The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors

Coexistence of cooperators and defectors is common in nature, yet the evolutionary origin of such social diversification is unclear. Many models have been studied on the basis of the assumption that benefits of cooperative acts only accrue to others. Here, we analyze the continuous snowdrift game, in which cooperative investments are costly but yield benefits to others as well as to the cooperator. Adaptive dynamics of investment levels often result in evolutionary diversification from initially uniform populations to a stable state in which cooperators making large investments coexist with defectors who invest very little. Thus, when individuals benefit from their own actions, large asymmetries in cooperative investments can evolve.     

The neural basis of altruistic punishment

Many people voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms. Evolutionary models and empirical evidence indicate that such altruistic punishment has been a decisive force in the evolution of human cooperation. We used H2 15O positron emission tomography to examine the neural basis for altruistic punishment of defectors in an economic exchange. Subjects could punish defection either symbolically or effectively. Symbolic punishment did not reduce the defector's economic payoff, whereas effective punishment did reduce the payoff. We scanned the subjects' brains while they learned about the defector's abuse of trust and determined the punishment. Effective punishment, as compared with symbolic punishment, activated the dorsal striatum, which has been implicated in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions. Moreover, subjects with stronger activations in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs in order to punish. Our findings support the hypothesis that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violations and that the activation in the dorsal striatum reflects the anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors.     

商业保险参与新农合的必要性分析

结合政府主导下的新农合运行中存在的筹资成本及管理成本机制不健全、保障机制不健全、政府监管不到位等问题,分析了国内外商业保险机构参与新农合的实例,得出商业保险机构的参与对新农合政策的有效实施有着正相关作用,即商业保险参与新农合存在一定的必要性,由此从政府、企业及农民自身角度出发提出商业保险参与新农合的对策建议。     

Breeding together: kin selection and mutualism in cooperative vertebrates

In cooperatively breeding vertebrates, nonbreeding helpers raise young produced by dominant breeders. Although the evolution of cooperative breeding has often been attributed primarily to kin selection (whereby individuals gain "indirect" benefits to their fitness by assisting collateral relatives), there is increasing evidence that helpers can be unrelated to the young they are raising. Recent studies also suggest that the indirect benefits of cooperative behavior may often have been overestimated while the direct benefits of helping to the helper's own fitness have probably been underestimated. It now seems likely that the evolutionary mechanisms maintaining cooperative breeding are diverse and that, in some species, the direct benefits of helping may be sufficient to maintain cooperative societies. The benefits of cooperation in vertebrate societies may consequently show parallels with those in human societies, where cooperation between unrelated individuals is frequent and social institutions are often maintained by generalized reciprocity.     

Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games

The evolution of cooperation among nonrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. Reciprocal altruism fails to provide a solution if interactions are not repeated often enough or groups are too large. Punishment and reward can be very effective but require that defectors can be traced and identified. Here we present a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity. Optional participation can foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. In voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist. We show that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms, leading usually not to an equilibrium but to an unending cycle of adjustments (a Red Queen type of evolution). Thus, voluntary participation offers an escape hatch out of some social traps. Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random.     

Analysis on Investment Behavior of Agricultural Sector in China

In the process of industrialization, China has been a big agricultural country, and the agricultural sector's economic activities have been playing important role in economic growth. This paper established the investment behavior model of agricultural enterprises on the basis of Chinese practice. And then, the model presented the important factors impacting on investment, such as financing cost, wage, and policy factors, etc. Thirdly, this paper in particular used R-studio to estimate the impact of financing cost and policy factor on investment and capital accumulation of primary industry sector by gathering the data from 2003 to 2013. The results showed that the official interest rate of loans of financial institutions could be the proxy variable as the financing cost of agricultural enterprises, and the employment level of agricultural enterprises had negative impact on investment. Finally, this paper provided some explanations and suggestions on the basis of above results.     

Antisocial punishment across societies

We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people who behave prosocially. Our evidence comes from public goods experiments that we conducted in 16 comparable participant pools around the world. However, there is a huge cross-societal variation. Some participant pools punished the high contributors as much as they punished the low contributors, whereas in others people only punished low contributors. In some participant pools, antisocial punishment was strong enough to remove the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. We also show that weak norms of civic cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a country are significant predictors of antisocial punishment. Our results show that punishment opportunities are socially beneficial only if complemented by strong social norms of cooperation.     

社会规范对农户绿肥种植意愿与行为悖离影响分析——基于资源禀赋异质性视角

为探究缓解当前农业环境污染现状的解决之道,利用甘肃省644户微观调研数据,采用二元Logistic回归模型分析资源禀赋、社会规范对农户绿肥种植意愿与行为悖离的影响,并基于资源禀赋异质性视角探讨社会规范在影响农户绿肥种植意愿向行为转化中的作用机制。结果表明:1)农户资源禀赋水平的提升可以有效抑制悖离现象。2)社会规范中,价值引导、互动内化和制度规范均负向作用于农户绿肥种植意愿与行为的悖离,可有效促进农户绿肥种植意愿向实际行为转化与落实。3)资源禀赋异质性下,社会规范仍对农户绿肥种植意愿与行为悖离具有显著负向影响。其中价值引导在高禀赋家庭中发挥的作用大于低禀赋家庭;互动内化中亲戚邻居采取绿色环保的生产方式对低禀赋家庭影响较大,朋友是否采取绿色环保的生产方式对高禀赋家庭行为有重要影响;制度规范中政府农业面源污染行为的处罚措施对低禀赋家庭的约束作用更强,政府专业化生产补贴对高禀赋家庭的激励作用更大。建议要重视因禀赋差异引起的农户不同生产行为,对低禀赋群体应采取对应机制。同时要加强社会规范的引导作用,鼓励农户积极参与到绿肥种植的实践中。     

Differences between tight and loose cultures: a 33-nation study

With data from 33 nations, we illustrate the differences between cultures that are tight (have many strong norms and a low tolerance of deviant behavior) versus loose (have weak social norms and a high tolerance of deviant behavior). Tightness-looseness is part of a complex, loosely integrated multilevel system that comprises distal ecological and historical threats (e.g., high population density, resource scarcity, a history of territorial conflict, and disease and environmental threats), broad versus narrow socialization in societal institutions (e.g., autocracy, media regulations), the strength of everyday recurring situations, and micro-level psychological affordances (e.g., prevention self-guides, high regulatory strength, need for structure). This research advances knowledge that can foster cross-cultural understanding in a world of increasing global interdependence and has implications for modeling cultural change.     

市场经济与社区合作:泰国南奔府有机农业的个案研究

泰国的小农经济在市场化条件下顽强存在的主要原因是当地的社会结构和道德传统依然具有比较强的韧性和稳定性。对泰国南奔府的有机农业进行人类学田野调查发现,小农户在市场化情境中面临销路不稳定、农业劳动力短缺等风险,但是从事有机农业的农民通过有效运用有机农业的种植技术、社区合作网络来缓解这种风险,维护有机农业的价值。在政府政策、市场力量和“互帮互助”“团结协作”道德规范的共同作用下,小农户积极建立社区企业、学习中心等农业合作组织,这既有助于他们在参与市场化的过程中维护生计安全,同时也使这种道德规范开始具有市场经济的特征,焕发出新的生机与活力。此外,小农户的生产实践也有助于维护乡村的社会秩序,传承原有的道德规范。     

两岸企业农产品冷链物流合作的动态演化博弈研究

后ECFA时代,随着两岸农产品物流量的快速增长,两岸企业农产品物流合作中基于冷链成本的博弈问题日益突出.运用动态演化博弈模型建立了两岸企业间基于冷链物流成本的博弈关系,分析了企业冷链物流监控的稳定状态和影响因素.研究结果表明,两岸企业在农产品冷链物流合作中,当大陆企业的冷链物流成本低于未按冷链物流标准实施被查后的惩罚费用与信用损失之和,并且台湾企业的监控成本低于大陆企业未按冷链物流标准实施被查出后的惩罚费用和给台湾企业带来的潜在损失之和时,两岸企业才会发生博弈关系.当两岸企业都采取根据对方策略而进行调整的策略时,双方企业博弈会趋向于一定监控水平和一定实施程度的稳定点.     

新农村建设中提高政策支持效应、优化企业与农户合作行为分析——以贵州省W村为例

采用实地研究和调查研究方法,对贵州山区新农村建设中龙头企业与农户合作行为进行研究,分析合作行为现状与原因,提出加快合作组织建设、完善项目管理等措施,以探寻政府、企业和农户个人等利益相关方多方共赢的合作形式,进而促进区域农村经济社会发展。     

珠江三角洲现代农业制度创新

自家庭联产承包制以来，珠江三角洲对农业生产体制进行了一系列的调整，经历了统分结合双层经营体制、两田制、社区股份合作社等一系列的制度创新，基本实现了农地连片规模经营，并使农村剩余劳动力向非农产业转移，初步实现了农业产业化经营方式，珠三角农业现代化的发展要求农业体制实行进一步组织创新；包括从社区农业合作社分离出与其经济目标混合在一起的社会目标，农业微观组织由农户向家庭农场企业法人形式演进，农业社会服务体系向专业合作社、社区工业化及城乡一体化发展等等。     

社会资本能否缓解农户正规信贷需求抑制?——基于4省粮食种植户的实证分析

为了解粮食经营户不同类型社会资本对信贷需求抑制的影响,基于对四川、河南、浙江和黑龙江4省1 030户粮食种植户的调研数据,采用两阶段Heckman模型研究社会资本是否会抑制农户的信贷需求,并运用Tobit模型研究社会资本对农户信贷需求抑制程度的影响。结果表明,65.7%的粮食种植户受到信贷需求抑制,其中受到部分信贷需求抑制的比例为48.4%;社会资本变量中,社会关系因子、亲戚政治因子和组织关系显著影响农户的信贷需求抑制和信贷需求抑制程度,信任因子、金融关系变量和政治关系变量对信贷需求抑制和信贷需求抑制程度的影响不显著;此外,社会资本对资金需求小户的影响更为显著。基于以上结果,从政府角度而言,本研究指出要重视高社会资本易获得贷款这种外部因素而造成的社会不公平情况,警惕可能导致的贫富分化和社会不公平问题,并在此基础上提出相关建议;从金融机构角度,本研究提出了发展普惠金融的建议。     

集体林权制度改革后林农加入林业合作组织的行为意向分析——基于计划行为理论的视角

基于计划行为理论,从林农特征、加入林业合作组织的预期收益与成本风险、法律政策等制度环境和社会舆论、周围人群的期望和态度、林业生产经营状况等因素分析林农的行为态度、主观规范和知觉行为控制等,最后指出通过构建利益共同体提高和保障林农收益、优化制度环境和加强社会舆论引导以及指导林业合作组织进行规范化管理等增强林农加入林业合作组织的意向。     

农业大学参与农村劳动力职业技能培训的模式与思路

农业大学参与农村劳动力职业技能培训是促进农业科技成果转化和大学发挥其社会服务功能的客观需求。参与模式主要有自主开设培训班、与企业或协会联合培训、专家深入农村举办科技讲座和参与相关培训机构的培训活动等。实施大学参与培训,政府的导向、大学的办学定位和科技人员的培训思路需有相应的调整。     

重大科技项目绩效评估管理与元规范执行成本

重大科技项目一般投入资金多,社会对这些项目的期望值也较高。为了保证科研团队遵守科研规范,有效地进行投入,从而高质量地完成任务,需要建立有效的规范维持机制。这个机制包括对不遵守规范者进行相应的惩处,也包括对被监管团队的不努力行为作出惩罚,即建立元规范执行机制。为了降低规范与元规范执行成本,建立科学有效地重大科技项目评估体系也十分重要。该文就评估体系建立的原则、方法、实施的制度保证等方面的问题进行了探讨。指出在无规范原博弈中加入发现违规者的成本,完善绩效评估管理体系,对规范的建立和维持意义重大。     

The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions

Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with nonpunishment institutions is highly controversial in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates, whereas the sanction-free society becomes fully depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.     

Rewarding performance that is hard to measure: the private nonprofit sector

The private nonprofit form of institutions is large and growing. Its role in a mixed economy is the subject of this article. Nonprofits differ from private enterprises primarily in the constraints on them. The key element is that nonprofits may not distribute profits to anyone associated with the organization, a restriction that is in sharp contrast to the freedom that private firms have to reward owners and managers for generating profit. The theoretical case that such a constraint can be useful when consumers are poorly informed is examined. Also, the available empirical evidence on differences in behavior between nonprofit and for-profit organizations is presented.     

农民专业合作组织发展过程中资源整合方式研究——以苏北P村蔬菜专业合作组织为例

本文以苏北P村蔬菜专业合作社为个案,探讨农村专业合作组织发展过程中资源整合方式。研究表明,从蔬菜产业协会发展到蔬菜专业合作社,合作组织逐渐由松散型的非正式组织变为规范性的正式组织,合作组织对农村社区资源的整合方式也由非制度性向制度性转变,即从社区精英的社会资本为主导、通过＂熟人＂、＂口头契约＂等非制度性手段,转变为以政...