规模化商品肉鸡主要疫病流行动态

1 禽流感 禽流感在很长时间仍然是养禽业重大传染病,是禽病防控的重点.H5亚型家禽禽流感:H5N1、H5N2、H5N6、H5N8;H9亚型家禽禽流感:H9N2;H7亚型家禽禽流感:H7N7、H7N9. 1.1 病毒理化性质 禽流感病毒是囊膜病毒,对去污剂等脂溶剂比较敏感.对碘蒸气和碘溶液特别敏感.常用消毒剂能迅速破坏其传染性.病毒可在加热、极端的pH、非等渗和干燥的条件下失活.禽流感病毒可以在自然环境中,特别是凉爽和潮湿的条件存活很长时间.粪便中病毒的传染性在4℃条件下可以保持长达30～50天,20℃时为7天,60℃、20分钟可以灭活病毒.     

H9N2亚型禽流感流行趋势与预防概述

H9N2亚型禽流感是目前在我国处于长期流行的一种危害禽养殖业的疾病,而且对养禽业带来的危害是严重的,我国H9N2亚型禽流感病毒(AIVS)近些年流行分支出现了改变,这给我们在预防H9N2禽流感发生带来了一定的困难。本文通过对H9N2亚型禽流感病毒目前流行趋势介绍,临床病理变化以及会出现与其他疫病混合感染的情况,综合阐述了H9N2亚型禽流感在临床上如何预防,为今后养禽业在预防H9N2亚型禽流感病毒发生时提供理论基础。     

北美H7亚型禽流感病毒RT-PCR检测方法的建立

本研究通过分析NCBI数据库中H7亚型禽流感病毒HA基因序列,根据该基因设计引物,建立了针对北美H7亚型禽流感病毒HA基因的一步法RT-PCR检测方法,并对反应条件进行了优化。该方法可特异地检出北美H7亚型禽流感病毒HA基因,而未检出欧亚分支H7亚型禽流感病毒H7N2和H7N9、其他亚型流感病毒(H1N1、H3N2、H5N1、H5N8和H9N2),以及新城疫病毒和鸡传染性支气管炎病毒;检测方法的灵敏度可达0.1 pg/μL。该检测方法的建立为监测北美H7亚型禽流感病毒提供了良好的技术支撑,可用于外来禽流感病毒的检测。     

加强监测,从源头控制和根除家禽流感病毒

正我国自1992年家禽中发生H9N2亚型禽流感以来,又先后发生H5和H7亚型禽流感流行,不仅造成严重经济损失,给养殖业带来灾难性打击,而且这些亚型的禽流感病毒可感染部分人群,引发严重的公共卫生事件。虽然我国从家禽中曾分离到很多种亚型的A型流感病毒,但就危害性而言最重要的是H5N1(H5NX)、H7N9和H9N2三个亚型。1 H9N2亚型禽流感流行特点和进化动态H9N2亚型禽流感是我国家禽中存在最广泛、传播最快的禽流感。     

H7N9亚型禽流感病毒的分布与遗传来源分析

2013年3月31日,国家卫生与计划生育委员会通报了上海和安徽确诊3例人感染H7N9亚型禽流感病例,顿时世界为之轰动,世界卫生组织（WHO）对此也高度关注。截止2013年4月25日,全国共确诊H7N9禽流感病例113人,分布在浙江、上海、江苏、河南等多个省份。历史上,美国、蒙古、韩国等多个国家都曾从野鸟和水禽中检出过H7N9亚型禽流感病毒,但从未有过人感染发病的报道。这次发生首次展现了H7N9具有夸宿主传播的能力。病毒基因组遗传进化分析表明这次流行的H7N9亚型禽流感病毒不同于以往的任何一株H7N9病毒,其HA 基因与我国南方水禽近年来分离到的H7亚型禽流感病毒密切相关,NA 基因则与2011年韩国野鸟分离到的H7N9亚型禽流感病毒遗传关系较近,其余6个基因则与国内地方流行的H9N2亚型禽流感病毒高度同源。因此,该病毒可能是不同亚型禽流感病毒在同一宿主体内经二元或三元重排而形成的新病毒。本文就H7N9亚型禽流感病毒的历史分布和国内新出现的H7N9亚型禽流感病毒的分子特性和遗传进化进行了分析。     

华东地区家鸭中N2亚型低致病性禽流感病毒神经氨酸酶基因的重排

为研究华东地区家鸭中低致病性禽流感病毒NA基因的遗传进化规律,对2000年～2006年分离的包括H3N2,H5N2,H6N2,H9N2和H11N2的44株禽流感病毒的NA基因进行了遗传进化分析.44株病毒NA基因之间的同源性为82.9%～99.9%,4株H9N2病毒的NA基因同源性为96.9%～99.9%,所有H3N2病毒的NA基因同源性为92.3%～99.9%,H5N2、H6N2和H11N2病毒的同种亚型毒株间的NA基因同源性变化幅度较大,相反,有些不同HA亚型毒株间的NA基因同源性反而很高.进一步分析NA基因推导的氨基酸序列也表现出相似的规律.华东地区家鸭中N2亚型的禽流感病毒正处于不断地进化状态中,不同N2亚型的禽流感病毒之间已存在NA基因的重排.     

鸽感染H9N2亚型禽流感病毒的诊治

鸽通常被认为对禽流感病毒易感性不高。近期江苏省泰兴市某农户饲养的肉鸽出现呼吸道症状和腹泻,并伴有一定程度的死亡。经实验室诊断,从病死鸽体内分离到H9N2亚型禽流感病毒,且鸽群血清抗体检测结果显示H9亚型禽流感病毒抗体阳性,结合该鸽群未接种禽流感疫苗的事实,确诊为H9N2亚型禽流感病毒感染。提示在鸽饲养过程中应该考虑H9亚型禽流感病毒感染的预防。     

湖北地区鸡源H9N2亚型禽流感病毒的分离鉴定及遗传进化分析

为了分离鉴定病鸡排泄物中的禽流感病毒,并分析其遗传背景,通过鸡胚接种试验区和病毒特异性抗体中和试验区,从病鸡排泄物中分离鉴定出2株禽流感病毒,分别命名为A/chicken/Jinmen/JM0305/2017(JM0305)和A/chicken/Daye/DY0602/2017(DY0602)。利用禽流感病毒亚型特异性抗体中和试验区和基因测序分析等方法对2株禽流感病毒进行亚型鉴定。结果表明,2株禽流感病毒均属于H9N2亚型。为了解这2株H9N2亚型禽流感病毒的生物学特性,对其全基因组进行了分析以及毒力测定。结果显示,将2株毒株感染雏鸡后,未产生明显的禽流感临床症状,2株H9亚型禽流感病毒的MDT值分别为72.0h和91.2h,HA裂解位点处的氨基酸序列均为-PSRSSR/GL-,表明2株禽流感病毒均属于低致病性禽流感。遗传进化分析表明2株病毒的HA基因均在H9亚型分支上,NA基因均在N2亚型的分支上;通过进化树分析表明2株病毒属于以A/chicken/Beijing/1/94(H9N2)为代表的欧亚谱系。该结果为进一步研究鸡源H9N2亚型禽流感病毒分子进化奠定了基础。     

谈谈H7N9亚型流感的主要防控措施及建议

禽流感病毒(Avian influenza virus,AIV)属于正黏病毒科流感病毒属,是一种呈球形或杆状、有包膜的单股负链RNA病毒,为A型流感病毒,可分为16个H亚型(H1-H16)和9个N亚型(N1-N9),因此,禽流感病毒可分为HXNX共144种亚型,H7N9亚型流感病毒是其中的一种.目前,国内引起家禽发病的主要是H5N1和H9N2亚型.2013年3月31日,中国上海市和安徽省首次发现3例人感染H7N9禽流感确诊病例,此后在全国部分地区陆续出现确诊病例,引起国内外广泛的关注,同时对家禽业带来严重的经济损失.     

禽流感病毒N9亚型RT-PCR检测方法的建立

为建立一种简便、快速、灵敏、准确的禽流感病毒N9亚型检测方法,根据GenBank中收录的禽流感病毒N9亚型高度保守的基因序列设计引物,通过优化反应条件建立禽流感病毒N9亚型RT-PCR检测方法,并对该方法进行灵敏度、敏感性、特异性试验和临床样品检测。建立了禽流感病毒N9亚型RTPCR检测方法,用该方法检测时,H7N9、H10N9均呈阳性,而非N9亚型的禽流感病毒及新城疫病毒等其他禽传染病病毒均呈阴性,能检测到1/32血凝单位的H7N9禽流感病毒。建立了禽流感病毒N9亚型RTPCR检测方法,具有操作简便、灵敏度高、特异性强的特点,值得推广应用。     

我国H5和H7N9亚型高致病性禽流感的监测及疫情暴发分析

禽流感病毒（avian influenza virus,AIV）是一种重要的人兽共患病病原,严重制约养禽业的健康发展,并对公共卫生安全构成极大威胁。其中,H5（H5N1、H5N2、H5N6、H5N8等）和H7N9亚型高致病性禽流感病毒（highly pathogenic avian influenza virus,HPAIV）引起的高致病性禽流感（highly pathogenic avian influenza,HPAI）对我国养禽业危害巨大。通过实施强制免疫,疫情得到了控制,但在禽群中仍散状暴发,并出现多种新型病毒,防控形势依然严峻。本文总结了截至2021年9月我国禽类暴发H5和H7N9亚型HPAI的所有官方公布的疫情暴发事件以及监测数据,分析了其流行特点,以期为禽流感的预警和防控提供参考。     

(Highly pathogenic) avian influenza as a zoonotic agent

Zoonotic agents challenging the world every year afresh are influenza A viruses. In the past, human pandemics caused by influenza A viruses had been occurring periodically. Wild aquatic birds are carriers of the full variety of influenza virus A subtypes, and thus, most probably constitute the natural reservoir of all influenza A viruses. Whereas avian influenza viruses in their natural avian reservoir are generally of low pathogenicity (LPAIV), some have gained virulence by mutation after transmission and adaptation to susceptible gallinaceous poultry. Those so-called highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) then cause mass die-offs in susceptible birds and lead to tremendous economical losses when poultry is affected. Besides a number of avian influenza virus subtypes that have sporadically infected mammals, the HPAIV H5N1 Asia shows strong zoonotic characteristics and it was transmitted from birds to different mammalian species including humans. Theoretically, pandemic viruses might derive directly from avian influenza viruses or arise after genetic reassortment between viruses of avian and mammalian origin. So far, HPAIV H5N1 already meets two conditions for a pandemic virus: as a new subtype it has been hitherto unseen in the human population and it has infected at least 438 people, and caused severe illness and high lethality in 262 humans to date (August 2009). The acquisition of efficient human-to-human transmission would complete the emergence of a new pandemic virus. Therefore, fighting H5N1 at its source is the prerequisite to reduce pandemic risks posed by this virus. Other influenza viruses regarded as pandemic candidates derive from subtypes H2, H7, and H9 all of which have infected humans in the past. Here, we will give a comprehensive overview on avian influenza viruses in concern to their zoonotic potential.     

H9N2 influenza viruses isolated from poultry in Korean live bird markets continuously evolve and cause the severe clinical signs in layers

H9N2 influenza viruses are endemic in many Asian countries. We demonstrated that H9N2 influenza viruses isolated from poultry in Korean live bird markets are genetically changing and could cause the clinical signs in layers. Genetic analysis showed that Korean avian H9N2 influenza viruses are distinct from H9N2 influenza viruses circulating in poultry in China and Hong Kong. When we infected layers with H9N2 isolates, layers showed about 30% mortality and the reduction of egg productions. Considering that H9N2 influenza virus is one of potential pandemic candidates, the continuous surveillance is needed to monitor avian H9N2 influenza viruses for the poultry industry and humans.     

H9N2亚型禽流感病毒与其他病原混合感染的研究进展

H9N2亚型禽流感病毒（Avian influenza virus,AIV）属于低致病性AIV,但因其分布广泛、传播迅速,可引起感染家禽生产性能下降,给家禽业带来了极大的经济损失。H9N2亚型AIV在感染家禽过程中可引起严重的免疫抑制,使家禽极易继发上呼吸道细菌、消化道细菌等感染,从而导致H9N2亚型AIV致病力增强,细菌黏附定植能力增强,家禽死亡率显著升高。另外,H9N2亚型AIV还能与禽传染性支气管炎病毒、禽传染性法氏囊病病毒、新城疫病毒等发生混合感染,病毒入侵时有可能出现协同作用或颉颃作用,从而相互促进或抑制病毒的复制和排毒;H9N2亚型AIV还极易发生突变或与其他亚型流感病毒在混合感染时发生基因重组产生感染人的新亚型毒株,给人类健康和公共卫生安全带来重大威胁。作者综述了H9N2亚型AIV与其他病原混合感染的研究进展,通过阐述H9N2亚型AIV与细菌或病毒混合感染的协同或颉颃作用,以期为临床上H9N2亚型AIV混合感染的防治提供参考。     

H5N1亚型禽流感病毒起源及演化关系的探讨

通过综述感染人类的H5N1亚型高致病性禽流感病毒起源及演化关系,表明感染人的A/Hongkong/97(H5N1)株及目前流行的高致病性禽流感病毒可能起源于禽源的A型流感病毒株(A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96)。自1996年以来,H5N1亚型禽流感病毒的基因型经Gs/Gd,A,B,C,D,E,V,W,X0-X3,Y,Z和Z 不断的演化为目前流行的基因型Z。高致病性禽流感病毒(H5,H7和H9亚型)在禽,特别是水禽体内的重组或重配而相互传播,并随候鸟的迁徙而传播不易消灭,H5N1亚型的禽流感在不同地区的不断暴发与流行已严重威胁着养禽业的发展及人类的健康,需要进行长期监控。     

H5N1亚型禽流感病毒起源及演化关系的探讨H5N1亚型禽流感病毒起源及演化关系的探讨

通过综述感染人类的H5N1亚型高致病性禽流感病毒起源及演化关系，表明感染人的A／Hongkong／97（H5N1）株及目前流行的高致病性禽流感病毒可能起源于禽源的A型流感病毒株（A／Goose／Guangdong／1／96）。自1996年以来，H5N1亚型禽流感病毒的基因型经Gs／Gd，A，B，C，D，E，V，W，）X0—X3，Y，Z和Z^＋不断的演化为目前流行的基因型Z。高致病性禽流感病毒（H5，H7和H9亚型）在禽，特别是水禽体内的重组或重配而相互传播，并随候鸟的迁徙而传播不易消灭，H5N1亚型的禽流感在不同地区的不断暴发与流行已严重威胁着养禽业的发展及人类的健康，需要进行长期监控。     

从“H7N9禽流感”命名说开去

2013年2月以来,华东地区被一场突如其来的＂疫情＂笼罩,后确诊为人感染H7N9禽流感病毒。由于被冠以“H7N9禽流感”,致使全国养禽业损失惨重。截至2013年上半年,受H7N9流感疫情影响,在短短3个月的时间内,养殖场户直接经济损失超过600亿元。最近,世界卫生组织（WHO）、世界动物卫生组织（OIE）和联合国粮农组织（FAO）等三家国际组织专家就“H7N9禽流感”名称会商,建议媒体使用“H7N9流感”或“H7N9病毒”的名称,这样更客观、准确。文章提出,对待类似情况,一定要本着科学、严谨的态度,不要因为人为的原因,造成不必要的损失,增加疾病控制的难度。     

Serological and Virological Surveillance of Avian Influenza A Virus H9N2 Subtype in Humans and Poultry in Shanghai,China, Between 2008 and 2010

We report the serological evidence of low‐pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 infection in an occupational poultry‐exposed population and a general population. A serological survey of an occupational poultry‐exposed population and a general population was conducted using a haemagglutinin‐inhibiting (HI) assay in Shanghai, China, from January 2008 to December 2010. Evidence of higher anti‐H9 antibodies was found in serum samples collected from poultry workers. During this period, 239 H9N2 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) were isolated from 9297 tracheal and cloacal paired specimens collected from the poultry in live poultry markets. In addition, a total of 733 influenza viruses were isolated from 1569 nasal and throat swabs collected from patients with influenza‐like symptoms in a sentinel hospital, which include H3N2, H1N1, pandemic H1N1 and B, but no H9N2 virus was detected. These findings highlight the need for long‐term surveillance of avian influenza viruses in occupational poultry‐exposed workers.     

Wildlife surveillance associated with an outbreak of lethal H5N2 avian influenza in domestic poultry

Wildlife surveillance was conducted for influenza viruses in conjunction with the 1983-84 lethal H5N2 avian influenza epizootic in domestic poultry in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. Virus-isolation attempts made on cloacal and tracheal swabs from 4,466 birds and small rodents within the quarantined areas and 1,511 waterfowl in nearby Maryland yielded only a single H5N2 isolate from a pen-raised chukar in Pennsylvania. Antibodies against hemagglutinin type 5 and/or neuraminidase type 2 were found in 33% of the aquatic birds tested; however, this finding could not be used to confirm previous H5N2 avian influenza virus activity because of the possibility of prior infections with multiple influenza subtypes. The low prevalence of lethal H5N2 avian influenza virus in wild birds and small rodents strongly indicated that these animals were not responsible for dissemination of the disease among poultry farms during the outbreak.     

Novel human H7N9 influenza virus in China

Outbreaks of H7N9 avian influenza in humans in 5 provinces and 2 municipalities of China have reawakened concern that avian influenza viruses may again cross species barriers to infect the human population and thereby initiate a new influenza pandemic. Evolutionary analysis shows that human H7N9 influenza viruses originated from the H9N2, H7N3 and H11N9 avian viruses, and that it is as a novel reassortment influenza virus. This article reviews current knowledge on 11 subtypes of influenza A virus from human which can cause human infections.