Study on Compensation Standard of the Urban House Dismantlement Based on Game Theory

It is a hot question in recent years in China about the urban house dismantlement and development, and the low compensation standard of the urban house dismantlement has been thought to be the main reason that cause dispute of the urban house dismantlement. After a two-player game model is built, the paper solves mix-strategy Nash equilibrium of game and analyzes the influence of improving compensation to game equilibrium. It is concluded that, if government only improve policy of compensation standard to issue, the resident ready to move with their house to be dismantled can enjoy the great benefit shortly, but the long-term policy result is to reduce the incidence of the urban house dismantlement and slow down paces that the old city transforms.     

城乡统筹发展中农业非点源污染控制的农户行为管理研究

为了将农户的“有限理性”纳入政府对农业非点源污染农户行为管理分析框架中,为政府治理非点源污染提供相应政策参考,在 “有限理性”假设下,基于城乡统筹发展中农户行为的“集体表现”视角,运用“复制动态”方法,研究非点源污染控制的农户行为演化过程,分析政府在农户行为从初始状态到“演化稳定策略”过程中的作用。结果表明,农户“有限理性”使农业非点源污染控制的农户生产生活行为存在不确定性,但在与政府监督行为的长期博弈中,农业非点源污染控制的农户生产生活行为存在“演化稳定策略”。为促进这一稳定策略均衡,需要政府积极参与,并采用相关措施激励农户采用能使农业非点源污染排放达标的生产生活行为。     

完全信息静态博弈下农业保险分析——以甘肃省为例

为促进甘肃省农业保险政策的完善及提高农户对农业保险的有效需求,进而促进甘肃省农业保险的可持续发展,本研究针对农业保险市场上政府、保险公司和农户三大利益主体之间的相互影响关系,采用完全信息静态博弈理论对各个利益主体的收益进行博弈分析,同时结合甘肃省实地调研数据,选取逻辑回归分析方法提取影响农户参与农业保险的主要因素。分析得出：在保险公司和农户的博弈中,保险公司在农户有投保意愿时应当做出的积极回应为不经营策略,如果选择经营,则会损失更多(-M-P+C<0),其中,C为农户的投保金额,M为出险后农户获得的保险金,P为保险公司的经营成本;农户在保险公司做出经营策略的时候,应当积极投保,这样才能获得收益,如果保险公司选择不经营,农户无论做出什么选择,都会损失预防灾情的资金N,并且如果农户选择投保还会损失更多;在政府与保险公司的博弈中,可以看出,政府的最佳收益为0,说明政府不支持保险公司进行农业保险业务是最佳策略;而对保险公司来说,只有在政府支持的情况下,才能获得最佳收益（-M-P C Q),其中,Q表示政府对保险公司的支持成本,这说明,只有在政府支持的情况下,保险公司经营农业保险的积极性才能提高。逻辑回归分析表明文化程度、务农人数、耕地面积、农业收入占家庭收入比重、了解农业保险程度对农户农业保险购买行为具有显著的影响。     

Quality Earned Value Method Based on Quality Evaluation

In this paper the features of information asymmetry and information model under the model of management by construction agency in project invested by government are analyzed, the information asymmetry in the main bodies of construction agency in the project invested by government is studied. Especially the advantages and weaknesses in information among government consignor, consuming unit and construction agency are analyzed. A dynamic model of incomplete information among government consignor, consuming unit and construction agency has been set up,a game theory analysis on the actions about the main bodies of construction agency in the project invested by government is carried out.     

“城中村”改造过程中的房屋拆迁补偿问题调查与思考

摘要：“城中村”集体土地房屋拆迁补偿问题关系到城市的发展和村民的生存命脉。本文以郑州市金水区燕庄为例,对“城中村”改造过程中的房屋拆迁补偿政策和执行情况进行了实地调查。结果表明,燕庄“城中村”改造补偿过程中存在一些问题,如村民对补偿标准不满意、村民无法有效地了解政府的安置补偿政策、补偿费用不到位、过程不民主、村民有抵制拆迁和拒绝补偿的倾向等。建议通过法律约束、政策引导、社会保障和人文关怀等改进措施,保障村民权益,为城市化进程中的“城中村”改造提供参考依据。     

Game Analysis between Manufacturer and Wholesaler in the Management of Distribution Channel

In the distribution channel management, a good cooperation relationship between manufacture and wholesaler is an effective way for them to complement each other with their respective advantages, improve channel competitive abilities and adapt to market fluctuations. Based on their mutual cooperative relationship, a mixed game model is constituted by introducing the characteristics and postulating the prerequisites of trade between manufacturer and wholesaler, then the factors affecting their mutual cooperative relationship and the conditions of their stable cooperation are found through analyzing the mixed game model. Furthermore, a finitely repeated game model is used to analyze the cooperation between manufacturer and wholesaler, the conclusion of the cooperative qualification that influences the cooperation of both sides is given. As a result, the strategies employed by the manufacturer and wholesaler are pointed out.     

Analysis of Causes and Impacts of Soft Budget Constraints of Enterprises Based on Dynamic Game for Three Players

This paper researches the behavior difference among government,banks and enterprises and how it affects soft budget constraints of enterprises and non-performing loans of banks based with dynamic game.The game model suggests that government will give banks some assistance and let them refinance enterprises,especially government has strong(incentive) to sustain SOEs in China's transitional economy.Banks will do it if the assistance from government is more than the loss from refinance enterprises.In addition the value of liquidation of enterprises and the new loans affect banks' refinancing old enterprises.     

城乡建设用地增减挂钩政策实施后复垦农民满意度研究——基于渝东南少数民族地区扶贫乡镇的调研

城乡建设用地增减挂钩是国家优化城乡用地结构与开展扶贫攻坚的重要政策,复垦是该政策的重要环节,复垦农民满不满意是衡量该政策有效性的重要指标。本文通过对重庆市复垦阶段的政策与流程梳理,结合对渝东南少数民族地区扶贫乡镇的实地调研,构建了复垦农民满意度指标体系,采用模糊综合评价法对政策实施细则改变前后的满意度差异进行了分析和评价。研究结果表明,通过对政策进行调整后,复垦农民对“经济补偿”与“环境改善”的满意度有了较大提高,但在“政策宣导”、“复垦实施”、“政府服务”及“法律保障”等方面仍有改善的空间。最后从复垦农民满意度的角度出发,在补偿方式、权益保障等方面对增减挂钩政策提出了优化建议。     

Private Government Formation in the DC Metropolitan Area

ABSTRACT This paper examines a variety of quasi-governmental organizations, mandatory homeowners' associations, special service districts, and transportation management associations, recently established in the urban region. Using the Washington, DC metropolitan area as a case study, this paper explores reasons for their development and implications of them for urban governance. It is argued that these organizations marry the concepts of public special districts and public-private partnerships in a process of private government formation. Private governments, it is suggested, are not wholly a private response to the shedding of services by the public sector, the dominant notion of privatization and local state restructuring, but the result of demands emerging in the private sector stimulated by social and spatial change. This signals the need to add to the concept of public-driven privatization the process of private initiated change where the resulting goods and services are more fully shaped by the needs of private interests. The evidence suggests these institutions do not represent a scaling back of the local state as privatization implies, but an extension of state structures in a fundamentally new direction, an extension which could be labeled the parallel state.     

Institutions and local growth coalitions in China's urban land reform: The case of Hangzhou High‐Technology Zone

Abstract: China's urban land reform is a gradualist process of transforming a planned land allocation system to an open land market system, while the ownership of the land remains under the control of the state. This process defines the relationships between local government and emerging non‐public interest groups in the land development process. These issues can be most clearly seen in the State‐Approved Development Zones, where municipalities have been encouraged to promote economic development and test out land policy initiatives. Using the institutionalist and urban growth machine analytical approaches to land development processes, this study examines the operation of development processes and the role of local government and its relationship with other interest groups. By employing a case study research strategy, focused upon the Hangzhou High‐Technology Zone, the study uncovered a local government‐led growth coalition which featured participation by other interest groups and revealed the applicability and variations when applying two strands of theories to a socialist economy in transition. Besides the land reform policy implications drawn from the case study evidence, the study concludes that the presence of interest groups and the missing community organisations unique to China give new theoretical implications and that both theories work much better with the economic domain than with the political domain largely because of a lagged political reform.     

Operation of Debt-to-equity Swaps in State-owned Enterprise: a Game Theory''s Viewpoint

Operation of Debt to equity Swaps are thought to be a game process of conflict of interest when concerned interest groups seek furthest uses of them and dispute eminent domain of financial resources if state owned enterprise's property right configuration is not to be changed. That is to say, operation of swaps of debt to equity is one game between commercial bank and state owned enterprise firstly, and then it is another game of actualizing contract between AMC and stated owned enterprise. So the corresponding models are constructed according to game theory. The result indicates that enterprise and bank can compass an equilibrium and come to an agreement of swaps of debt equity. Nay, AMC must build up hawkish visualize to supervise and control enterprise's financial affairs and management in order to gain dividend and rights of section is bought back.     

An overview of APSIM, a model designed for farming systems simulation

The Agricultural Production Systems Simulator (APSIM) is a modular modelling framework that has been developed by the Agricultural Production Systems Research Unit in Australia. APSIM was developed to simulate biophysical process in farming systems, in particular where there is interest in the economic and ecological outcomes of management practice in the face of climatic risk. The paper outlines APSIM's structure and provides details of the concepts behind the different plant, soil and management modules. These modules include a diverse range of crops, pastures and trees, soil processes including water balance, N and P transformations, soil pH, erosion and a full range of management controls. Reports of APSIM testing in a diverse range of systems and environments are summarised. An example of model performance in a long-term cropping systems trial is provided. APSIM has been used in a broad range of applications, including support for on-farm decision making, farming systems design for production or resource management objectives, assessment of the value of seasonal climate forecasting, analysis of supply chain issues in agribusiness activities, development of waste management guidelines, risk assessment for government policy making and as a guide to research and education activity. An extensive citation list for these model testing and application studies is provided.     

Study on Managerial Mode of Urban Infrastructure Projects

In this paper, the current situation of the management of urban infrastructure construction projects invested by government and the weakness of its managerial mode are briefly analyzed. The authors point out that it is a practical choice to improve the management by innovating in the managerial mode and establishing specialized organizations. Employing basic methods of science of organization and management, referring to the experience of developed countries, a new mode named "Works Bureau" is suggested. Two operational models based on financial and non-financial requirement of government projects are demonstrated in detail.     

Electricity Pricing Regulation in Demand Side Management

Time of use(Tou) price is one of the most efficient measure for modern demand side management(DSM).But a scientifically pricing is based on understanding the function of pricing mechanism and comprehensive analysis to social benefit.The authors develop a pricing model by game theory based on analysis of consumer's response to the time of-use price and analyze the pricing regulation of government for maximum social benefit.A conclusion is drawn,which suggests that government should let the electricity corporation to pricing, but just give a regulation on the average price level.     

Building knowledge city in transformation era: Knowledge‐based urban development in Beijing in the context of globalisation and decentralisation

This study examines knowledge‐based urban development in Beijing with the objective of revealing the impact of the ‘synergetic’ forces of globalisation and local government intervention on knowledge‐based urban development in the context of the coexisting processes of globalisation and decentralisation. The findings in this paper show that due to the rapid growth of the cultural industry sector, knowledge‐based urban development has created various kinds of ‘cultural industry clustered areas’, which were recently promoted by the 2008 Olympic Games. ‘Synergetic’ global and local forces are leading knowledge‐based urban development, with the emergence of a local coalition regime in which local government manages local development, considered as ‘enterprises’ in the decentralisation process, while the State retains a significant influence on knowledge‐based urban development. The central and municipal governments tend to emphasise strategies to ‘facilitate the climate for growth’ rather than the centrally planned control they exerted prior to the 1980s.     

Analysis of Financing of LBO by Game Theory

Based on introducing the concept of Leveraged Buy-outs (LBO) briefly, in this paper, the basic characters of LBO are analyzed. The choice of payoff function and game process in financing game of LBO for both sides by asymmetric information dynamic game model are analyzed as well. Finally, the game equilibrium is gained and the means of some relative policies are discussed.     

Research on Mechanism of Mutual Reaction and Operation of Asset Management Corporation in the Debt-to-equity Swaps

The article constructs a game model between asset management corporation and enterprises during the course of operation of debt-to-equity swaps in the state-owned enterprises, which is theoretical foundation to perfect the operation function of asset management corporation, and with it to annotate the rational causes which the operational course of the debt-to-equity swap was not advancing, and gives a primary explain that a deviation appears between the reality of operation of debt-to-equity swaps and theoretical anticipation. Based on aforementioned viewpoints, the article brings forward countermeasures to perfect operation of debt-to-equity swaps for asset management corporation finally.     

甘肃省集体林改后农户对生态公益林的管护积极性研究

在分析集体林权制度改革确权到户后关于集体公益林管护问题评述的基础上,构建了甘肃省生态公益林管护双方的博弈模型,研究了博弈达到稳态的条件以及影响生态公益林管护行为的因素。结果表明,甘肃省农户对生态公益林的期望收益低,林业补贴标准不高等因素是农户管护经营积极性不高的主要原因,并在此基础上对如何提高农户对生态公益林的管护积极性进行了探讨。     

农地城市流转驱动力与农地保护研究

无论在发达国家，还是在发展中国家，农地城市流转现象是其实现工业化和城市化所必须付出的一种代价，已经成为经济发展和城市化、工业化进程中的一个普遍现象。人多地少的国情决定我国农地保护的重要性，但是对处于城市化的加速发展阶段的中国，农地流转必将会持续一段时间，可见，我国农地保护面临的形势不容乐观。本文在他人研究的基础上，认为农地是在地方政府、村经济集体、农民、企业以及居民几大动力主体的相互作用下，在制度缺陷、经济增长、区位状况、城市化以及价值观念驱动力的共同作用下，不断地向城市转移的。最后，提出了保护农地，必须树立科学发展观等对策。     

集体建设用地使用权流转中的博弈分析——基于利益主体的问卷调查

为了探寻集体建设用地使用权流转中收益分配均衡的关键点,为集体建设用地使用权流转制度的创新提供借鉴。采用问卷调查法,博弈论,研究集体建设用地使用权流转中的博弈关系。研究结果表明：首先,当前的集体建设用地使用权流转中利益主体之间存在的一系列矛盾。其次,流转中相关的影响因素发生作用的特点是流转各方面的信息公开程度是影响收益均衡的关键点;而相同信息条件下利益主体方自身的收益与对方的压力成正比,与自身的压力成反比;且当用地业主的压力大于或等于一定数值时,农户的收益在信息相同条件下大于信息不相同条件下的收益,而用地业主的收益则刚好相反。因此,政府等管理部门可以从政策或者制度层面加大价格等方面信息的宣传力度和公开程度,制定相应的调控政策或者规则从宏观层面去把握、指导和管理,保障利益主体方的收益均衡。