Horse owners' biosecurity practices following the first equine influenza outbreak in Australia

A cross-sectional study was conducted involving 759 Australian horse owners to determine their biosecurity practices and perceptions one year after the 2007 equine influenza outbreak and to investigate the factors influencing these perceptions and practices. A web link to an online questionnaire was sent to 1224 horse owners as a follow-up to a previous study to obtain information about biosecurity perceptions and practices, impacts of the 2007 EI outbreak, demographic information and information about horse industry involvement. Ordinal logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine factors associated with poor biosecurity practices. Biosecurity compliance (low, medium, high), as determined by horse owners' responses to a 16-item question on the frequency of various biosecurity measures, was used as the outcome variable in ordinal logistic regression analyses. Variables with a univariable p-value ≤0.2 were eligible for inclusion in multivariable models built using a manual stepwise approach. Variables with a p-value <0.05 in multivariable models were retained in the final model. Two potential confounders - age and gender of participants - were included in the final model irrespective of their p-values. Thirty percent of the respondents had low biosecurity compliance and were performing biosecurity practices 'not very often' or 'never'. Younger people, people with two or more children, those who were not involved with horses commercially and those who had no long-term business impacts resulting from the 2007 EI outbreak were more likely to have lower biosecurity compliance. People who were not fearful of a future outbreak of equine influenza in Australia and those who thought their current hygiene and access control practices were not very effective in protecting their horses also had poor biosecurity practices. In this observational study we identified factors associated with a group of horse owners with low levels of biosecurity compliance. As this cross-sectional study only assesses associations, the identified factors should be further investigated in order to be considered in the design of extension activities to increase horse owners' biosecurity compliance.     

Horse owners'/managers' perceptions about effectiveness of biosecurity measures based on their experiences during the 2007 equine influenza outbreak in Australia

Following the first ever equine influenza outbreak in Australia in 2007, a study was conducted involving 200 horse owners and managers to determine their perceptions about effectiveness of biosecurity measures and the factors associated with these perceptions. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with horse owners/managers to obtain information about their perceptions of the effectiveness of biosecurity practices, their sources of information about infection control during the outbreak and their horse industry involvement. Two outcome variables were created from horse owners' responses to a 17-item question on the perceived effectiveness of various recommended equine influenza biosecurity measures: (a) a binary outcome variable (Low/High biosecurity effectiveness) and (b) a continuous outcome variable (the proportion of the 17 measures considered 'very effective'). These outcomes were used in binomial logistic and linear regression analyses, respectively, to determine factors associated with perceptions of biosecurity effectiveness. Variables with a p-value <0.05 in multivariable models were retained in the final models. The majority (83%) of the 200 horse owners and managers interviewed believed that more than half of the recommended equine influenza biosecurity measures were very effective for protecting their horses from equine influenza infection in the event of a future outbreak. Interviewees that were more likely to judge on-farm biosecurity measures as effective were those who received infection control information from a veterinarian during the outbreak, did not experience equine influenza infection in their horses, and those on small acreage premises (homes with horses on site). Greater levels of preparedness for a future equine influenza outbreak and greater interest in information about infection control were associated with a better perception about effectiveness of biosecurity measures. This study identified factors associated with horse owners' and managers' perception of effectiveness of biosecurity measures. These findings should be considered in the design of infection control programs.     

两株H1N1亚型重组流感病毒的猪致病性研究

选取2种不同宿主来源的新型甲型重组H1N1亚型流感病毒(犬流感病毒(A/canine/Guangxi/QZ5/2013)(简称CIV-QZ5)和猪流感病毒(A/swine/Guangxi/QZ5/2014)(简称SIV-QZ5),以猪为动物模型,分别以106 PFU/mL病毒剂量和气管攻毒的方式感染3周龄仔猪,从而探究新型甲型重组犬流感病毒对猪的致病性。试验发现CIV-QZ5及SIV-QZ5均能有效感染仔猪,攻毒仔猪均出现发热(≥39.5℃)、流鼻涕、食欲减退、活动减少等流感症状,其中CIV组出现1头仔猪(A3)死亡。通过对肺脏灌洗液进行病毒滴定,发现CIV组在攻毒后3d和5d在肺脏的复制能力较SIV组强,最高达到3.12log10PFU/mL。病理剖检发现,肺脏出现不同程度的实变。肺脏病理切片发现两组均出现不同病变,其中以死亡仔猪(A3)最为明显,主要以支气管上皮细胞坏死脱落,肺泡壁增厚,肺泡腔以及支气管内有大量的弥漫性浸润的单核细胞为主要特征。结果表明,猪源甲型重组CIV不仅能引发猪出现明显流感症状,而且能有效地在肺脏复制,为了解潜在的猪-犬跨宿主传播机制奠定了基础。     

Serological Evidence of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus Infections in Greek Swine

The introduction of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) influenza virus in pigs changed the epidemiology of influenza A viruses (IAVs) in swine in Europe and the rest of the world. Previously, three IAV subtypes were found in the European pig population: an avian‐like H1N1 and two reassortant H1N2 and H3N2 viruses with human‐origin haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase proteins and internal genes of avian decent. These viruses pose antigenically distinct HAs, which allow the retrospective diagnosis of infection in serological investigations. However, cross‐reactions between the HA of pH1N1 and the HAs of the other circulating H1 IAVs complicate serological diagnosis. The prevalence of IAVs in Greek swine has been poorly investigated. In this study, we examined and compared haemagglutination inhibition (HI) antibody titres against previously established IAVs and pH1N1 in 908 swine sera from 88 herds, collected before and after the 2009 pandemic. While we confirmed the historic presence of the three IAVs established in European swine, we also found that 4% of the pig sera examined after 2009 had HI antibodies only against the pH1N1 virus. Our results indicate that pH1N1 is circulating in Greek pigs and stress out the importance of a vigorous virological surveillance programme.     

Influenza A Viruses Detected in Swine in Southern Germany after the H1N1 Pandemic in 2009

Infections with influenza A viruses (IAV) are highly prevalent in swine populations, and stable cocirculation of at least three lineages has been well documented in European swine – till 2009. However, since the emergence of the human pandemic pdmH1N1 virus in 2009, which has been (re)introduced into individual swine herds worldwide, the situation has been changing. These variations in the respective IAV pools within pig populations are of major interest, and the zoonotic potential of putative emerging viruses needs to be evaluated. As data on recent IAV in swine from southern Germany were relatively sparse, the purpose of this study was to determine the major IAV subtypes actually present in this region. To this aim, from 2010 to 2013, 1417 nasal swabs or lung tissue samples from pigs with respiratory disease were screened for IAV genomes. Overall, in 130 holdings IAV genomes were detected by real‐time RT‐PCR targeting the matrix protein gene. For further analyses, several PCR protocols were adapted to quickly subtype between H1, pdmH1, H3, N1 and N2 sequences. Taken together, cocirculation of the three stable European lineages of IAV was confirmed for Bavaria. H1N1 sequences were identified in 59, whereas H1N2 genomes were only diagnosed in 14, and H3N2 in 9 of the holdings analysed. However, pdmH1 in combination with N1 was detected in 2010, 2012 and 2013 confirming a presence, albeit in low prevalence, likewise pdmH1N2 reassortant viruses. Interestingly, individual cases of coinfections with more than one subtype were diagnosed. Partial genome sequences were determined and phylogenetic analyses performed. Clearly other than in the human population classically circulating IAV have not been displaced by pdmH1N1 in Bavarian swine. However, some interesting viruses were detected. Further surveillance of these viruses in the Bavarian pig population will be of major importance, to monitor future developments.     

Serological Survey in Dogs and Cats for Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Germany

A serological survey for the detection of antibodies to influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 was carried out in a population of dogs and cats in Germany. A total of 1150 sera collected in 2010 and 2011 were screened using an ELISA targeting anti‐nucleoprotein NP antibodies. Those initially screened positive samples were subsequently tested for antibodies to N1 neuraminidase followed by a virus neutralization test using A/Bayern/74/2009 strain. A prevalence of A(H1N1)pdm09‐specific antibodies of 0.13% and 1.93% was estimated among dogs and cats, respectively. Evidence of exposure to other influenza A virus subtypes was also observed.     

Public perceptions of the transmission of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 from pigs and pork products in Australia

A cross-sectional study was conducted at the height of the pandemic influenza H1N1/09 outbreak in Australia in 2009. The objectives of the study were to evaluate public perceptions about transmission and prevention of the disease, to understand their concerns and preparedness to cope with the disease, and to investigate drivers influencing their behaviour. A questionnaire was designed and administered to 510 customers visiting 15 butcher shops in the Greater Sydney region between 26th June and 2nd August 2009. Data were analysed to estimate the proportion of people with certain perceptions and to evaluate the influence of these perceptions on two binary outcome variables: (1) whether or not people believed that avoiding pork would protect them from contracting H1N1/09, and (2) whether or not they actually made some changes to pork consumption after the outbreak. A majority of the respondents had perceptions based on fact about transmission and prevention of H1N1/09. As many as 96.8% of the respondents believed that washing their hands frequently was likely to protect them from contracting H1N1/09. Similarly, most believed that they could contract H1N1/09 by travelling on public transport with a sick person present (94.1%), by shaking hands with a sick person (89.2%), or by attending a community gathering (73.7%). Women were more likely than men to have factual perceptions about protective behaviours. Misconceptions regarding transmission of the disease were evident, with 21.7% believing that avoiding eating pork could protect them against H1N1/09, 11.1% believing that they could contract H1N1/09 by drinking tap water, 22.8% by handling uncooked pork meat and 15.6% by eating cooked pork. Approximately one third of respondents believed that working in a pig farm or an abattoir increased their likelihood of contracting H1N1/09 (36.9% and 32.3%, respectively). Younger people (<35 years old) were more likely to have these misconceptions than older people. Reduction in consumption of pork, ham or bacon was significantly associated with misconceptions regarding the risk of contracting H1N1/09 from eating pig meat products. It is recommended that in the event of a future disease emergency, communication activities providing factual information and targeting younger people should be used.     

Detection of Novel Reassortant Influenza A (H3N2) and H1N1 2009 Pandemic Viruses in Swine in Hanoi,Vietnam

From May to September 2013, monthly samples were collected from swine in a Vietnamese slaughterhouse for influenza virus isolation and serological testing. A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses and a novel H3N2 originating from reassortment between A(H1N1)pdm09 and novel viruses of the North American triple reassortant lineage were isolated. Serological results showed low seroprevalence for the novel H3N2 virus and higher seroprevalence for A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. In addition, serology suggested that other swine influenza viruses are also circulating in Vietnamese swine.     

Concurrent 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infection in Ferrets and in a Community in Pennsylvania

We report a fall 2010 cluster of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 (pH1N1) infections in pet ferrets in Lehigh Valley region of Pennsylvania. The ferrets were associated with one pet shop. The influenza cluster occurred during a period when the existing human surveillance systems had identified little to no pH1N1 in humans in the Lehigh Valley, and there were no routine influenza surveillance systems for exotic pets. The index case was a 2.5‐month‐old neutered male ferret that was presented to a veterinary clinic with severe influenza‐like illness (ILI). In response to laboratory notification of a positive influenza test result, and upon request from the Pennsylvania Department of Health (PADOH), the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture (PDA) conducted an investigation to identify other ill ferrets and to identify the source and extent of infection. PDA notified the PADOH of the pH1N1 infection in the ferrets, leading to enhanced human surveillance and the detection of pH1N1 human infections in the surrounding community. Five additional ferrets with ILI linked to the pet shop were identified. This simultaneous outbreak of ferret and human pH1N1 demonstrates the important link between animal health and public health and highlights the potential use of veterinary clinics for sentinel surveillance of diseases shared between animals and humans.     

Influenza virus surveillance in waterfowl in Pennsylvania after the H5N2 avian outbreak

During the latter stages of the lethal H5N2 influenza eradication program in domestic poultry in Pennsylvania in 1983-84, surveillance of waterfowl was done to determine if these birds harbored influenza viruses that might subsequently appear in poultry. From late June to November 1984, 182 hemagglutinating viruses were isolated from 2043 wild birds, primarily ducks, in the same geographical area as the earlier lethal H5N2 avian influenza outbreak. The virus isolates from waterfowl included paramyxoviruses (PMV-1, -4, and -6) and influenza viruses of 13 antigenic combinations. There was only one H5N2 isolate from a duck. Although this virus was antigenically related to the lethal H5N2 virus, genetic and antigenic analysis indicated that it could be discriminated from the virulent family of H5N2 viruses, and it did not originate from chickens. Many of the influenza viruses obtained from wild ducks were capable of replicating in chickens after experimental inoculation but did not cause disease. These studies show that many influenza A virus strains circulating in waterfowl in the vicinity of domestic poultry in Pennsylvania did not originate from domestic poultry. These influenza viruses from wild ducks were capable of infecting poultry; however, transmission of these viruses to poultry apparently was avoided by good husbandry and control measures.     

甲型H1N1流感病毒实验室生物风险评估

根据目前掌握的资料,从生物学特性、流行特点、临床表现以及实验室活动等方面对甲型H1N1流感病毒做了初步的风险评估,以期为从事甲型H1N1病毒有关操作的实验室做好相关的风险评估及生物安全防护工作提供依据。     

Pandemic A/H1N1/2009 influenza virus in swine, Cameroon, 2010

Although swine origin A/H1N1/2009 influenza virus (hereafter "pH1N1″) has been detected in swine in 20 countries, there has been no published surveillance of the virus in African livestock. The objective of this study was to assess the circulation of influenza A viruses, including pH1N1 in swine in Cameroon, Central Africa. We collected 108 nasal swabs and 98 sera samples from domestic pigs randomly sampled at 11 herds in villages and farms in Cameroon. pH1N1 was isolated from two swine sampled in northern Cameroon in January 2010. Sera from 28% of these herds were positive for influenza A by competitive ELISA and 92.6% of these swine showed cross reactivity with pandemic A/H1N1/2009 influenza virus isolated from humans. These results provide the first evidence of this virus in the animal population in Africa. In light of the significant role of swine in the ecology of influenza viruses, our results call for greater monitoring and study in Central Africa.     

A serological survey of canine H3N2, pandemic H1N1/09 and human seasonal H3N2 influenza viruses in dogs in China

Influenza viruses have been isolated from dogs in China; however, the extent of influenza infection among dogs is not yet clear. Here, we examined the seroprevalence of avian-origin canine H3N2, pandemic H1N1/09 and human seasonal H3N2 influenza viruses in pet dogs in China during January 2012 to June 2013. The seropositivity rate of canine H3N2, H1N1/09 and human H3N2 were 3.5%, 1.5%, and 1.2%, respectively. Dogs aged 2–5 years were most commonly seropositive to canine H3N2 virus. It is worth noting that two serum samples were positive against both canine H3N2 and H1N1/09 viruses, suggesting the possibility of coinfection with both viruses. Our findings emphasize the necessity for continued surveillance of influenza viruses in dogs in China.     

部分猪场H1和H3亚型猪流感的血清学调查

为了解中国部分省市规模化猪场H1和H3亚型猪流感病毒的流行情况,采用血凝抑制试验对采集于广东、湖南、河南省12个市县28个规模化猪场的799份血清进行H1和H3亚型猪流感病毒的抗体检测。结果表明,H1亚型抗体阳性率在0~83.33%之间,猪抗体总阳性率为46.18%(369/799),猪场阳性率为89.29%(25/28)。H3亚型抗体阳性率在0~100.00%之间,猪抗体总阳性率为61.33%(490/799),猪场阳性率为85.71%(24/28)。广东、湖南和河南地区H1亚型抗体阳性率分别为48.91%、40.26%和50.67%,H3亚型抗体阳性率分别为58.55%、70.78%和78.67%。在被调查的上述3个地区的猪群中,H1和H3亚型猪流感病毒的感染较为普遍,其中H3亚型感染率高于H1亚型,且各地区猪流感病毒的流行情况存在地域性差异。     

从"猪流感"到"甲型H1N1流感"看当前动物检疫工作

2009年3月墨西哥与美国先后出现甲型H1N1型流感,并在很短时间内席卷全球,WHO不仅将此次流感疫情称谓由"猪流感"变更为"甲型H1N1流感",而且将其预警级别也提高到了6级。目前研究表明甲型H1N1流感是由新的流感病毒引起,该毒株包含有猪流感、禽流感和人流感等三种流感病毒的基因片段。其易感人群的年龄段主要为儿童和青壮年,且人群间传染性强。临床表现除一般流感症状外,表现出特异的呼吸道和消化道疾病症状,病死率高于一般流感。本文对猪流感、甲型H1N1流感的特征及其相互关系以及对动物检疫工作的影响等进行简述。     

新型A型H1N1猪流感疫情动态及防控措施

2009年3月18日由墨西哥发端的人类大流行性甲型(A型)H1N1流感疫情迅速在全球蔓延,并已扩散到中国。新型A型H1N1流感突破种间屏障由人传染给猪、禽,并相继在北美、南美、大洋洲出现疫情。2009年4月21日,新型A型H1N1猪流感疫情首次在北美的加拿大发生;2009年6月24日,在南美的阿根廷发生猪流感疫情;2009年7月24日,远在大洋洲的澳大利亚也出现猪流感疫情;更糟糕的是在2009年7月23日,在南美紧邻阿根廷的智利的禽类(火鸡)首次发生A型流感疫情。此次新型A型H1N1流感疫情呈现大流行病学显著变化:①突破种间屏障由人传染给猪、禽;②突破地理屏障,在三大洲先后暴发规模不等、强度不一的多起疫情。因此,我国卫生主管部门、兽医主管部门和出入境检验检疫部门应高度戒备,密切关注,采取严格的生物安全措施,严防疫情疫病跨越国境,特别是防止新型A型H1N1流感疫情在人群、猪群、禽群之间相互传播,避免疫情在人类和动物进一步扩散。