Analysis of the Behavior of Together-conspired Bidding

Since China adopted formalized and standardizedprocedures of tender and bidding in the construction industry, many illegal actions have been prevented effectively. However, the together-conspired bidding, a new illegal activity,recently emerged in many regions of China. It is widely believed that the establishedfair competition system will be frustrated and the healthy development of the industry will be harmed, if the together-conspired bidding can not be controlled. This paper firstly introduces the background of the together-conspired bidding and stressed the necessity of preventing together-conspired bidding. Then, the whole procedure of together-conspired bidding is studied and ananticipated profit model fortogether-conspired bidding is provided from the economic angle. According to the analysis on interactions between the economic factors and the anticipated profits, some strategic methods to prevent the together-conspired biddingare recommended.     

On the Non-price Bottom Bidding System under the Mode of Valuation with Bill Quality of Construction Works

It is the direction of the project bidding system reform to apply the non-price bottom bidding system under the mode of valuation with bill quality of construction works in China. In this paper, the significance of implementing the non-price bottom bidding system is analyzed and emphasis is put on the workout of the non-price bottom bidding, valuation and so on. The risk prevention and risk management are studied on the side of tenderee from the qualification examination, engineering guarantee, defending system and so on.     

Measurements to Protect Owners'' Benefits under the Non-price Bottom Bidding

Investment on construction projects has become an important factor in improving the development of economy in China.The non-price bottom bidding is a representation that the investment on projects is becoming standardized.During the years of trying out the non-price bottom bidding,the colluding in bidding or bidding below the cost has happened several times,which have damaged the benefits of owners.To solve theses problems,this paper firstly studies the reason of these problems-the failure in the normal relationship between principal and agent.Then,some measures have been presented as follows: building systematic and scientific system of qualification prejudication,judging behaviors of colluding in bidding and bidding below the cost with reason and providing a surety mechanism of the project.The authors hope that these measures are beneficial to non-price bottom bidding.     

Management System of the Tender and Bidding for Power Projects with a Valuation Based on the Bill of Quantities

Valuation based on the bill of quantifies will change the existing valuation mode of tender and bidding. For the standardized management of tender and bidding for power projects and the inteUigentized information management of power enterprises, it is an inevitable trend of reform to apply the valuation mode based on the bill of quantifies. According to the characteristics of power projects, this paper expounds the working process of the valuation mode based on the bill of quantities and analyzes the goal and function need of the tender and bidding management system. Considering the calculation procedure of the valuation and the quote strategy of quantities bill, the composition of fees for the valuation is settled and the calculation method is designed. To establish the management system of tender and bidding with a valuation based on the bill of quantities is beneficial for the costing reform of power projects and the perfection of the tender and bidding market. Therefore it is of great significance to spread the new management mode of project costing with a valuation based on the bill of quantities.     

Investigation on the Theory and Means of Construction Tendering and Bidding in the Period of Economy Transition

The tendering and bidding of engineering construction is a means, which makes use of the function of market mechanism to carry on or transmit the project.It has a history over one hundred years abroad, but it is used in China with great force only twenty years.Because actualizing construction tendering and bidding goes with the reform of market mechanism, the fashion of construction tendering and bidding in China is different from that customarily used internationally and there are many differences in means and procedures.In this paper, beginning with the theory of tendering and bidding, the premises of the first-price-sealed tendering and the current condition of China are compared and the means and development objects of tendering in the period of national economy transition are discussed.Finally, some problems and strategies to the problems of the mold of tendering of bill quantity of construction works are discussed.     

Optimal bidding models of power plants considering transmission congestion

In order to achieve optimal bidding strategy of power plants in electricity market, the authors build optimal bidding model by predicting the bidding coefficients of competitors, and the optimal bidding coefficient without considering transmission capacity is achieved. Based on the bidding coefficients, the market clearing model is built, and the expected market clearing price is achieved. According to the expected values, the authors calculate the power flow. When forecasting the transmission congestion, this paper presents an optimal bidding model taking transmission congestion into account. Based on sensitivity analysis, the output regulation of power plants with minimum cost of eliminating congestion is achieved. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method can help power plants achieve the optimal profit.     

Should State and Local Government Bidding for Big Businesses Be More Like eBay?

During recent decades, and especially after the economic downturn that began in the late 2000s, many U.S. state and local governments have intensified their pro‐growth efforts to promote corporate investment and jobs, including ever higher incentives (such as tax breaks and grants) in their bidding wars for big businesses. This paper draws an analogy—between bidding for big businesses and bidding on eBay—to highlight the drawbacks of high‐profile bidding wars among governments given that the large corporations establish the bidding rules in their favor. The main consideration raised is whether state and local government bidding for big businesses, which operates analogously to an auction, should be more like eBay, whose rules are fair not only for sellers but also for bidders.     

Microcomputer Network Management Information System for Construction Engineering Invite and Bidding

To assure that inviting and bidding are accomplished legally, normally and orderly in the construction engineering, a tangible market came into being by means of novel technologies, such as computers, networks and information managing so that exoteric, fair and equitable principles are embodied during inviting and bidding in the construction engineering. A framework model of the information managing system for inviting and bidding is proposed, which owns common functions and can be applied to usual construction engineering bargaining. Functions and characteristics of the computer network management system, which was developed and applied on the basis of the framework model, for construction engineering inviting and bidding information are demonstrated. In addition, pivotal technologies of developing the system also are expatiated.Anticipated effects are gained and the system is proved to own a friendly man machine interface after running and applying near a year. Maneuverability and expansibility is competent for inviting and bidding in the tangible construction market.     

On the Formation of Civil Engineering Contract

It is the major way to form a civil engineering contract by means of bidding and tendering passing through the following steps as: tendering, bidding, bid opening, evaluation, acceptance and contract signing. The legal nature of the bid is an invitation to offer. The bid has certain legal binding which is different from the ordinary invitation to offer. The legal nature of the tendering is an order, which is sent to the inviter by the bidder. The letter of acceptance takes effect when it is issued and meanwhile the civil engineering contract is formed.     

Ascertainment of the Cost of Construction Product in Construction Tendering and Bidding

The Tendering and Bidding Law" states that the bidder should not compete bidding through quoted price lower the cost, but it does not ascertain the meaning of the cost of building product. It is the purpose of this paper to ascertain the meaning of the building product cost. The calculation bases of both the social average product cost and of the enterprise individual product cost are analyzed and they are compared with each other. The authors point out that for some enterprise there is individual product cost lower the social average product cost. The function of design mechanism of bidding is revealing "private information" on "the lowest price". The purpose of carrying out bidding is introducing competition, reducing the cost for the owner and realizing the maximum yield. Both indicate the cost of building product, mentioned in "The Tendering and Bidding Law" should be the enterprise individual product cost.     

The Probability Risk Analysis of Bidding and Pricing for the Use of Land

In this paper by the probability method the effect of the undefinite indexes and the risk indexes on interior revenue rate(IRR) the main economic evaluation index in bidding and pricing of the use of land, is researched. The risk of the item is appreciated and the basis of bidding and pricing for the use of land is acquired. An example is presented.     

基于决策树的农产品供应商竞标能力的数据挖掘分析

应用基于决策树的数据挖掘算法对农产品电子商务B2B系统中的历史竞标样本进行了分类,通过给出一个结合实例的算法实现过程,说明了供应商在竞标过程中产品报价等部分影响因素间的一些潜在性规则,从而得出不同特征的农产品供应商在虚拟市场中的竞标能力高低差异依次由产品报价、配送及时率、市场需求水平等因素决定。     

Study on the Application of Communications Mechanism of Multi-agent Cooperation System in Tender Offer and Bidding

The quantity of work is needed to calculate the cost in tender offer and bidding. We represent the characteristic of KQML and put forward the idea of constructing the cost calculation system, which includes quantities calculation agents and cost calculation agents, applicable for not only tender bidding but also tender offer. The emphasis is to construct the communications mechanism between two kinds of agents by KQML. Then a communications application example between two kinds of Agent is depicted.     

Improvement Algorithm of Generation Cost Based on Reliability

This paper discusses the influenced manner of reliability on bidding, and establishes the direct functional relationship among reliability, generation cost and electricity price in different risk of power generation. In this function model, the generation cost and the price could reflect the current reliability of equipment in a dynamic way. The generation risk is also considered in competitive bidding. The bidding strategy based on this model helps the power plant acquire the optimal benefit.     

Value Engineering Applied in the Bidding

Project bidding and assessing aim at choosing the best bidder, and then achieve the best optimization of bidder's value aim. The current method of project bidding does not qualifiedly describe the connection among the quality, time limit for the project, and investment of engineering project, so it can not exactly evaluate the bidder's value aim. Consequently, this is not beneficial to achieve the best value. Value engineering is a function analysis method achieving the necessary functions at the lowest cost of total lifetime cycle. Based on the analysis of the existing issues in the valuating system, this paper provides some improvement on the current valuating methods and scientific basis for choosing the best bidder through calculating the value coefficient such as function, cost and value.     

Constructing organization network for community-oriented collaborative product design

Community-oriented collaborative design is an emergent form of collaborative product development, in which the range of collaborative partners extends to wide area community members. It is difficult to construct the organization network because the accurate features of the wide area community members are hard to access. Aiming at this problem, an organization network constructing method based on bidding mechanism is proposed. First, the bidding process based on contract net with confirmation protocol (CNCP) is presented. Then, considering the false profit declared by the bidders, a multiple rounds bidding process combined with genetic algorithm (GA) is used to get the best sub-projects allocation scheme, in which the total payment of sub-projects is minimal and the project due time is satisfied. A case analysis shows that the method can eliminate the false profit declared by the bidders and provides an operable way to construct network organization for community-oriented collaborative design.     

Selecting Bid with Reasonably Low Price Without Bottom Price Based On Sector Estimate

For raveling out the main shortage of tendering which is the reasonable sector is unreasonable of making the bid evaluation uncertain. In order to eliminate subjective factor, this paper quantificationally analyses the price in bidding and establishes the sector selecting bid model based on the sector estimate idea, which tries to provide a new method and academic basic for determining the reasonable sector. Finally, the article gives an example to prove that the model is feasible and effective and it tries to ensure the bidding assessment public, equitable and just.     

Something New or More of the Same in the Bidding Wars for Big Business?

The economic downturn that began in 2007–2008 was blamed by some commentators on neoliberalism and pro‐business policies. So we might expect U.S. state and local governments to have responded with policy changes affecting their neoliberal economic development strategies. Based on this assumption, this paper is a theoretically informed examination of recent high‐profile bidding wars in Wisconsin. The highest profile example was in 2009 when General Motors chose a plant in Michigan over Wisconsin and Tennessee for a new small car line. Wisconsin's Commerce Secretary characterized Michigan's $1.2 billion incentive offer as “absolutely crazy” (compared with his state's $409 million offer!). My main research question is how have Wisconsin state and local governments adjusted their neoliberal economic development efforts in these bidding wars given the recent economic downturn and weak economy? This paper uses the largest incentive offers in Wisconsin during the tenure of the current and previous state governors within the context of ten themes drawn from the literature to problematize the neoliberal policy of bidding for big business. It concludes by considering the implications for economic development policies.     

information Asymmetry Theory and Its Application in the Project Management

This paper introduces the basic content of information asymmetry theory and comments on the theory of information asymmetries.It establishes an information model in project management and analyzes the phenomenon of information asymmetries between owner and contractor in the phase of bidding and fulfilling.It presents some countermeasures of resolving information asymmetries in the project management such as building information network,devising reasonable contract,reinforcing government' s guidance,strengthening the good faith,breeding intermediate agency,building the system of early risk warning and so on.     

The Bankruptcy System and the Auction Model of Management Buyout

This paper studied how the auction processis influenced by bankruptcy probability, bankruptcy cost, and the corporatetax rate. The study found thatthe bidding price of the management is negatively associated with bankruptcy cost and probability, and positivelyassociated with the corporate tax. However, the expected profit of the outside investor is positivelyassociated with bankruptcy cost and probability, and negatively associated with the corporate tax. When the bankruptcy cost and probabilityis high enough, the acquisition market would be totally inefficient.