Facing nuclear reality

Nuclear weapons that are safe and secure, reliable, survivable, and effective will be a critical element of this nation's deterrent for the foreseeable future. The existence of these weapons reflects the tension that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear test bans will not reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons or this tension. Imprudent nuclear test bans, however, could impair the viability of this vital element of U.S. security. New, more restrictive test limitations would not enhance our national security. They do not address the two most important issues-namely, major reductions in strategic and conventional forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and a widespread lessening of tension between our two countries. In fact, it is conceivable that the diversion of political attention from arms reduction efforts and the distrust generated by test-ban verification problems could actually increase tensions between the two countries. We believe that more restrictive test limitations or a nuclear test ban should be considered only as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to arms control. We must reduce the numbers of the most destabilizing weapons and the overall size of the strategic arsenals through negotiations. A restrictive test ban may be a proper last step in our quest for nuclear arms control and a stable peace, but it would, in our opinion, be an imprudent first step. Further test limitations will be consistent with increased stability and decreased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union only if they are instituted after major stabilizing reductions are made in the strategic nuclear and conventional forces of both countries.     

Uranium power and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons

Only a few nonnuclear weapons states with uranium-fueled power plants have kept the weapons option open, and none has evidenced activities intended for diverting fissionable material from its civilian system. Analysis of alternative strategies shows that acquisition of nuclear weapons material would probably depend on military production facilities rather than diversion. Horizontal proliferation is primarily a political issue and is related only marginally to uranium power development. Restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act on the supply of equipment and fuel by the United States appear to have induced, in some nonnuclear weapons states, the building of small-scale facilities that can be modified for production of weapons material. More attention should be given to the international political, economic, and military factors that persuade such states to abjure nuclear weapons.     

A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing

Our foregoing analysis of the role of a comprehensive test ban leads us to the following conclusions. 1) A CTB by itself will have little direct effect on the arms race between the superpowers. It would not hinder their nuclear arms production and deployment nor would it necessarily present a significant obstacle to the development of new nuclear weapons systems, despite limiting the development of new nuclear warhead designs. It can hardly make a dent in the destructive capability of the superpowers or in their ability to step up the pace of the arms race. 2) The chief merits of a CTB reside in the political sphere. It would help promote detente and could help to escalate interest in arms control agreements of broader scope. But in neither of these effects would it be as significant as a successful SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) agreement. The CTB also lingers as a piece of unfinished business since the signing of the LTB in 1963. The question can be and has been raised, "If the superpowers are serious about arms control, why have they not accepted the CTB, which is simple in concept and in form and is also free of serious military risks?" Such doubts about the sincerity of the superpowers' willingness to limit their own arms development will persist as long as there is no CTB. Substantial agreement at SALT would lessen some of this effect too, but would not eliminate it completely. 3) Recent progress in seismic identification has been impressive, and other means of obtaining technical intelligence about nuclear testing have probably also improved greatly. In addition, research on the technical means of on-site inspection has demonstrated its limited effectiveness. Therefore, the role of on-site inspections as an added deterrent to cheating on a CTB has diminished substantially. This is not to say that detection and identification of all nuclear tests is possible now, or ever, but only that on-site inspection would add very little to the other technical means now available for verification. 4) It will become increasingly difficult in the United States to oppose the CTB on the basis of risks that accompany possible Soviet evasion of a treaty that does not include the right of onsite inspection. The opposition to a CTB is now likely to shift to the more direct argument that nuclear testing is important to keep pace with continuing worldwide technical and military developments. The justification for U.S. testing is only in part because of advances in Soviet nuclear technology per se. Those opposing a CTB may argue that it makes little sense, and may even be courting danger, to freeze nuclear technology alone and that banning nuclear tests should await an agreement that copes with all military research and development and all qualitative improvements in weapons systems. This directly confronts the argument that the unique virtue of a CTB is that it provides a simple and feasible first step in the very complicated problems of controlling military technology. 5) The mutual deterrence of the superpowers will not be compromised if a CTB agreement is reached and one side or the other clandestinely violates such an agreement. The state of nuclear technology in both countries is mature, and the destructive capability of their nuclear arsenals can be easily maintained. Whatever small improvements can come as a consequence of clandestine testing would hardly affect the strategic balance. 6) It seems unlikely that China and France will agree to stop testing in the near future. These countries refused to join the nonproliferation treaty, which did not affect their nuclear programs, and it is doubtful that, proceeding from military considerations alone, they would join a CTB. Their nuclear programs are still not mature, and a CTB would freeze their positions of inferiority with respect to the superpowers. There may, however, be wider political and security arrangements to induce them to participate. Cessation of tests by the other nuclear powers might serve as an inducement to China and France to refrain from testing. 7) The key near-nuclear powers, such as Japan, India, and Israel, are much more concerned with the military activities of their neighbors than they are with those of the superpowers. The modest nuclear restraints that a CTB imposes on the superpowers are hardly likely to have a direct impact on the approach of these countries to their own security. However, for these critical near-nuclear countries a CTB may be much more acceptable than the nonproliferation treaty. A CTB would not prohibit the production of fissionable material, the development of nuclear weapons technology short of testing, nor the stockpiling of untested nuclear weapons, and is therefore less restrictive. Consequently, these powers may be willing to ratify a CTB, but not the nonproliferation treaty. On the other hand, the CTB may provide them with a ready excuse for not succumbing to the pressure to ratify the nonproliferation treaty, if indeed they need excuses or would bow to such pressure. 8) A CTB is of very little added, direct significance to other nonnuclear powers who have already ratified or are about to ratify the nonproliferation treaty. It may only lessen their pique about the treaty's being highly discriminatory-the treaty imposes no restraints on the nuclear weapons programs of the nuclear powers, while the CTB restricts all parties to the agreement. 9) Peaceful nuclear explosions do not now show great promise and significance for economic development. What can be done with peaceful explosions can often be done by other means, although possibly at a slightly higher cost. On the other hand, making allowance for peaceful explosions greatly complicates a CTB. A useful approach to the problem of banning military tests but not foregoing indefinitely the use of peaceful explosions might, therefore, be to ban all nuclear explosions for a period of several years and to stipulate in the agreement that in that time there would be negotiations on how peaceful explosions may be controlled in a way that would not jeopardize the CTB.     

Iraq and the future of nuclear nonproliferation: the roles of inspections and treaties

In the aftermath of the GulfWar, revelations about Iraq's extensive program to develop nuclear weapons challenge the future of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Until inspections sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council began, Iraq's violations of its obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its related safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency went undetected. The ultimate impact of Iraq's behavior on the regime cannot yet be determined, but there is now an opportunity to improve safeguards and other aspects of the regime, including strengthening export controls and proliferation intelligence collection and sharing and the development of appropriate response capabilities.     

PHYSICS: Will Livermore Laser Ever Burn Brightly?

The National Ignition Facility (NIF), a superlaser being built here at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in an effort to use lasers rather than nuclear explosions to create a fusion reaction, is supposed to allow weapons makers to preserve the nuclear arsenal--and do nifty fusion science, too. But a new report that examines its troubled past also casts doubt on its future. Even some of NIF's scientific and political allies are beginning to talk openly of a scaled-down version of the original 192-laser design.     

原核生物现代分类学的主要遗传标记

细菌分类学产生以来,其分类方法经历了多次改变.传统上的细菌分类方法在现代细菌分类学家眼中除了它们的历史价值外就再无其它东西了.对新颖技术特别是核酸的不断了解,发展了更为有效的细菌分类方法,如:DNA阵列,16S rRNA基因分析法等等,它们能彻底解决传统分类法不能解决的问题.这些分类方法必将在原核生物现代分类中扮演举足轻重的角色.     

Europium-155 in debris from nuclear weapons

The lithium-drifted germanium detector enables determination of europium-155 on a routine basis in environmental samples contaminated with debris from nuclear weapons. From measurements of europium-155, cesium-144, and strontium-90 in air filters collected between 1961 and 1966, the yield of europium-155 from weapons was estimated at 1400 atoms per 10(6) fissions, which is close to the yield of europium-155 from fast fission of uranium-238.     

Science and politics: free speech controversy at lawrence laboratory

The Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, one of the nation's most distinguished scientific institutions, has been struck by a series of "free speech" controversies in recent months. The laboratory, which is operated by the University of California and is almost entirely funded by the Atomic Energy Commission, has facilities in two California locations, Berkeley and Livermore. Each has been under fire for allegedly stifling open discussion of controversial issues. The Berkeley facility, a leading center for the study of high-energy physics and fundamental nuclear science, has been split by an internal debate over the right of scientists to hold formal political discussions at the laboratory during their lunch hours. The controversy has led to the banning of meetings, the circulating of petitions and counterpetitions bearing hundreds of names, the publishing of an underground newspaper, and the suspension of a controversial physicist. The Livermore facility, a major center for developing nuclear weapons, has been accused of trying to muzzle two staff scientists who contend that existing radiation standards are too lax to protect the public from nuclear radiation hazards. Livermore has also been the target of demonstrations and of a lawsuit seeking to open the weapons laboratory to allow discussions between outsiders and staff scientists concerning the implications of weapons research. The article below discusses the controversy at the Berkeley laboratory, where only unclassified research is performed. A subsequent article will discuss the conflict at security-conscious Livermore.     

清朝政府对茶叶武器的认知——以鸦片战争为考察中心

茶叶是清代中英贸易的核心商品。18世纪50年代起,英国成为中国茶叶最大输出国。茶叶贸易为英国政府和东印度公司带来了巨额利益,也是清朝政府对英国使用茶叶武器的现实基础。清朝对茶叶武器的认知来源于古代的以茶治边政策,只不过运用对象从对待周边少数民族转移到对待西方来华贸易国家。清朝对俄罗斯、安延集都使用过茶叶武器,对英国使用茶叶武器则不过是增加了一次实践罢了。对英国使用茶叶武器的思想具有多层次性,即英国绝对需茶、以茶可制英国及以茶制英方式。但对英国使用以茶制之最终并没有取得预期的效果,主要原因是高估了茶叶武器的作用,低估了英国的侵略野心以及道光皇帝经常反复无常。     

Strontium-calcium movement from soil to man

The calcium reservoirs of the biosphere are becoming labeled to varying degrees with strontium-90 from nuclear weapons. These reservoirs include the human and animal skeleton, the milk, the vegetation, the upper layers of soil, and the waters. The degree of labeling is governed by the dilution that occurs, or the differential behavior of calcium and strontium in various steps of the food chain. This differential behavior normally provides a factor of protection against strontium-90 in the soil and vegetation that may be as high as 25 for the newborn and is most likely not less than 6 for adults, depending on food habits. The physiological steps that are important in the movement of the two elements in the biosphere are described to provide a basis for an approach toward increase of the discrimination against strontium in favor of calcium. Some aspects of agricultural practices are discussed from this standpoint. The matter of hazard from levels now existing and the present need to undertake remedial measures are not discussed, in major part because of lack of experimental data on which to base such considerations.     

Gamma-ray measurements of a soviet cruise-missile warhead

A portable germanium detector was used to detect gamma-ray emissions from a nuclear warhead aboard the Soviet cruiser Slava. Measurements taken on the missile launch tube indicated the presence of uranium-235 and plutonium-239-the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. With the use of this equipment, these isotopes probably could have been identified at a distance of 4 meters from the warhead. Such inspections do not reveal detailed information about the design of the warhead.     

Perceived risk, trust, and the politics of nuclear waste

The Department of Energy's program for disposing of high-level radioactive wastes has been impeded by overwhelming political opposition fueled by public perceptions of risk. Analysis of these perceptions shows them to be deeply rooted in images of fear and dread that have been present since the discovery of radioactivity. The development and use of nuclear weapons linked these images to reality and the mishandling of radioactive wastes from the nation's military weapons facilities has contributed toward creating a profound state of distrust that cannot be erased quickly or easily. Postponing the permanent repository and employing dry-cask storage of wastes on site would provide the time necessary for difficult social and political issues to be resolved.     

Fallout plutonium in an alkaline, saline lake

Plutonium isotopes, derived from global fallout following atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, have been measured in the water and sediments of a natural alkaline, saline lake. The activities of fallout plutonium in the water column are about two orders of magnitude greater than in most freshwater lakes, where these nuclides are found predominantly in the sediments.     

Portraits of science. "The most versatile physicist of his generation"

P. M. S. Blackett (1897-1974) entered Cambridge University and the Cavendish Laboratory as a young veteran of the first world war. His innovative research with the Wilson cloud chamber resulted in photographic evidence of nuclear transformation and the existence of the positron. In the 1950s and 1960s, he helped to pioneer the use of paleomagnetic evidence in support of the theory of continental drift. A leader of operational research during the second world war, Blackett became an outspoken critic in the postwar period of American atomic policy and British development of nuclear weapons, taking on a public role for which he was sometimes criticized.     

An age-induced switch to a hyper-recombinational state

There is a strong correlation between age and cancer, but the mechanism by which this phenomenon occurs is unclear. We chose Saccharomyces cerevisiae to examine one of the hallmarks of cancer--genomic instability--as a function of cellular age. As diploid yeast mother cells aged, an approximately 100-fold increase in loss of heterozygosity (LOH) occurred. Extending life-span altered neither the onset nor the frequency of age-induced LOH; the switch to hyper-LOH appears to be on its own clock. In young cells, LOH occurs by reciprocal recombination, whereas LOH in old cells was nonreciprocal, occurring predominantly in the old mother's progeny. Thus, nuclear genomes may be inherently unstable with age.     

Receptor-estrogen complex in the nuclear fraction of rat uterine cells during the estrous cycle

A quantitative method was used to determine the concentration of receptor-estrogen complex in the nuclear fraction of rat uterine cells throughout the estrous cycle. The concentrations of nuclear receptor-estrogen complex were: metestrus, 0.22; diestrus, 0.75; proestrus, 1.29; and estrus, 0.31 picomoles per milligram of DNA. This cyclic fluctuation in the nuclear complex closely parallels the secretion of ovarian estrogen during the estrous cycle, an indication that the accumulation of receptor-estrogen complex by the nuclear fraction of uterine cells may be of physiological significance, and under the control of endogenous estrogen.     

NUCLEAR SECURITY: Los Alamos Under Siege After Secrets Recovered

The secrets-packed computer hard drives that temporarily disappeared at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico could spark big changes in science and security at the country's nuclear weapons laboratories. As Science went to press, investigators were trying to determine if the disks--missing from a vault since at least 7 May and discovered behind a nearby copying machine on 16 June--were pocketed by spies or just mislaid by employees. Their disappearance touched off a debate about how useful they might be to a rogue nation or terrorist group.     

An upheaval in u.s. Strategic thought

Early this year, the U.S. land-based force of nuclear missiles became vulnerable to a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union, as the Soviets deployed a large number of highly accurate warheads on their own missiles. They first demonstrated this capability in 1977. Since then, U.S. missile vulnerability has come to assume great importance in superpower relations. Western observers have portrayed the Soviet achievement as a sign of aggression, and made missile vulnerability into a symbol of declining American military strength. The government has proposed a vast military buildup of nuclear weapons, supposedly made necessary by this new threat. But the public is increasingly skeptical, and support for some form of arms control is growing. The first article in this series examines how the United States learned of the Soviet accuracy, and why it caused such great alarm. The next article will examine the Reagan Administration's response to this threat.     

Childhood leukemia and fallout from the Nevada nuclear tests

Cancer mortality data from the National Center for Health Statistics, covering the period 1950 through 1978, were used to test a reported association between childhood leukemia and exposure to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests in Nevada between 1951 and 1958. No pattern of temporal and geographic variation in risk supportive of the reported association was found. Comparison of these results with those presented in support of an association of risk with fallout suggests that the purported association merely reflects an anomalously low leukemia rate in southern Utah during the period 1944 to 1949.     

The looming threat of bioterrorism

Biological weapons have recently attracted the attention and the resources of the nation. Discerning the nature of the threat of bioweapons as well as appropriate responses to them requires greater attention to the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. The dominant paradigm of a weapon as a nuclear device that explodes or a chemical cloud that is set adrift leaves us ill-equipped conceptually and practically to assess and thus to prevent the potentially devastating effects of bioterrorism. Strengthening the public health and infectious disease infrastructure is an effective step toward averting the suffering that could be wrought by a terrorist's use of a biological agent.