A survey of gastro-intestinal parasitic infection in domestic and wild birds in Chittagong and Greater Sylhet,Bangladesh

A survey of gastrointestinal parasitic infection as determined by faecal examination was conducted among domestic and wild birds in Bangladesh. Birds were sampled from households, wet markets and wetlands in Chittagong and Greater Sylhet districts during April 2012 to February 2013. Mist nets were used to catch resident wild and migratory birds. The overall prevalence of parasitic infection ranged among locations from 25 to 55% in indigenous domestic ducks (live bird samples = 304), 20% in resident wild birds (environmental faecal samples = 40) and 40% in migratory birds (live bird samples = 35). The prevalence of parasitic infection was significantly higher in indigenous domestic ducks collected during summer (39%) than winter (22%) (p = 0.04). In domestic indigenous ducks and Muscovy ducks, both single and multiple types of parasitic infections were found. However, other domestic birds and wild birds often had a single type of parasitic infection. Ascaridia spp. with an average egg load of 50–900, was commonly detected in faecal samples of domestic and wild birds in this study. Other identified parasites were Capillaria spp. and Heterakis spp. both in domestic and wild birds. Improvement of biosecurity measures for household duck farms through educating and motivating household farmers could help mitigate the effects of parasitic infection on production.     

Impact of inland waters on highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in neighboring poultry farms in South Korea

BackgroundSince 2003, the H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype has caused massive economic losses in the poultry industry in South Korea. The role of inland water bodies in avian influenza (AI) outbreaks has not been investigated. Identifying water bodies that facilitate risk pathways leading to the incursion of the HPAI virus (HPAIV) into poultry farms is essential for implementing specific precautionary measures to prevent viral transmission.ObjectivesThis matched case-control study (1:4) examined whether inland waters were associated with a higher risk of AI outbreaks in the neighboring poultry farms.MethodsRivers, irrigation canals, lakes, and ponds were considered inland water bodies. The cases and controls were chosen based on the matching criteria. The nearest possible farms located within a radius of 3 km of the case farms were chosen as the control farms. The poultry farms were selected randomly, and two HPAI epidemics (H5N8 [2014–2016] and H5N6 [2016–2017]) were studied. Conditional logistic regression analysis was applied.ResultsStatistical analysis revealed that inland waters near poultry farms were significant risk factors for AI outbreaks. The study speculated that freely wandering wild waterfowl and small animals contaminate areas surrounding poultry farms.ConclusionsPet birds and animals raised alongside poultry birds on farm premises may wander easily to nearby waters, potentially increasing the risk of AI infection in poultry farms. Mechanical transmission of the AI virus occurs when poultry farm workers or visitors come into contact with infected water bodies or their surroundings. To prevent AI outbreaks in the future, poultry farms should adopt strict precautions to avoid contact with nearby water bodies and their surroundings.     

Influenza virus surveillance in waterfowl in Pennsylvania after the H5N2 avian outbreak

During the latter stages of the lethal H5N2 influenza eradication program in domestic poultry in Pennsylvania in 1983-84, surveillance of waterfowl was done to determine if these birds harbored influenza viruses that might subsequently appear in poultry. From late June to November 1984, 182 hemagglutinating viruses were isolated from 2043 wild birds, primarily ducks, in the same geographical area as the earlier lethal H5N2 avian influenza outbreak. The virus isolates from waterfowl included paramyxoviruses (PMV-1, -4, and -6) and influenza viruses of 13 antigenic combinations. There was only one H5N2 isolate from a duck. Although this virus was antigenically related to the lethal H5N2 virus, genetic and antigenic analysis indicated that it could be discriminated from the virulent family of H5N2 viruses, and it did not originate from chickens. Many of the influenza viruses obtained from wild ducks were capable of replicating in chickens after experimental inoculation but did not cause disease. These studies show that many influenza A virus strains circulating in waterfowl in the vicinity of domestic poultry in Pennsylvania did not originate from domestic poultry. These influenza viruses from wild ducks were capable of infecting poultry; however, transmission of these viruses to poultry apparently was avoided by good husbandry and control measures.     

Antibody prevalence of low-pathogenicity avian influenza and evaluation of management practices in Minnesota backyard poultry flocks

Low‐pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses have caused illness in poultry and humans with poultry contact. To determine whether there is evidence of exposure to avian influenza viruses (AIV) among backyard poultry in Minnesota and their human caretakers, 150 flocks of backyard birds were sampled for antibodies to AIV from August 2007 through December 2008. One hundred flocks were tested through routine slaughter surveillance by the Minnesota Board of Animal Health and an additional 50 flocks were contacted and sampled by study investigators. Blood was collected from 10 to 13 birds from each flock and a survey of biosecurity and management practices was administered to the flock owner. Blood samples were tested by agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID) for influenza A antibodies. Tested flocks had a median flock size of 100 birds (range: 12–800 birds), and were most commonly owned for meat for personal use (81% of respondents), fun or hobby (58%) and eggs for personal use (56%). Although 7% of flock owners reported that their birds had shown respiratory signs in the previous 3 months, only 1 of 150 flocks tested positive for influenza by AGID. Antibodies to LPAI H6N1 were detected in the positive flock. The owner of the positive flock did not have antibodies to H6 or other common AIV. Based on the findings of this study, the risk of transmission of LPAI viruses from backyard poultry to owners in Minnesota appears to be low under current conditions and management practices.     

Full sequence analysis of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes and proteins of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus detected in Iran, 2015

Over the last two decades, the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus has gained a lot of attention due to its zoonotic and mutative nature. Iran is among the countries significantly affected by the virus as it hosts migratory birds during seasonal migration. In this study, the molecular characterizations of hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes and proteins of H5N1 strain A/chicken/Iran/8/2015 detected in backyard poultry, Mazandaran province, were investigated. Phylogenetic analysis classified this virus as a member of subclade 2.3.2.1c, with the cleavage site motif of “PQRERRRK-R/GLF”. HA carried a few mutations altering affinity to mammalian cells; however, the virus was categorized as avian. NA protein had the 20-amino acid deletion at aa position 49–69 similar to those isolated since 2000. Mutations of H253Y and H274Y contributing to antiviral resistance were present in NA. From this analysis, it can be concluded that the wild migratory birds flying from Western Asia to Eastern Africa are probably the main carriers of seasonal H5N1 in the country.

     

Risk-based surveillance for H5N1 avian influenza virus in wild birds in Great Britain

Recent outbreaks of the H5N1 strain of avian influenza in Europe have highlighted the need for continuous surveillance and early detection to reduce the likelihood of a major outbreak in the commercial poultry industry. In Great Britain (gb), one possible route by which H5N1 could be introduced into domestic poultry is through migratory wild birds from Europe and Asia. Extensive monitoring data on the 24 wild bird species considered most likely to introduce the virus into GB, and analyses of local poultry populations, were used to develop a risk profile to identify the areas where H5N1 is most likely to enter and spread to commercial poultry. The results indicate that surveillance would be best focused on areas of Norfolk, Suffolk, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, south-west England and the Welsh borders, with areas of lower priority in Anglesey, south-west Wales, north-east Aberdeenshire and the Firth of Forth area of Scotland. These areas have significant poultry populations including a large number of free-range flocks, and a high abundance of the 24 wild bird species.     

Molecular characterization of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of H5N1 influenza A viruses isolated from poultry in Vietnam from 2004 to 2005

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza A viruses have been spreading among domestic poultry, wild aquatic birds, and humans in many Asian countries since 2003. The largest number of patients, to date, infected with the H5N1 viruses are in Vietnam, where these viruses continue to cause outbreaks in domestic poultry. Here, we molecularly characterized the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of nine H5N1 viruses isolated between January 2004 and August 2005 from domestic poultry in Vietnam. We found that several groups of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses are circulating among these birds, which suggests that H5N1 viruses of different lineages have been introduced into Vietnam multiple times.     

Wildlife surveillance associated with an outbreak of lethal H5N2 avian influenza in domestic poultry

Wildlife surveillance was conducted for influenza viruses in conjunction with the 1983-84 lethal H5N2 avian influenza epizootic in domestic poultry in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. Virus-isolation attempts made on cloacal and tracheal swabs from 4,466 birds and small rodents within the quarantined areas and 1,511 waterfowl in nearby Maryland yielded only a single H5N2 isolate from a pen-raised chukar in Pennsylvania. Antibodies against hemagglutinin type 5 and/or neuraminidase type 2 were found in 33% of the aquatic birds tested; however, this finding could not be used to confirm previous H5N2 avian influenza virus activity because of the possibility of prior infections with multiple influenza subtypes. The low prevalence of lethal H5N2 avian influenza virus in wild birds and small rodents strongly indicated that these animals were not responsible for dissemination of the disease among poultry farms during the outbreak.     

Epidemiology of H5N1 avian influenza

High pathogenic (HP) H5N1 avian influenza (AI) infection has been reported in domestic poultry, wildlife, and human populations since 1996. Risk of infection is associated with direct contact with infected birds. The mode of H5N1 spread from Asia to Europe, Africa and the Far East is unclear; risk factors such as legal and illegal domestic poultry and exotic bird trade, and migratory bird movements have been documented. Measures used to control disease such as culling, stamping out, cleaning and disinfection, and vaccination have not been successful in eradicating H5N1 in Asia, but have been effective in Europe.     

Legislation for the control of avian influenza in the European union

In the light of experience gained with avian influenza (AI) outbreaks in Europe and elsewhere in the world, the European Union (EU) legislation has recently been updated. The strategy to control the introduction and spread of AI relies on rapid disease detection, killing of infected birds, movement restrictions for live birds and their products, cleaning and disinfection and vaccination. Measures are not only to be implemented in case of outbreaks of highly pathogenic AI (HPAI), but are now also directed against occurrence of low pathogenic AI of H5 and H7 (LPAI) subtypes in poultry, albeit in a modified manner proportionate to the risk posed by these pathotypes. Enhanced surveillance in poultry holdings and wild birds, as well as preventive vaccination, has also been introduced. EU Measures are flexible and largely based on risk assessment of the local epidemiological situation. The occurrence of HPAI H5N1 of the Asian lineage in the EU and its unprecedented spread by wild migratory birds necessitated the adoption of additional control measures. Although HPAI H5N1 has affected wild birds and poultry holdings in several EU Member States, EU legislation and its implementation in Member States has so far successfully limited the impact of the disease on animal and human health.     

Newcastle disease--seroepidemiologic study of a highly contagious epizootic in poultry and in wild birds in Switzerland

Newcastle disease (ND) is a highly contagious viral disease particularly of domestic poultry. Switzerland is currently declared free from ND. A serosurvey using an ELISA was performed to investigate infections with ND-Virus (NDV) in 260 Swiss laying hen flocks, 169 backyard poultry flocks and 1576 wild birds. For laying hen flocks, a stochastic model was applied to analyse the results from serological testing. Four laying hen flocks were identified as NDV-seropositive, and the true NDV seroprevalence in this population was most likely between 1.3 and 1.5%. NDV antibodies were also detected in five of the 169 backyard poultry-flocks. ND-antibody positive birds were found in 10% of all wild birds examined, with the highest proportions among cormorants, grebes, birds of prey, owls, and swifts. The study indicated that positive flocks must have been in contact with NDV strains causing sub-clinical infection, since no clinical signs had been observed. Moreover, trade of poultry or poultry eggs was considered to be an important factor associated with seropositivity in backyard poultry flocks. Contact to wild birds did not seem to be of major importance.     

Questionnaire study and postmortem findings in backyard chicken flocks in Finland

Background

Although modern commercial poultry production today is based on large farms and intensive husbandry, keeping backyard poultry has regained popularity in industrialized countries. However, the health status of backyard flocks is still relatively poorly documented. A questionnaire was sent to the owners of 376 backyard poultry flocks (<500 birds) in order to study health management procedures and characterize backyard poultry populations in Finland. Information was also collected on the postmortem findings from non-commercial flocks using necropsy data from the Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira).

Results

Backyard flocks in Finland are small in size (<50 birds), comprising mainly chickens. Based on the results of the questionnaire, the health of such flocks is good, mortality low and vaccinations are not commonly used. Most of the flocks were registered in the national poultry register. The standard biosecurity practices are not generally applied and contact with wild birds, pets and farm animals is frequent, which can make the flocks more prone to infectious diseases. We conducted an 11-year retrospective study of the postmortem necropsy findings of the Evira in order to document the diseases, which caused mortality in backyard chickens in Finland. Necropsy was performed on a total of 132 non-commercial laying hens during 2000 – 2011. The most common postmortem findings were Marek’s disease (27%) and colibacillosis (17%).

Conclusions

This study is the first to report data on characteristics of and management practices for backyard chicken flocks in Finland. Close connections with commercial flocks are rare and farms are usually distantly located suggesting that the risk that these backyard flocks pose to commercial poultry is low.     

Quantitative transmission characteristics of different H5 low pathogenic avian influenza viruses in Muscovy ducks

EU annual serosurveillance programs show that domestic duck flocks have the highest seroprevalence of H5 antibodies, demonstrating the circulation of notifiable avian influenza virus (AIV) according to OIE, likely low pathogenic (LP). Therefore, transmission characteristics of LPAIV within these flocks can help to understand virus circulation and possible risk of propagation. This study aimed at estimating transmission parameters of four H5 LPAIV (three field strains from French poultry and decoy ducks, and one clonal reverse-genetics strain derived from one of the former), using a SIR model to analyze data from experimental infections in SPF Muscovy ducks. The design was set up to accommodate rearing on wood shavings with a low density of 1.6 ducks/m²: 10 inoculated ducks were housed together with 15 contact-exposed ducks. Infection was monitored by RNA detection on oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs using real-time RT-PCR with a cutoff corresponding to 2–7 EID50. Depending on the strain, the basic reproduction number (R₀) varied from 5.5 to 42.7, confirming LPAIV could easily be transmitted to susceptible Muscovy ducks. The lowest R₀ estimate was obtained for a H5N3 field strain, due to lower values of transmission rate and duration of infectious period, whereas reverse-genetics derived H5N1 strain had the highest R₀. Frequency and intensity of clinical signs were also variable between strains, but apparently not associated with longer infectious periods. Further comparisons of quantitative transmission parameters may help to identify relevant viral genetic markers for early detection of potentially more virulent strains during surveillance of LPAIV.     

Origin and evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in Asia

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by H5N1 viruses were reported almost simultaneously in eight neighbouring Asian countries between December 2003 and January 2004, with a ninth reporting in August 2004, suggesting that the viruses had spread recently and rapidly. However, they had been detected widely in the region in domestic waterfowl and terrestrial poultry for several years before this, and the absence of widespread disease in the region before 2003, apart from localised outbreaks in the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR), is perplexing. Possible explanations include limited virus excretion by domestic waterfowl infected with H5N1, the confusion of avian influenza with other serious endemic diseases, the unsanctioned use of vaccines, and the under-reporting of disease as a result of limited surveillance. There is some evidence that the excretion of the viruses by domestic ducks had increased by early 2004, and there is circumstantial evidence that they can be transmitted by wild birds. The migratory birds from which viruses have been isolated were usually sick or dead, suggesting that they would have had limited potential for carrying the viruses over long distances unless subclinical infections were prevalent. However, there is strong circumstantial evidence that wild birds can become infected from domestic poultry and potentially can exchange viruses when they share the same environment. Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that wild birds have played a more significant role in spreading disease than trade through live bird markets and movement of domestic waterfowl. Asian H5N1 viruses were first detected in domestic geese in southern China in 1996. By 2000, their host range had extended to domestic ducks, which played a key role in the genesis of the 2003/04 outbreaks. The epidemic was not due to the introduction and spread of a single virus but was caused by multiple viruses which were genotypically linked to the Goose/GD/96 lineage via the haemagglutinin gene. The H5N1 viruses isolated from China, including the Hong Kong SAR, between 1999 and 2004 had a range of genotypes and considerable variability within genotypes. The rising incidence and widespread reporting of disease in 2003/04 can probably be attributed to the increasing spread of the viruses from existing reservoirs of infection in domestic waterfowl and live bird markets leading to greater environmental contamination. When countries in the region started to report disease in December 2003, others were alerted to the risk and disease surveillance and reporting improved. The H5N1 viruses have reportedly been eliminated from three of the nine countries that reported disease in 2003/04, but they could be extremely difficult to eradicate from the remaining countries, owing to the existence of populations and, possibly, production and marketing sectors, in which apparently normal birds harbour the viruses.     

Virological and molecular epidemiological investigations into the role of wild birds in the epidemiology of influenza A/H5N1 in central Thailand

A serological and virological surveillance program to investigate the HPAI H5N1 virus in wild bird populations was undertaken from February 2007 to October 2008. The purpose of the survey was to investigate the infection status in free ranging wild birds in Banglane district, Nakhon Pathom province, central Thailand. Samples from wild birds were collected every two months. Choanal and cloacal swabs, serum and tissue samples were collected from 421 birds comprising 44 species. Sero-prevalence of the virus tested by H5N1 serum neutralization test (using a H5N1 virus clade 1; A/chicken/Thailand/vsmu-3-BKK/2004) was 2.1% (8 out of 385 samples; 95% CI 0.7, 3.5). Species that were antibody positive included rock pigeons (Columba livia), Asian pied starling (Gracupica contra), spotted dove (Streptopelia chinensis), oriental magpie robin (Copsychus saularis), blue-tailed bee-eater (Merops philippinus), myna (Acridotheres spp.), and pond heron (Ardeola spp.). Prevalence by H5N1 virus isolation was 0.5% (2 out of 421 samples; 95% CI 0.0, 1.1); the two H5N1 virus-positive samples were from Asian pied starling (Gracupica contra) and white vented myna (Acridotheres grandis). Positive virological samples were collected in June 2007 while all positive serology samples were collected between May and August except for one sample collected in December 2007. No positive samples were collected in 2008. Molecular studies revealed that the wild bird H5N1 viruses were closely related to poultry viruses isolated in other parts of Thailand. However, there was no poultry H5N1 prevalence study performed in the study site during the time of this wild bird survey. Interpretation of source of virus isolates would include spill-over of H5N1 viruses from contaminated sources due to movement of domestic poultry and/or fomites from other areas; or infection of wild birds within the outbreak locations and then translocation by wild bird movement and interaction with wild birds inhabiting distant locations.