Perceived risk, trust, and the politics of nuclear waste

The Department of Energy's program for disposing of high-level radioactive wastes has been impeded by overwhelming political opposition fueled by public perceptions of risk. Analysis of these perceptions shows them to be deeply rooted in images of fear and dread that have been present since the discovery of radioactivity. The development and use of nuclear weapons linked these images to reality and the mishandling of radioactive wastes from the nation's military weapons facilities has contributed toward creating a profound state of distrust that cannot be erased quickly or easily. Postponing the permanent repository and employing dry-cask storage of wastes on site would provide the time necessary for difficult social and political issues to be resolved.     

A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing

Our foregoing analysis of the role of a comprehensive test ban leads us to the following conclusions. 1) A CTB by itself will have little direct effect on the arms race between the superpowers. It would not hinder their nuclear arms production and deployment nor would it necessarily present a significant obstacle to the development of new nuclear weapons systems, despite limiting the development of new nuclear warhead designs. It can hardly make a dent in the destructive capability of the superpowers or in their ability to step up the pace of the arms race. 2) The chief merits of a CTB reside in the political sphere. It would help promote detente and could help to escalate interest in arms control agreements of broader scope. But in neither of these effects would it be as significant as a successful SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) agreement. The CTB also lingers as a piece of unfinished business since the signing of the LTB in 1963. The question can be and has been raised, "If the superpowers are serious about arms control, why have they not accepted the CTB, which is simple in concept and in form and is also free of serious military risks?" Such doubts about the sincerity of the superpowers' willingness to limit their own arms development will persist as long as there is no CTB. Substantial agreement at SALT would lessen some of this effect too, but would not eliminate it completely. 3) Recent progress in seismic identification has been impressive, and other means of obtaining technical intelligence about nuclear testing have probably also improved greatly. In addition, research on the technical means of on-site inspection has demonstrated its limited effectiveness. Therefore, the role of on-site inspections as an added deterrent to cheating on a CTB has diminished substantially. This is not to say that detection and identification of all nuclear tests is possible now, or ever, but only that on-site inspection would add very little to the other technical means now available for verification. 4) It will become increasingly difficult in the United States to oppose the CTB on the basis of risks that accompany possible Soviet evasion of a treaty that does not include the right of onsite inspection. The opposition to a CTB is now likely to shift to the more direct argument that nuclear testing is important to keep pace with continuing worldwide technical and military developments. The justification for U.S. testing is only in part because of advances in Soviet nuclear technology per se. Those opposing a CTB may argue that it makes little sense, and may even be courting danger, to freeze nuclear technology alone and that banning nuclear tests should await an agreement that copes with all military research and development and all qualitative improvements in weapons systems. This directly confronts the argument that the unique virtue of a CTB is that it provides a simple and feasible first step in the very complicated problems of controlling military technology. 5) The mutual deterrence of the superpowers will not be compromised if a CTB agreement is reached and one side or the other clandestinely violates such an agreement. The state of nuclear technology in both countries is mature, and the destructive capability of their nuclear arsenals can be easily maintained. Whatever small improvements can come as a consequence of clandestine testing would hardly affect the strategic balance. 6) It seems unlikely that China and France will agree to stop testing in the near future. These countries refused to join the nonproliferation treaty, which did not affect their nuclear programs, and it is doubtful that, proceeding from military considerations alone, they would join a CTB. Their nuclear programs are still not mature, and a CTB would freeze their positions of inferiority with respect to the superpowers. There may, however, be wider political and security arrangements to induce them to participate. Cessation of tests by the other nuclear powers might serve as an inducement to China and France to refrain from testing. 7) The key near-nuclear powers, such as Japan, India, and Israel, are much more concerned with the military activities of their neighbors than they are with those of the superpowers. The modest nuclear restraints that a CTB imposes on the superpowers are hardly likely to have a direct impact on the approach of these countries to their own security. However, for these critical near-nuclear countries a CTB may be much more acceptable than the nonproliferation treaty. A CTB would not prohibit the production of fissionable material, the development of nuclear weapons technology short of testing, nor the stockpiling of untested nuclear weapons, and is therefore less restrictive. Consequently, these powers may be willing to ratify a CTB, but not the nonproliferation treaty. On the other hand, the CTB may provide them with a ready excuse for not succumbing to the pressure to ratify the nonproliferation treaty, if indeed they need excuses or would bow to such pressure. 8) A CTB is of very little added, direct significance to other nonnuclear powers who have already ratified or are about to ratify the nonproliferation treaty. It may only lessen their pique about the treaty's being highly discriminatory-the treaty imposes no restraints on the nuclear weapons programs of the nuclear powers, while the CTB restricts all parties to the agreement. 9) Peaceful nuclear explosions do not now show great promise and significance for economic development. What can be done with peaceful explosions can often be done by other means, although possibly at a slightly higher cost. On the other hand, making allowance for peaceful explosions greatly complicates a CTB. A useful approach to the problem of banning military tests but not foregoing indefinitely the use of peaceful explosions might, therefore, be to ban all nuclear explosions for a period of several years and to stipulate in the agreement that in that time there would be negotiations on how peaceful explosions may be controlled in a way that would not jeopardize the CTB.     

Science and politics: free speech controversy at lawrence laboratory

The Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, one of the nation's most distinguished scientific institutions, has been struck by a series of "free speech" controversies in recent months. The laboratory, which is operated by the University of California and is almost entirely funded by the Atomic Energy Commission, has facilities in two California locations, Berkeley and Livermore. Each has been under fire for allegedly stifling open discussion of controversial issues. The Berkeley facility, a leading center for the study of high-energy physics and fundamental nuclear science, has been split by an internal debate over the right of scientists to hold formal political discussions at the laboratory during their lunch hours. The controversy has led to the banning of meetings, the circulating of petitions and counterpetitions bearing hundreds of names, the publishing of an underground newspaper, and the suspension of a controversial physicist. The Livermore facility, a major center for developing nuclear weapons, has been accused of trying to muzzle two staff scientists who contend that existing radiation standards are too lax to protect the public from nuclear radiation hazards. Livermore has also been the target of demonstrations and of a lawsuit seeking to open the weapons laboratory to allow discussions between outsiders and staff scientists concerning the implications of weapons research. The article below discusses the controversy at the Berkeley laboratory, where only unclassified research is performed. A subsequent article will discuss the conflict at security-conscious Livermore.     

Smoke production from multiple nuclear explosions in nonurban areas

The amount of smoke that may be produced by wildland or rural fires as a consequence of a large-scale nuclear exchange is estimated. The calculation is based on a compilation of rural military facilities, identified from a wide variety of unclassified sources, together with data on their geographic positions, surrounding vegetation (fuel), and weather conditions. The ignition area (corrected for fuel moisture) and the amount of fire spread are used to calculate the smoke production. The results show a substantially lower estimated smoke production (from wildland fires) than in earlier "nuclear winter" studies. The amount varies seasonally and at its peak is less by an order of magnitude than the estimated threshold level necessary for a major attenuation of solar radiation.     

Facing nuclear reality

Nuclear weapons that are safe and secure, reliable, survivable, and effective will be a critical element of this nation's deterrent for the foreseeable future. The existence of these weapons reflects the tension that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear test bans will not reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons or this tension. Imprudent nuclear test bans, however, could impair the viability of this vital element of U.S. security. New, more restrictive test limitations would not enhance our national security. They do not address the two most important issues-namely, major reductions in strategic and conventional forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and a widespread lessening of tension between our two countries. In fact, it is conceivable that the diversion of political attention from arms reduction efforts and the distrust generated by test-ban verification problems could actually increase tensions between the two countries. We believe that more restrictive test limitations or a nuclear test ban should be considered only as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to arms control. We must reduce the numbers of the most destabilizing weapons and the overall size of the strategic arsenals through negotiations. A restrictive test ban may be a proper last step in our quest for nuclear arms control and a stable peace, but it would, in our opinion, be an imprudent first step. Further test limitations will be consistent with increased stability and decreased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union only if they are instituted after major stabilizing reductions are made in the strategic nuclear and conventional forces of both countries.     

An upheaval in u.s. Strategic thought

Early this year, the U.S. land-based force of nuclear missiles became vulnerable to a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union, as the Soviets deployed a large number of highly accurate warheads on their own missiles. They first demonstrated this capability in 1977. Since then, U.S. missile vulnerability has come to assume great importance in superpower relations. Western observers have portrayed the Soviet achievement as a sign of aggression, and made missile vulnerability into a symbol of declining American military strength. The government has proposed a vast military buildup of nuclear weapons, supposedly made necessary by this new threat. But the public is increasingly skeptical, and support for some form of arms control is growing. The first article in this series examines how the United States learned of the Soviet accuracy, and why it caused such great alarm. The next article will examine the Reagan Administration's response to this threat.     

Technological Strategies and National Purpose: Domestic and foreign developments necessitate a new relationship

It would be presumptuous to suggest that economic and technological forces will determine the course of domestic or international affairs. In the last analysis, passions rule the world. Nonetheless, to a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and conflicts seek their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems.     

German energy technology prospects

After more than 25 years of development of nuclear power and almost 10 years of research and development in numerous areas of nonnuclear energy, there is now a good basis for judging the future prospects of energy technologies in the Federal Republic of Germany. The development of nuclear power has provided an important and economically advantageous new source of energy. Further efforts are needed to establish the nuclear fuel cycle in all stages and to exploit the potential of advanced reactors. In all other areas of energy technology, including energy conservation, new energy sources, and coal, economics has turned out to be the key problem, even at today's energy prices. Opportunities to overcome these economic problems through additional R & D are limited. There is some potential for special applications, and there are many technologies that could contribute to the energy supply of developing countries. In general, however, progress in energy conservation and the use of renewable energy sources will depend on the degree to which energy policy measures can improve their economic basis. For some technologies, such as solar thermal power stations and coal liquefaction, large-scale economic deployment cannot be foreseen today. Instead of establishing costly demonstration projects, emphasis will be put on improving key components of these technologies with the aim of having the most advanced technology available when the economic parameters are more favorable.     

PHYSICS: Will Livermore Laser Ever Burn Brightly?

The National Ignition Facility (NIF), a superlaser being built here at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in an effort to use lasers rather than nuclear explosions to create a fusion reaction, is supposed to allow weapons makers to preserve the nuclear arsenal--and do nifty fusion science, too. But a new report that examines its troubled past also casts doubt on its future. Even some of NIF's scientific and political allies are beginning to talk openly of a scaled-down version of the original 192-laser design.     

Dispelling myths about verification of sea-launched cruise missiles

It is widely believed that an arms control limit on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would be nearly impossible to verify. Among the reasons usually given are: these weapons are small, built in nondistinctive industrial facilities, deployed on a variety of ships and submarines, and difficult to distinguish from their conventionally armed counterparts. In this article, it is argued that the covert production and deployment of nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missiles would not be so straightforward. A specific arms control proposal is described, namely a total ban on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. This proposal is used to illustrate how an effective verification scheme might be constructed.     

Radioactive wastes: a comparison of u.s. Military and civilian inventories

Contrary to widespread belief, the accumulated inventory of fission products generated by the still small U.S. civilian nuclear power industry may already be comparable to that generated in the past by U.S. military nuclear programs. Although the volumes of the military wastes are very large, they are on the average almost 100 times more dilute than projected commercial high-level wastes.     

餐饮业的竞争与毛泽东军事思想

毛泽东军事思想是人类思想的瑰宝。毛泽东提出的一系列包括人民战争、以弱胜强等思想不仅在革命战争时期是克敌制胜的法宝,而且在市场经济条件下同样具有现实意义。     

农业基础设施投入对不同粮食作物产出的影响研究

农业基础设施被视为推进"藏粮于地"与"藏粮于技"战略的重要载体,研究农业基础设施投入对不同粮食作物产出的差异效应,有利于提高农业基础设施的投资效率,更好地保障国家粮食安全。基于农业基础设施对粮食产出影响的理论分析,以三大主粮作物的主产区域为研究对象,采用FGLS等计量方法,分析农业基础设施以及农田水利、农业电力、农村交通等三类主要基础设施对三大主粮作物的产出效应差异。实证结果表明:整体上,农业基础设施对水稻与小麦两种作物产出有显著的正向影响,影响系数分别为0.052 3和0.110 8;农业基础设施对玉米作物产出则不明显。细分农业基础设施的类型来看,农田水利设施对水稻与玉米两种作物产出有显著的正向影响,影响系数分别为0.673 4和0.288 0;农业电力设施对小麦产出有显著的正向影响,影响系数为0.066 0。因此,提出农业基础设施建设资金要向水稻与小麦主产区域倾斜;要因地制宜推进农业基础设施建设,在水稻和玉米主产区域加强农田水利设施建设,在小麦主产区域加强农业电力设施建设等政策建议。     

Science in europe/the antinuclear movement takes hold

Five months after the announcement of President Carter's nonproliferation policy, the common wisdom in this country is that Europe has hardly wavered in its rush toward nuclear power. The cry that "Europe will do what it wants whether the United States builds a breeder or not" is often heard from American nuclear interests, with apparent justification as the State Department has shown little visible progress in negotiating new agreements and some signs of retreating from its original goals. But popular protest against nuclear power has reached a pitch in Europe that would be barely imaginable today in this country, and the political strength of the antinuclear forces has become formidable, not only in Sweden where nuclear power was a pivotal issue last year, but across the continent. West Germany's research minister recently predicted that that country's two ruling coalition parties will vote for a complete moratorium on nuclear construction when they meet this fall, and some observers predict that any moratorium contingent on creation of a waste disposal site could last up to 12 years. Beyond public opposition, the plutonium breeder is running into trouble in Germany for many of the same reasons it has in the United States; program delays, safety concerns, and cost overruns threaten to undermine the claim that it can one day become an economically competitive energy source. Nuclear opposition is far from being a single-issue movement in Europe, as groups of many political persuasions embrace it for their own reasons. But as the following report by Nigel Hawkes details, the Carter administration policy is not the only thing holding back nuclear power in Europe.-W.D.M.     

西北军政委员会与建国初期的西北农林建设

西北军政委员会是新中国成立初期设立于西北的最高政权机关,虽然它主要是为实施军事管制、建立政治社会秩序而设立的,但是作为军政合一的政权组织。西北军政委员会在建国初期,为挽救西北地区破败的农业经济,无论是对该区农业经济、还是与之相辅相成的林业经济发展,都提出了诸多的保障措施,并制定了一系列有利于农林经济发展的方针政策,在为建国初期的西北农林建设和发展做出了积极而有力的贡献的同时,也为长远的西北农林业的发展打下了良好基础。     

Dependability of wind energy generators with short-term energy storage

Power fluctuations and power duration curves for wind energy generators, including energy storage facilities of a certain capacity, are compared to those of typical nuclear reactors. A storage system capable of delivering the yearly average power output for about 10 hours already makes the dependability of the wind energy system comparable to that of a typical nuclear plant.     

"数字鸿沟"视阈下的数字图书馆建设

数字鸿沟是当代信息社会中的世界性问题，分布十分广泛。数字鸿沟的危害波及一国政治、经济、文化、军事安全与社会稳定。我们认为数字图书馆是填平数字鸿沟，变数字鸿沟为数字桥梁，加速中国信息化进程，弘扬中华文化的最有力武器之一。我们要加强具有中国特色数字图书馆和数字资源的建设，以提升国家核心竞争力，从而将数字鸿沟转化为数字机遇。     

New approaches to nuclear proliferation policy

Nuclear proliferation is not one but a complex of problems. One relates to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its effect on the spread of nuclear weapons and knowledge. Second, Iraq's violation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligation has exposed certain weaknesses in the traditional regime of multilateral nonproliferation institutions and treaties. Third, Pakistan's achievement of a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1980s brings the postproliferation question to the forefront in South Asia. There is no single solution to this complex set of problems, but the beginning of wisdom is to build upon the successes of the past, add new policy procedures, and, above all, increase the priority given to the issue. Otherwise, we may be faced with the ironic outcome that the widely welcomed end of the Cold War may increase the prospect of nuclear use.     

Thermoclines: a solar thermal energy resource for enhanced hydroelectric power production

The solar thermal energy stored in hydroelectric reservoir thermoclines is very large and greatly exceeds the gravitational hydroenergy of the surface water, even after limitations arising from the second law of thermodynamics have been taken into account. Greatly enhanced power production can be obtained at present hydroelectric facilities if heat engines are adapted to exploit this large thermal energy resource.     

中国妇女高阶政治权力图景分析

妇女解放和提升妇女社会地位是一个综合性的问题。在政治权力图景中,高阶政治权力更能综合地反映当前妇女地位的真实状况。本文根据当代妇女解放运动所发生的变化,重点分析政治权力高阶妇女数量的增加,意味着更多的妇女参与政治所筛选的结果。依此进一步分析了当前中国政治格局中政治权力高阶的图景。结果得出：政治权力高阶明显呈现出两性分布不均匀的图景,中国妇女地位的提升,还有很长距离要走。