test limitations will be consistent with increased stability and decreased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union only if they are instituted after major stabilizing reductions are made in the strategic nuclear and conventional forces of both countries.     

Cost of space-based laser ballistic missile defense

Orbiting platforms carrying infrared lasers have been proposed as weapons forming the first tier of a ballistic missile defense system under the President's Strategic Defense Initiative. As each laser platform can destroy a limited number of missiles, one of several methods of countering such a system is to increase the number of offensive missiles. Hence it is important to know whether the cost-exchange ratio, defined as the ratio of the cost to the defense of destroying a missile to the cost to the offense of deploying an additional missile, is greater or less than 1. Although the technology to be used in a ballistic missile defense system is still extremely uncertain, it is useful to examine methods for calculating the cost-exchange ratio. As an example, the cost of an orbiting infrared laser ballistic missile defense system employed against intercontinental ballistic missiles launched simultaneously from a small area is compared to the cost of additional offensive missiles. If one adopts lower limits to the costs for the defense and upper limits to the costs for the offense, the cost-exchange ratio comes out substantially greater than 1. If these estimates are confirmed, such a ballistic missile defense system would be unable to maintain its effectiveness at less cost than it would take to proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to overcome it and would therefore not satisfy the President's requirements for an effective strategic defense. Although the method is illustrated by applying it to a space-based infrared laser system, it should be straightforward to apply it to other proposed systems.     

A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing

Our foregoing analysis of the role of a comprehensive test ban leads us to the following conclusions. 1) A CTB by itself will have little direct effect on the arms race between the superpowers. It would not hinder their nuclear arms production and deployment nor would it necessarily present a significant obstacle to the development of new nuclear weapons systems, despite limiting the development of new nuclear warhead designs. It can hardly make a dent in the destructive capability of the superpowers or in their ability to step up the pace of the arms race. 2) The chief merits of a CTB reside in the political sphere. It would help promote detente and could help to escalate interest in arms control agreements of broader scope. But in neither of these effects would it be as significant as a successful SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) agreement. The CTB also lingers as a piece of unfinished business since the signing of the LTB in 1963. The question can be and has been raised, "If the superpowers are serious about arms control, why have they not accepted the CTB, which is simple in concept and in form and is also free of serious military risks?" Such doubts about the sincerity of the superpowers' willingness to limit their own arms development will persist as long as there is no CTB. Substantial agreement at SALT would lessen some of this effect too, but would not eliminate it completely. 3) Recent progress in seismic identification has been impressive, and other means of obtaining technical intelligence about nuclear testing have probably also improved greatly. In addition, research on the technical means of on-site inspection has demonstrated its limited effectiveness. Therefore, the role of on-site inspections as an added deterrent to cheating on a CTB has diminished substantially. This is not to say that detection and identification of all nuclear tests is possible now, or ever, but only that on-site inspection would add very little to the other technical means now available for verification. 4) It will become increasingly difficult in the United States to oppose the CTB on the basis of risks that accompany possible Soviet evasion of a treaty that does not include the right of onsite inspection. The opposition to a CTB is now likely to shift to the more direct argument that nuclear testing is important to keep pace with continuing worldwide technical and military developments. The justification for U.S. testing is only in part because of advances in Soviet nuclear technology per se. Those opposing a CTB may argue that it makes little sense, and may even be courting danger, to freeze nuclear technology alone and that banning nuclear tests should await an agreement that copes with all military research and development and all qualitative improvements in weapons systems. This directly confronts the argument that the unique virtue of a CTB is that it provides a simple and feasible first step in the very complicated problems of controlling military technology. 5) The mutual deterrence of the superpowers will not be compromised if a CTB agreement is reached and one side or the other clandestinely violates such an agreement. The state of nuclear technology in both countries is mature, and the destructive capability of their nuclear arsenals can be easily maintained. Whatever small improvements can come as a consequence of clandestine testing would hardly affect the strategic balance. 6) It seems unlikely that China and France will agree to stop testing in the near future. These countries refused to join the nonproliferation treaty, which did not affect their nuclear programs, and it is doubtful that, proceeding from military considerations alone, they would join a CTB. Their nuclear programs are still not mature, and a CTB would freeze their positions of inferiority with respect to the superpowers. There may, however, be wider political and security arrangements to induce them to participate. Cessation of tests by the other nuclear powers might serve as an inducement to China and France to refrain from testing. 7) The key near-nuclear powers, such as Japan, India, and Israel, are much more concerned with the military activities of their neighbors than they are with those of the superpowers. The modest nuclear restraints that a CTB imposes on the superpowers are hardly likely to have a direct impact on the approach of these countries to their own security. However, for these critical near-nuclear countries a CTB may be much more acceptable than the nonproliferation treaty. A CTB would not prohibit the production of fissionable material, the development of nuclear weapons technology short of testing, nor the stockpiling of untested nuclear weapons, and is therefore less restrictive. Consequently, these powers may be willing to ratify a CTB, but not the nonproliferation treaty. On the other hand, the CTB may provide them with a ready excuse for not succumbing to the pressure to ratify the nonproliferation treaty, if indeed they need excuses or would bow to such pressure. 8) A CTB is of very little added, direct significance to other nonnuclear powers who have already ratified or are about to ratify the nonproliferation treaty. It may only lessen their pique about the treaty's being highly discriminatory-the treaty imposes no restraints on the nuclear weapons programs of the nuclear powers, while the CTB restricts all parties to the agreement. 9) Peaceful nuclear explosions do not now show great promise and significance for economic development. What can be done with peaceful explosions can often be done by other means, although possibly at a slightly higher cost. On the other hand, making allowance for peaceful explosions greatly complicates a CTB. A useful approach to the problem of banning military tests but not foregoing indefinitely the use of peaceful explosions might, therefore, be to ban all nuclear explosions for a period of several years and to stipulate in the agreement that in that time there would be negotiations on how peaceful explosions may be controlled in a way that would not jeopardize the CTB.     

Nuclear Pulse (II): Ensuring Delivery of the Doomsday Signal

Defense strategists today assume that a single Soviet warhead detonated 200 miles above Nebraska would knock out unprotected communications equipment all across the United States. The reason is electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a by-product of high-altitude nuclear explosions that blankets huge tracts of the earth with peak fields of 50,000 volts per meter. The first installment of this three-part series described how EMP was discovered and why its potentially chaos-producing effects were overlooked for more than a decade. The second part examines the ongoing debate in the Pentagon over how to cope with the EMP threat. The third part will discuss questions EMP raises about waging a limited nuclear war.     

Administering and managing the u.s. And soviet space programs

This raises a fundamental question about the management, in its largest sense, of the U.S. space program and the other activities undertaken in response to the Sputnik experience. Has the whole operation represented but another highly successful one-shot exercise in crisis management, or has it represented incorporation into American society of a new way to organize, systematically and purposefully, the development and use of scientific and technological resources to the furtherance of national goals? It is too early to discern the answer to this question. But how it is answered will heavily weight any final appraisal of the comparative results of the U.S. and Soviet space programs.     

Gamma-ray measurements of a soviet cruise-missile warhead

A portable germanium detector was used to detect gamma-ray emissions from a nuclear warhead aboard the Soviet cruiser Slava. Measurements taken on the missile launch tube indicated the presence of uranium-235 and plutonium-239-the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. With the use of this equipment, these isotopes probably could have been identified at a distance of 4 meters from the warhead. Such inspections do not reveal detailed information about the design of the warhead.     

Corrections and clarifications

The Random Sample item, "Russians, U.S. differ on Arctic sub threat" (25 June, p. 1881) should have said that the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant has dumped 1 million curies of cesium-137 (not plutonium) into the North Sea. The plant has dumped more than 18,000 curies of plutonium.     

Bioterrorism. DOD retreats on plan for anthrax vaccine

Anthrax bacterium, once the deadly scourge of goat-hair workers, has become the bane of the U.S. defense establishment. Without infecting a single soldier, it has created a logistical headache for the Pentagon, as military contractors have fallen far short of supplying a vaccine that will protect all troops and be acceptable to health authorities. Last week military officials were forced to beat a hasty retreat in their current efforts, raising the hackles of legislators who already had serious doubts about the program.     

Outlook for soviet oil

Public debate about Soviet oil has become more widespread in the past 5 years, but during this period Soviet petroleum exports have ceased to be made available by volume. Soviet oil consumption has usually been estimated by deducting exports from total production. This article takes the alternative approach, using Soviet statistics from a variety of sources, to build up a sectoral pattern of Soviet oil demand and to consider this in the broader context of total Comecon energy supply and demand. From this focus future prospects for the Comecon energy balance are analyzed.     

Uncertainties in building a strategic defense

Building a strategic defense against nuclear ballistic missiles involves complex and uncertain functional, spatial, and temporal relations. Such a defensive system would evolve and grow over decades. It is too complex, dynamic, and interactive to be fully understood initially by design, analysis, and experiments. Uncertainties exist in the formulation of requirements and in the research and design of a defense architecture that can be implemented incrementally and be fully tested to operate reliably. The analysis and measurement of system survivability, performance, and cost-effectiveness are critical to this process. Similar complexities exist for an adversary's system that would suppress or use countermeasures against a missile defense. Problems and opportunities posed by these relations are described, with emphasis on the unique characteristics and vulnerabilities of space-based systems.     

The costs of the soviet empire

A comprehensive framework is developed and applied to estimate the economic costs incurred by the Soviet Union in acquiring, maintaining, and expanding its empire. The terms "empire" and "costs" are explicitly defined. Between 1971 and 1980, the average ratio between empire costs and Soviet gross national product was about 3.5 percent; as a ratio to Soviet military spending, empire costs averaged about 28 percent. The burden imposed on Soviet economic growth by empire costs is also considered, as well as rates of change in these costs, and the important political, military, and strategic benefits associated by the Soviet leadership with maintenance and expansion of the empire. Prospective empire costs and changes in Soviet economic constraints resulting from the declining performance of the domestic economy are also considered.     

U1 small nuclear RNA genes are subject to dosage compensation in mouse cells

Multiple copies of a gene that encodes human U1 small nuclear RNA were introduced into mouse C127 cells with bovine papilloma virus as the vector. For some recombinant constructions, the human U1 gene copies were maintained extrachromosomally on the viral episome in an unrearranged fashion. The relative abundance of human and mouse U1 small nuclear RNA varied from one cell line to another, but in some lines human U1 RNA accounted for as much as one-third of the total U1. Regardless of the level of human U1 expression, the total amount of U1 RNA (both mouse and human) in each cell line was nearly the same relative to endogenous mouse 5S or U2 RNA. This result was obtained whether measurements were made of total cellular U1 or of only the U1 in small nuclear ribonucleoprotein particles that could be precipitated with antibody directed against the Sm antigen. The data suggest that the multigene families encoding mammalian U1 RNA are subject to some form of dosage compensation.     

A low-threshold test ban is feasible

At present, nuclear explosions are limited by treaty to underground testing with yields of no more than 150 kilotons, and recently there have been renewed calls for further test restrictions. As part of these discussions, the U.S. Congress is considering bills that would legislate new limits to testing,whereas the Reagan Administration opposes such constraints. The editors of Science have asked two groups of participants in the debate to present their arguments for or against new limits to testing. Feiveson, Paine, and von Hippel argue for a treaty of indefinite duration between the United States and the Soviet Union, which includes the following provisions: (i) a ban on all testing outside a desiqnated site having known seismic properties; (ii)verification by means of on-site inspection and in-country seismic monitoring; (iii) unlimited testing below 1 kiloton at the special site; and (iv) an average of one test per year with a yield of up to 15 kilotons for ensuring reliability of the nuclear stockpile. MiUer, Brown, and Nordyke argue that a lowering of the present 150-kiloton threshold would be undesirable, and that new test bans would divert attention from a comprehensive approach to negotiated reductions in the nuclear and conventional arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.     

Potential Cuban agricultural export profile under open trade between the U. S. and Cuba

The sweeping changes that have taken place in the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union have detrimentally impacted an already weak Cuban economy. The establishment of the Special Period (1990-) embodies increasing austerity, especially in the inputs market. Recent economic liberalization policies in Cuba may lead to a more market-oriented economy, the lifting of the U. S. embargo, and commercial relations between the two countries. There is concern on the potential impact that resumption of trade may have on the U. S. and Florida's agricultural economy. This study implies potential costs for the citrus, sugar, horticultural, and seafood industries in Florida, while potential Florida exports unveil trade opportunities of a large magnitude. Further research is needed to quantify potential benefits and costs. Of special importance is the fate of Cuba's recent program on low-input sustainable agriculture once large amounts of inputs become available.