基于“三权分置”的农地承包权评估方法探讨

在城乡中国的背景下,“三权分置”的新时期中国农地制度创新理论为土地产权改革提供了机遇,农地承包权价值内涵构成及价格评估是值得深入研究的课题,这不仅给农用地流转提供依据,也是自然资源资产价值核算的关键。本研究从“三权分置”的政策背景演变入手,重释了承包权内涵及价值构成,并在分析影响价值因素的前提下探讨了采用收益还原法与叠加法来评估承包权基准地价。研究认为,（1）承包权是因农户具备了集体经济组织成员身份,从而享有对农村集体土地承包的权利;身份权特征明显,具有主体专一、财产收益、效益处分及有效占有等4个特点;（2）集体成员身份权具有身份性、平等性、共同性及约束性等4个特性,享受成员权的主体形式可以是农户家庭也可以是集体经济组织的个人或是两者的结合;（3）依据农地承包权的生产收益权价值和社会保障价值构成,采用收益还原法和叠加法两种方法来评估承包权价格,在确定社会保障价值时可以借用征地区片综合地价中的社保费用值来量化。本研究在维护农户土地权益前提下,以期为全面有序开展农地质量价格评估和价值核算提供有益参考。     

地权认知、资源禀赋、信任与农地流转的实证研究

为研究影响农地流转的因素,2009—2011年,利用实地调查和计量研究方法,对3次在贵州5个县调查取得的404户农户的资料进行实证分析。结果表明影响农地流转的因素至少可以从3个维度进行探讨,即一是农户对地权的认知,二是资源禀赋,三是信任。农户对地权的认知和农户的资源禀赋影响农地流转意愿,信任不仅影响农户流转农地时对契约的选择,而且影响农地能否顺利流转。     

Deformity of Chinese Rural Land Expropriation System and Its Innovation in the Process of Urbanization

Rural land expropriation system has become the first problem that influences rural social stabilization and the process of urbanization,and also has become a focus of farmers' action in protection and fight for their rights.The deformity of rural land expropriation system has become a key factor that prevents farmers' successful transformation into citizens.We should innovate and perfect the rural land expropriation system,classify and delimit the ranges of rural land expropriation,establish the equality of law status between collective land property and national land property,reestablish the property rights of rural land,change contract management rights of rural land into substantial rights,demonstrate scientific and reasonable compensation standard of rural land,take various arrangements and perfect the means of judicial relief.     

Research on the Effectiveness of the Direct Regulation Pricing Methods of Public Utility

This paper analyzes the industrial organization of public utility and its cause and synthetically researches government direct regulating pricing methods of public utility, mostly the static or dynamic cost mark-up pricing methods. It is indicated by the means of game theory and imperfect contract theory, under the conditions of imperfect information and the government's inferior position, It's impossible to develop the incentive mechanism to utility enterprise, makes low productivity in public utility. The inefficiency of the cost monitor and control is inevitable when the direct regulation pricing system be used. The thought of direct pricing methods is a mechanical obstruction to improve the effectiveness of public utility. It's the radical approach for the government to reform the regulation modes in order to improve the effectiveness and social surplus of public utility.     

Empirical Analysis of Corporate Intellectual Capital and Corporate Performance

The principal purpose of this study is to investigate the association between the efficiency of value-added by a major components of a firm's resource (human capital,physical capital and structural capital) and corporate performance (profitability).Data consists of 30 firms are drown from computer area.Empirical analysis is conducted with correlation and linear multiple regression analysis.Findings from empirical analysis indicate that association between physical capital and profitability is statistically significant,there is a positive relation between human capital and firm performance,but not statistically significant.Accordingly, we analyse the factors that probably affect the findings.     

Restitution of fishing rights to Maori: representation,social justice and community development

For a quarter of a century, the government of New Zealand has been engaged in a process of restitution of property to Maori. Although land is the main object of Maori claims for restitution, rights to fisheries are also important. The nature of these rights is being influenced by findings of the Waitangi Tribunal and determined by legislation and judicial decisions. Both the definition of customary rights of Maori and the allocation of commercial fishing assets between urban Maori and members of traditional tribes present difficult questions not fully resolved. One principle that does appear to be settled is that full restitution is not feasible. Instead, both government and Maori seek settlements that will provide a firm foundation for community and economic development.     

Analysis of the Type of Contract Price in Construction Projects

In the construction projects, the contract, which is the most important behavior norm, determines the rights and responsibilities of client and contractor. All engineering activities aim at implementing and carrying out the articles of the contract. However, as the key component of the contract, the type of contract price determines the distribution mode of most of the engineering risk between client and contractor. In this paper, the most popular types of contract price used in the international construction projects are introduced. The advantages and disadvantages of each type and the distribution mode of the engineering risk between client and contractor are analyzed. At the end, some advice are given to the clients that they should choose the proper type of contract price and have innovation according to the characteristics of certain project and the situation of themselves.     

农地产权制度的多样性研究

研究农地产权制度多样性的理论和历史,正确认识农地产权制度改革中的新情况和新问题具有重要意义。模型和历史分析表明,农地产权制度的多样性是农民生产组织自觉追求制度利润的结果。农地产权制度的多样性有利于农地产权的制度竞争,有利于农村生产力水平的提高。农地产权制度的政策选择要与当地的农村经济发展水平相适应。政府在产权制度改革进程中不但要发挥其增加制度收益的积极作用,如促进农村集体经济组织建设,建立城乡人力资源互动机制,适当提高农产品收购价格等,而且要约束其增加制度成本的行为。     

重庆市农村剩余劳动力转移型态的实证分析

以调研资料为经验数据，对重庆市农村剩余劳动力转移型态进行了实证分析。通过研究认为：在制度变迁过程中，不同的制度安排有不同的劳动力转移型态。中国农村剩余劳动力转移型态与农地承包制度、社会保障制度和经济管理制度三组核心制度之间存在密切联系。在现有制度背景框架下，重庆农村剩余劳动力在转移途径上还主要停留在“兼业型”转移型态，在流动方式上还主要表现为通过亲朋好友带动和自身外出务工的盲目流动。但同时也看出，随着经济发展水平的提高、城乡统筹社会保障制度的建立和市场制度的完善，农村剩余劳动力转移型态在循序优化，土地对农民的保障功能在逐步削弱，政府和民间机构在农村剩余劳动力转移过程中的主导作用在明显增强。     

浙江省农村集体产权制度改革的实证研究——基于嘉兴、丽水农村集体产权制度改革实践的考察

为了研究农村集体产权制度改革的具体进展,对农村集体产权制度改革建言献策,推动改革的不断完善,本研究对嘉兴市、丽水市农村集体产权制度改革实践进行了考察。结果表明,欲进一步深化农村集体产权制度改革,应进一步细化“政经分离”改革的具体内容,在考量中国各地区集体经济发展水平差距较大的现实因素下分步推进,不断反刍集体经济组织的治理机制;弱化集体经济组织成员资格认定的户籍标准,建立以“土地承包关系作为基本生活保障”为核心的成员认定规则,切实保障好集体成员的合法权益;全面培育农村产权流转交易市场,通过立法与政策扶持为农村集体经济的发展壮大保驾护航。     

Operation of Debt-to-equity Swaps in State-owned Enterprise: a Game Theory''s Viewpoint

Operation of Debt to equity Swaps are thought to be a game process of conflict of interest when concerned interest groups seek furthest uses of them and dispute eminent domain of financial resources if state owned enterprise's property right configuration is not to be changed. That is to say, operation of swaps of debt to equity is one game between commercial bank and state owned enterprise firstly, and then it is another game of actualizing contract between AMC and stated owned enterprise. So the corresponding models are constructed according to game theory. The result indicates that enterprise and bank can compass an equilibrium and come to an agreement of swaps of debt equity. Nay, AMC must build up hawkish visualize to supervise and control enterprise's financial affairs and management in order to gain dividend and rights of section is bought back.     

Study on the Effect of Construction Contract

In dealing with the construction contract, to establish a contract is a result of judgment of facts, to be valid is a result of judgment of law and to come into force includes both above two. There is some close relation between subcontracting construction partly and general contracting, contract subcontracting, joint contract, but is different from subcontracting construction wholly in nature. The reasons, causing construction contract to be null and void, are various. In dealing with invalid ones, the clients should be claimed to undertake some responsibilities according to different conditions. These responsibilities involve relevant administrative responsibility in addition to civil responsibility such as reimbursement, compensation at a discount, restitution of damages and taking over the property.     

An Analysis of the Affection of Cooperative Opportunities on the Status of Partners in the Strategic Cooperation of Firms

In the strategic cooperation, relative status of the two partners which joined together by the covenant has a great impact on the finally profit distribution. It is analyzed by game theory in this paper that the influence of exterior cooperative opportunities upon the status of a firm when the firm join in an alliance. We focus on the great impact, which is produced by the chance to cooperate with the others that belong separately to the two firms in a strategic cooperation, on the status and profit distribution of the two parts. It is found that a firm will possessed a powerful status in an alliance and carve up more profits from the alliance when it has more opportunities for cooperating. The status differences between the cooperative partners can be better described when a firm sets up a strategic cooperation by combining the method The former researches are done which inspect the inner factors, such as the degree of firms being eager to join an alliance.     

健全土地适度规模经营下的承包经营权流转市场

土地承包经营权流转市场的健全,是发展和完善农村家庭联产承包制、改造传统农业、构建现代农业的目标,也是提高土地产出率和劳动生产率、转移农村剩余劳动力、增加农民收入的有效途径。但目前农村土地承包经营权流转市场体制不够健全,存在着缺乏市场流转中介组织,缺乏土地的定级及价格评估机构等问题。针对存在的这些问题,本文提出了大力发展市场经济,完善农村市场经济体制,完善农村土地承包经营权流转市场以及农村土地承包经营权流转自身的法律制度等一系列的措施,达到稳妥推进适度规模经营的目的。     

Supply Chain Coordination for Perishable Product with Dynamic Pricing Policy

Perishable products need to be sold up before a fix time which is usually called product's lifetime.As the salvage of perished products is almost zero,and the demand is uncertainty,retailers usually set the product's price dynamically to influence the demand.When retailer's dynamic pricing policy is considered,we wonder which contracts can realize the supply chain coordination.Three typical contracts-return contract,price discount contract and revenue sharing contract are analyzed.Only revenue sharing contract among the three can realize supply chain coordination under dynamic pricing policy.The extension of price discount policy quantity-price discount policy,can also realize supply chain coordination under dynamic pricing policy.     

三权分置下农地经营权流转中的农户法律认知实证研究——以河北省张北县为例

为解决三权分置下农地经营权流转纠纷问题,运用问卷调查与实证研究法,以河北张北县为例,对364户农户在土地经营权流转前、中、后期3个阶段的法律认知进行实证研究。调查结果显示,在土地流转的行为发生前,农户对土地权利的归属以及农地流转政策存在认知盲区;流转中农户维权意识淡薄,合同内容不规范,政府监管不力;流转后农户权利救济的行为方式的选择上以非诉的方式为主。为更好地保护“三权分置”下农地经营权流转中弱势农户的正当权益不受侵犯,农地流转前应加强宣传,培育流转中介组织;流转过程中要规范合同模式,完善流转程序;流转后需健全纠纷解决机制,提升农民维权能力等对策建议。     

An Analysis on Model of Board Structure and Its Efficiency

The firm governing is a structure with a board as its core, and its goal is to guard the interests and rights of the shareholders and related people thru supervising the management under the condition of firm's ownership and management separation. So, it is very important to know what the board structure is and whether it can work properly. Thru constructing board model and conducting theoretical and empirical analysis, in this paper, a best model of the board including the shareholders, managers and outsiders is proposed. In order to improve the efficiency of the board, attention should be paid to the following: composition of the board, separation of board director and general manager and the incentive scheme to outside board members.     

农地征收中的产权弱化问题分析

基于产权理论角度分析中国农地征收中存在的产权弱化问题。经过分析发现,农地产权的弱化导致农地征收的租值消散问题、农地征收定价困难问题与农地产权保护薄弱问题,这些问题都是造成农地征收补偿矛盾的重要原因。因此,中国农地征收可以从建立农地使用权交易市场、建立第三方评估制度、转变政府职能、加强农地产权保护等方面进行农地征收的制度完善,以强化农地产权,解决征地补偿中出现的诸多矛盾和问题。     

农村社区股份经济合作社产权分析

内容摘要：我国部分经济较发达的农村地区,农村社区股份经济合作社取代了已存续五十多年的农村集体经济组织。本文以江苏省陈巷村股份合作社为例,对这种新型的农村社区股份经济合作社进行产权结构分析。农村社区股份经济合作社产权较明晰,股东拥有所有权、控制权和剩余索取权。股东权益不因迁移而被剥夺,集体资产不因社区合并而被简单合并或平调。农村社区股份经济合作社与原来的农村集体经济组织相比具有诸多制度绩效;农村社区股份经济合作社有利于农村民主制度建设,有利于集体资产保值增值和农民收入的增加,有利于农村人口流动和农村城镇化。农村社区股份经济合作社是建设社会主义新农村的一个制度选择。     

Incentive Mechanism for Team Cooperation Based on Implicit Side Contract

Aiming at the free-riding problem in team incentive, this paper designs a dynamic incentive mechanism based on implicit side contract with dynamic game theory by introducing the reasonable assumption that there is horizontal monitor in team production. The theoretic analysis indicates that the dynamic incentive mechanism, in which a strict group incentive compatibility contract is taken at the first stage and an individual incentive compatibility contract is taken at the second stage, can implement team cooperation uniquely in the general condition of risk aversion and stochastic production by only two stage repeated game.