Evaluation of risk factors for the spread of low pathogenicity H7N2 avian influenza virus among commercial poultry farms

OBJECTIVE: To identify risk factors associated with the spread of low pathogenicity H7N2 avian influenza (AI) virus among commercial poultry farms in western Virginia during an outbreak in 2002. DESIGN: Case-control study. PROCEDURE: Questionnaires were used to collect information about farm characteristics, biosecurity measures, and husbandry practices on 151 infected premises (128 turkey and 23 chicken farms) and 199 noninfected premises (167 turkey and 32 chicken farms). RESULTS: The most significant risk factor for AI infection was disposal of dead birds by rendering (odds ratio [OR], 73). In addition, age > or = 10 weeks (OR for birds aged 10 to 19 weeks, 4.9; OR for birds aged > or = 20 weeks, 4.3) was a significant risk factor regardless of poultry species involved. Other significant risk factors included use of nonfamily caretakers and the presence of mammalian wildlife on the farm. Factors that were not significantly associated with infection included use of various routine biosecurity measures, food and litter sources, types of domestic animals on the premises, and presence of wild birds on the premises. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Results suggest that an important factor contributing to rapid early spread of AI virus infection among commercial poultry farms during this outbreak was disposal of dead birds via rendering off-farm. Because of the highly infectious nature of AI virus and the devastating economic impact of outbreaks, poultry farmers should consider carcass disposal techniques that do not require off-farm movement, such as burial, composting, or incineration.     

Are the Australian poultry industries vulnerable to large outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza?

Objective   To describe the structure of the Australian poultry industry and discuss the potential for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) to spread between Australian poultry farms.
Procedure   High densities of poultry farms, frequent contacts between farms by service providers, the supply of live poultry markets (LPM) and the presence of free-range duck flocks in affected regions have been identified as risk factors for the spread of HPAI between flocks in outbreaks causing the death or destruction of over 1 million poultry overseas. Data on 1,594 commercial Australian chicken meat, chicken egg, duck and turkey farms were collected by a telephone questionnaire of farm managers to assess the risk of a HPAI outbreak in Australia.
Results and Discussion   Five regions of Australia had farm densities comparable to overseas regions that experienced widespread HPAI. Common service providers routinely contacted different classes and types of farms over wide geographic areas. However, no responding farms supplied LPM and the majority of duck farms did not produce free-range ducks.
Conclusion   Outbreaks of HPAI have the potential to cause serious impacts on the Australian poultry industry. The risk posted by LPM and free-range ducks is limited, but the movement of genetic stock and common service providers could spread infection between companies, industries or geographical regions. Biosecurity measures are therefore considered critical to limit the secondary spread of infection should an outbreak occur.     

基于家禽产业链视角分析广东珠三角地区H7N9禽流感传播途径

珠三角地区H7N9禽流感传播途径具有复杂性和特殊性。为进一步明确传播途径,基于家禽产业链视角,在H7N9禽流感最为严重的广州市、深圳市、佛山市,采用分层抽样法选取有代表性且能反映整体情况的养殖场、批发市场、屠宰场、农贸市场,调查H7N9禽流感的动物防疫和个人防护情况。结果显示:养殖场的生物安全隔离仍不完善,存在活禽接触候鸟感染禽流感的风险;批发市场和屠宰场防疫水平高,人感染风险较低;农贸市场的动物防疫条件和个人防护不充分,易扩散病毒;最有可能的传播途径是与候鸟接触后携带病毒的活禽,通过"养殖—批发—零售"产业链蔓延。该结论在明确"禽传人"、"活禽市场环境暴露"观点上深化了产业链各环节间的传播路径。因此,珠三角地区H7N9禽流感的防控重点要加强养殖环节的生物安全隔离,并做好零售环节中活禽与人之间的防控。     

Identification of risk factors associated with highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus infection in poultry farms, in Nigeria during the epidemic of 2006-2007

We conducted a matched case-control study to evaluate risk factors for infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus in poultry farms during the epidemic of 2006-2007 in Nigeria. Epidemiologic data were collected through the use of a questionnaire from 32 case farms and 83 control farms. The frequency of investigated exposure factors was compared between case and control farms by using conditional logistic regression analysis. In the multivariable analysis, the variables for (i) receiving visitors on farm premises (odds ratio [OR]=8.32; 95% confidence interval [CI]=1.87, 36.97; P<0.01), (ii) purchased live poultry/products (OR=11.91; 95% CI=3.11-45.59; P<0.01), and (iii) farm workers live outside the premises (OR=8.98; 95% CI=1.97, 40.77; P<0.01) were identified as risk factors for HPAI in poultry farms. Improving farm hygiene and biosecurity should help reduce the risk for influenza (H5N1) infection in poultry farms in Nigeria.     

Chinese poultry farmers' decision‐making for avian influenza prevention: a qualitative analysis

Poultry farmers faced dual risk when mutant avian influenza (AI) virus showed the zoonotic characteristics. A/H5N1 and A/H7N9 were two dominant AI virus strains that have captured the attention of the public over the years for they have been reported to bring about greater loss to poultry and human, respectively. Previous studies mainly used quantitative methods investigating either the means that poultry farmers adopted for protecting their poultry against A/H5N1 infection or the poultry farmers' self‐protective behaviours against A/H7N9 infection. We sought insights into the underlying factors influencing Chinese poultry farmers' protective behaviours in response to the dual risk of AI by a qualitative way. Semi‐structured in‐depth interviews were conducted with 25 Chinese chicken farmers recruited by purposive sampling between November 2016 and May 2017, the peak season of AI. All interviews were audio‐taped, transcribed and analysed using a grounded theory approach. From participants' experiences, we revealed five main themes: Measures adopted for protecting poultry and farmers, Emotional response to the AI epidemic, Perceived risk of AI, Perceived effectiveness of the preventive measures adopted and Perceived self‐efficacy to take preventive measures. The information of AI outbreak directly triggered Chinese chicken farmers' emotional response and thereafter preventive actions. Compared to the perceived risk of poultry infection with A/H5N1 which mainly connected to economic loss, participants perceived much lower risk of human infection with A/H7N9. AI epidemic information played a key role triggering poultry farmers' response behaviours. Chinese poultry farmers weighted more attention on the risk of poultry infection which was highly associated with economic losses. The government should build and improve an early AI warning and information transmission network to poultry farmers. Further reinforcement of related self‐protective and preventive knowledge training towards poultry farmers is necessary.     

Evidence of Previous Avian Influenza Infection among US Turkey Workers

The threat of an influenza pandemic is looming, with new cases of sporadic avian influenza infections in man frequently reported. Exposure to diseased poultry is a leading risk factor for these infections. In this study, we used logistic regression to investigate serological evidence of previous infection with avian influenza subtypes H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, H9, H10, and H11 among 95 adults occupationally exposed to turkeys in the US Midwest and 82 unexposed controls. Our results indicate that farmers practising backyard, organic or free‐ranging turkey production methods are at an increased risk of infection with avian influenza. Among these farmers, the adjusted odds ratios (ORs) for elevated microneutralization assay titres against avian H4, H5, H6, H9, and H10 influenza strains ranged between 3.9 (95% CI 1.2–12.8) and 15.3 (95% CI 2.0–115.2) when compared to non‐exposed controls. The measured ORs were adjusted for antibody titres against human influenza viruses and other exposure variables. These data suggest that sometime in their lives, the workers had been exposed to low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. These findings support calls for inclusion of agricultural workers in priority groups in pandemic influenza preparedness efforts. These data further support increasing surveillance and other preparedness efforts to include not only confinement poultry facilities, but more importantly, also small scale farms.     

Economic analysis of an outbreak of avian influenza, 1997-1998

OBJECTIVE: To determine economic losses associated with an outbreak of avian influenza in flocks in Pennsylvania during 1997 and 1998. SAMPLE POPULATION: 5 premises containing avian influenza-infected layer, pullet, and turkey flocks. PROCEDURE: Losses incurred before depopulation, those incurred at the time of depopulation, and those that were attributable to depopulation (unrealized loss of income) were evaluated. Results were extrapolated to provide values for all infected flocks. RESULTS: Extrapolating the costs determined on the basis of age and number of birds from the 5 sample flocks to all other flocks infected with nonpathogenic avian influenza H7N2 yielded an estimated total cost to the Pennsylvania poultry industry of $3.5 million. CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS: The H7N2 virus is not highly pathogenic. If the pathogenicity of the virus does not change, then the poultry industry and state and federal governments will not have severe economic losses for the 1997-1998 outbreak similar to those for the 1983-1984 avian influenza outbreak in Pennsylvania. To decrease the potential for financial losses that could result from future outbreaks of avian influenza, it is essential that the commercial industry and livebird market system be separated via increased use of biosecurity measures.     

The cost-benefit of biosecurity measures on infectious diseases in the Egyptian household poultry

Increased animal intensification presents with increasing risks of animal diseases. The Egyptian household poultry is peculiar in its management style and housing and this present with particular challenges of risk of infection to both the flock and humans. Biosecurity remains one of the most important means of reducing risks of infection in the household poultry, however not much information is available to support its feasibility at the household level of production. In this study financial feasibilities of biosecurity were modeled and evaluated based on certain production parameters. Risks of particular importance to the household poultry were categorized and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 was the most risky disease while people-related risk was the most important risk category. It was observed that basic biosecurity measures were applicable in the household poultry and it would be 8.45 times better to implement biosecurity than to do nothing against HPAI H5N1; 4.88 times better against Newcastle disease and 1.49 times better against coccidiosis. Sensitivity analyses proved that the household poultry project was robust and would withstand various uncertainties. An uptake pathway for basic biosecurity was suggested. The outcome of this work should support decisions to implement biosecurity at the household sector of poultry production.     

Local poultry biosecurity risks to highly pathogenic avian influenza in Kaduna State, Nigeria

The study appraised local poultry biosecurity risks to highly pathogenic avian influenza by assessing farmers’ knowledge, beliefs and poultry practices using a standard questionnaire. Farmers’ knowledge on transmission and prevention was high but low on disease recognition. Radio was ineffective at informing Islamic educated farmers. Extensive knowledge on transmission and protection did not result in behavioural change as farmers engaged in risky practices of selling, eating or medicating infected poultry and not reporting poultry death. Islamic educated farmers do not believe highly pathogenic avian influenza is a serious and preventable disease. Women are more likely to self medicate when experiencing influenza-like illness. Audio-visual aids would improve avian influenza recognition while involvement of community leaders would enhance disease reporting. Outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in local poultry in Nigeria would follow a similar pattern in Southeast Asia if the risk perception among farmers is not urgently articulated.     

Sequence analysis of related low-pathogenic and highly pathogenic H5N2 avian influenza isolates from United States live bird markets and poultry farms from 1983 to 1989

The last highly pathogenic outbreak of avian influenza in the United States was caused by an H5N2 influenza virus in Pennsylvania and New Jersey in 1983-84. Through a combined federal and state eradication effort, the outbreak was controlled. However, in 1986-89, multiple H5N2 viruses were isolated from poultry farms and the live bird markets (LBMs) in the United States. To determine the epidemiologic relationships of these viruses, the complete coding sequence of the nonstructural gene and the hemagglutinin protein subunit 1 of the hemagglutinin gene was determined for 11 H5N2 viruses and compared with previously available influenza sequences. The H5N2 isolates from 1986-89 were all closely related to the isolates from the 1983-84 Pennsylvania outbreak by nucleotide and amino acid sequence analysis for both genes, providing additional evidence that the Pennsylvania/83 (PA/83) virus lineage was not completely eradicated. The PA/83 lineage also had a large number of unique amino acid changes not found in other avian influenza viruses, which was suggestive that this lineage of virus had been circulating in poultry for an extended period of time before the first isolation of virus in 1983. High substitution and evolutionary rates were measured by examining the number of nucleotide or amino acid substitutions over time as compared with the index case, CK/PA/21525/83. These rates, however, were similar to other outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry. This study provides another example of the long-term maintenance and evolution of influenza viruses in the U.S. LBMs and provides further evidence of the connection of the LBMs and the Pennsylvania 1983 H5N2 outbreak.     

Wildlife surveillance associated with an outbreak of lethal H5N2 avian influenza in domestic poultry

Wildlife surveillance was conducted for influenza viruses in conjunction with the 1983-84 lethal H5N2 avian influenza epizootic in domestic poultry in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. Virus-isolation attempts made on cloacal and tracheal swabs from 4,466 birds and small rodents within the quarantined areas and 1,511 waterfowl in nearby Maryland yielded only a single H5N2 isolate from a pen-raised chukar in Pennsylvania. Antibodies against hemagglutinin type 5 and/or neuraminidase type 2 were found in 33% of the aquatic birds tested; however, this finding could not be used to confirm previous H5N2 avian influenza virus activity because of the possibility of prior infections with multiple influenza subtypes. The low prevalence of lethal H5N2 avian influenza virus in wild birds and small rodents strongly indicated that these animals were not responsible for dissemination of the disease among poultry farms during the outbreak.     

广西玉林市规模化禽场禽流感病毒检测

为了解广西玉林市2020年规模禽场禽流感病毒感染状况,采用荧光RT-PCR方法,对广西玉林市7个县(市、区)42个规模化禽场采集的1260份禽喉/泄殖腔棉拭子样品进行了通用型禽流感病毒核酸检测(荧光PCR),并对检测为阳性的样本进行H5、H7亚型(双重荧光PCR)和H9亚型(荧光PCR)分型鉴定.结果显示:在42个规模...     

Assessing the risk of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 transmission through poultry movements in Bali,Indonesia

Indonesia continues to report the highest number of human and poultry cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. The disease is considered to be endemic on the island of Bali. Live bird markets are integral in the poultry supply chain on Bali and are important, nutritionally and culturally, for the rural and urban human populations. Due to the lack of biosecurity practiced along the supply chain from producer to live bird markets, there is a need to understand the risks associated with the spread of H5N1 through live bird movements for effective control. Resources to control H5N1 in Indonesia are very limited and cost effective strategies are needed. We assessed the probability a live bird market is infected through live poultry movements and assessed the effects of implementing two simple and low cost control measures on this risk. Results suggest there is a high risk a live bird market is infected (0.78), and risk mitigation strategies such as detecting and removing infected poultry from markets reduce this risk somewhat (range 0.67–0.76). The study demonstrates the key role live poultry movements play in transmitting H5N1 and the need to implement a variety of control measures to reduce disease spread.     

Control versus no control: options for avian influenza H5N1 in Nigeria

In January 2006, an outbreak of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) was recorded in Nigeria for the first time. This present work describes an estimation of possible costs associated with a vaccination-based control policy added to other measures to restrict HPAI H5N1 virus infections. The evaluations used epidemiological and production data, including budgets necessary for the vaccine acquisition, distribution and administration in arriving at the final costs. Using decision tree and cost benefit analysis the economical benefits for Nigeria and countries with similar veterinary infrastructures, biosecurity and farming systems are calculated. The result indicated that a halting in the continued spread of the virus through effective control measure will be 52 times better than taking no action. This should help policy makers in deciding in favour of vaccination combined with other tools as an effective means of controlling avian influenza H5N1. * Control of HPAI H5N1 will best be understood by policy makers in financial terms. * Effective control through vaccination of poultry is much cheaper and reduces the chances of human zoonoses. * Poultry vaccination combined with other control measures will be the most effective means of control in most developing economies.     

Risk factors for avian influenza and Newcastle disease in smallholder farming systems, Madagascar highlands

Newcastle disease (ND) and avian influenza (AI) are issues of interest to avian producers in Madagascar. Newcastle disease virus (NDV) is the major constraint for village aviculture, and avian influenza viruses type A (AIAV) are known to circulate in bird flocks. This study aims at classifying smallholder poultry farms, according to the combination of risk factors potentially associated with NDV and AIAV transmission and to assess the level of infection for each farm class. Two study sites, Lake Alaotra and Grand Antananarivo, were chosen with respect to their differences in terms of agro-ecological features and poultry productions. A typology survey involving 526 farms was performed to identify possible risk factors for (i) within-village, and (ii) between-village virus transmission. A cross-sectional serological study was also carried out in 270 farms to assess sero-prevalences of NDV and AIAV for each farm class and the link between them and risk factor patterns. For within-village transmission, four classes of farms were identified in Grand Antananarivo and five in Lake Alaotra. For between-village virus transmission, four classes of farms were identified for each site. In both sites, NDV sero-prevalence was higher than for AIAV. There was no evidence of the presence of H5 or H7 subtypes of AIAV. Sero-prevalences were significantly higher in Lake Alaotra than in Grand Antananarivo for both viruses (OR=2.4, p=0.02 for NDV, and OR=9.6, p<0.0001 for AIAV). For within-village NDV transmission in Grand Antananarivo, backyard chicken farms (OR=3.6, p<0.001), and chicken farms with biosecurity awareness (OR=3.4, p<0.01) had greater odds of having antibodies against NDV than the others. For between-village virus transmission, farms with multiple external contacts, and farms using many small markets had greater odds of having antibodies against NDV than the others (OR=5.4, p<0.01). For AIAV, there were no differences in sero-prevalences among farm classes. In Lake Alaotra, the observed high density of palmipeds and widespread rice paddies were associated with high sero-prevalences for both viruses, and a homogeneous risk of virus transmission between the different farm classes. In Grand Antananarivo, farm visits by collectors or animal health workers, and farm contacts with several markets were identified as potential risk factors for NDV transmission. Further studies are needed to identify the circulating virus genotypes, model their transmission risk, and provide adapted control measures.     

Serological evidence of avian influenza virus and canine influenza virus infections among stray cats in live poultry markets,China

From January 2010 to January 2012, we collected sera samples from 700 stray cats living in close proximity to poultry farms or poultry markets in 4 provinces in China. A number of cats had evidence of avian and canine influenza virus infection: avian H9N2 [24 by HI ≥1:20 and 16 by microneutralization (MN) assay ≥1:80]; avian H5N1 (9 by HI ≥1:20 and 3 by MN assay ≥1:80) and canine H3N2 (32 by HI ≥1:20 and 18 by MN ≥1:80). Bivariate analyses revealed that cats sampled near live poultry markets and cats with influenza-like-illness were at increased risk of having elevated antibody titers by HI against avian H9N2, avian H5N1, or canine H3N2 viruses. Hence, cats may play a very important role in the ecology of novel influenza viruses and periodic epidemiological surveillance for novel influenza infections among stray cats could serve as an early warning system for human threats.     

香港活禽市场的管理措施

香港于1997年发生全球首例人感染H5N1禽流感事件,随后几年又陆续从当地活禽市场分离到H5N1高致病性禽流感病毒。为降低人和家禽感染H5N1等高致病性禽流感病毒的风险,香港根据相关的研究和调查,对活禽市场陆续采取了一系列针对性措施,并对所采取的管理措施进行了科学的评估,有效地控制了高致病性禽流感疫情。笔者对香港活禽市场的管理措施、实施的技术依据、实施后的效果评估等方面进行了综述,以期为内地调整活禽市场管理措施,降低人和家禽通过其感染H5N1等高致病性禽流感的风险提供参考和借鉴。     

Virus spread pattern within infected chicken farms using regression model: the 2003-2004 HPAI epidemic in the Republic of Korea

During the 2003-2004 epidemic in Korea, the infection time and within-farm spread pattern of virus were analysed for the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak on chicken farms using regression models based on epidemiological data. Mortality observed on a given day had a positive linear association with time after initial infection. HPAI spread more rapidly on farms managed by employees and on farms with larger numbers of chicken houses in use. The disease spread more rapidly among layer chickens than among broilers. Using statistical model, we found that farmers recognize the abnormally high mortality resulting from HPAI approximately 5 days after infection. Without any intervention, entire flocks would die within 12 days of introduction of the HPAI virus to the infected farm.     

Assessment of the risks of communicable disease transmission through the movement of poultry exhibited at agricultural shows in New South Wales

Objective To assess biosecurity practices in the fancy poultry show sector that would influence the establishment and spread of exotic diseases in poultry in New South Wales. Design A cross-sectional survey of 105 fancy poultry exhibitors at seven agricultural shows. Procedure Exhibitors were interviewed about biosecurity practices on their farms and their knowledge of exotic diseases. Poultry stewards at 18 shows were interviewed about biosecurity practices at their shows. Results Although many exhibitors travelled only short distances to attend shows, some exhibitors attended up to 30 shows per year and travelled interstate to exhibit poultry. A network diagram revealed extensive connections and interactions of poultry throughout the eastern half of NSW. Five of 18 shows included cash sales without any record of purchasers; 46% of exhibitors reintroduced exhibited birds back into their flocks without a quarantine period; and 16% failed to wash cages used to transport the birds. There was a general awareness that exhibition of birds posed a risk to flock health, but knowledge of avian influenza and practices that could be adopted to minimise the risk of disease introduction was limited. Conclusions The factors that could assist the establishment and spread of exotic diseases in poultry in NSW include the mixing of birds at shows, inadequate recording of exhibitor details at shows, inadequate biosecurity practices when reintroducing exhibited poultry back into flocks, cash sales associated with shows that did not include the collection of purchaser details, and inadequate identification of birds.     

广东省人H7N9病例分布与活禽高危因素相关性研究

广东省人H7N9亚型禽流感的高危因素(接触活禽与活禽市场暴露)与活禽相关。为评价活禽交易限制、活禽调运限制与活禽H7N9免疫对人H7N9发病的影响,以接触活禽史病例数和活禽市场暴露史病例数的增减为研究视角,基于广东省2013—2018年H7N9亚型禽流感病例,采用Moran指数、K-means算法和Apriori算法等分析病例的空间分布特征、活禽高危因素导致病例的特征以及防控措施与病例数的关系。结果发现:病例的热点区域在珠三角,且向周边扩散,仅2017年的病例具有显著空间相关性。人活禽接触史病例分为3类,以中年、有基础病史、来自珠三角城市以及从事活禽销售为主;而活禽市场暴露史病例可分为4类,主要以男性、中年、无基础病史为主。未启动活禽交易限制和活禽H7N9免疫则分别增加活禽市场暴露史病例的概率是70.90%和71.70%,而启动活禽调运限制减少接触活禽史病例数的概率为70.60%。这表明,三大防控措施对减少因接触活禽与活禽市场暴露的人H7N9病例具有显著相关性。