香蕉低温害指标初探

香蕉喜温怕冷,强低温常使香蕉造成伤害,重者死亡,最低气温是香蕉生长的主要限制因子,收集福建香蕉主产区代表点1966/1967、1985/1986、1991/1992、1999/2000年冬季最低气温和附件香蕉园受害程度及近几年冬季在香蕉园进行最低气温考察记载和香蕉低温害调查的图片资料,经相关统计分析表明,它们可以用一元二次方程进行拟合;香蕉的无冻害、轻冻害、中冻害、重冻害、严重冻害的最低气温分别为：5.1,2.9,0.8,-1.1,-2.8℃。     

浅谈加快新疆农村信息化建设的重要性

本文从民族宗教、社会习俗、语言文化、地理地貌、农业经济结构、农业发展条件等方面阐述了新疆作为少数民族地区在农村经济、社会文化方面的特殊性,进而论述信息化建设在推动少数民族地区农村经济发展中的重要作用和意义。     

乡村振兴战略下农村财务管理信息化发展因素

农业是我国社会经济不断发展的重要依据,特别是在国家提出乡村振兴战略并全面实施后,加速推进我国农村现代化建设进程是现阶段急需解决的关键问题。近几年来,我国农村经济的发展得到了质的飞跃,但是农村地区一直以来都存在经济环境较差、基础设施建设弱等问题,从而导致农村地区的财务管理工作问题频发,并且传统的财务管理模式已经无法适应新时代环境下的财务管理标准。基于此,本篇文章围绕着能够影响农村财务管理信息化发展的因素进行讨论,并提出在乡村战略环境下的农村财务信管理信息化发展策略,以期将乡村振兴战略更好的贯彻落实于农村地区的财务管理中,加快其信息化发展的速度。     

我国农村信息化应用模式探讨及建议

阐述了当前我国农村信息化应用于推广的基本情况和形式,列举出当前信息化推广成功的省市所采取的模式．通过分析成功模式的共同点与存在问题．提出对农村信息化模式的建议。     

晋城市农业 农村信息化建设存在的问题及对策

论述了山西省晋城市农业、农村信息化建设的现状,取得的成效,以及存在的问题,提出了加强农业、农村信息化建设的对策和建议。     

建好农村信息化工作平台扎实做好农业服务工作

针对卫辉市农业信息化发展现状,介绍了该市农业信息化运行过程中做法,其中以市农业局为主导的多部门协作成为工作亮点。     

农村商品流通信息化发展初探——以北京市为例

随着计算机互联网的迅速普及和发展,信息化成为提升农村商品流通效率的核心所在。对北京郊区及城镇农产品市场进行了实地调研,从农村信息化组织管理体系、农村市场信息服务、流通商务网站运营以及农产品质量追溯等方面分析了农村商品流通信息化发展现状及存在的主要问题。总体看来,北京农村在信息化组织体系、市场信息服务以及流通电子商务建设等方面已初显成效,但仍存在信息化基础设施薄弱、适用于农村的信息产品少和信息化应用水平不高等问题。结合北京农村信息化建设实践,笔者从信息资源、信息服务以及信息人才建设等方面提出了相应的对策建议。     

谈市场经济条件下的农村经营管理干预

干预是对市场配置机制的一种强制性替代和有益补充。农村经营管理干预 ,是指政府部门或农业社会团体 ,通过法规或规则等特定方式 ,对农村经营管理工作进行强制性管制 ,以确保其能够合法、有序地进行的一种现代农村经营管理运作机制。本文在分析市场手段在农村经营管理中的局限性的基础上 ,进一步明确农村经营管理干预的实质 ,进而对建立和完善农村经营管理干预体系的主要途径进行初步探讨     

浅析退耕还林政策在农村的实施

随着我国社会经济的发展,退耕还林项目也被提上了进程。就当前形势来看,退耕还林是保证我国迈上可持续发展道路的重要途径,然而退耕还林也必然伴随着对农户经济收入的影响。种植和养殖是农村农户的经济来源,退耕还林政策要想在农村得到落实,必须制定和实施相关配套的政策,从而促进国家经济的良性发展。     

陈晓华：深入研究当前农业农村信息化重点工作

陈晓华副部长主持召开农业部市场信息体系建设领导小组会议。会议通报了“十二五”农业信息化规划编制、“金农工程”一期和农业部门户网站群建设、“信息化与现代农业博览会”筹备工作等情况,研究部署了下一阶段工作。张玉香总经济师出席了会议。农业部市场信息体系建设领导小组成员单位的负责同志参加了会议。陈晓华副部长在会上做了重要讲话。     

An Analysis of Principal-Agent of Game under the Asymmetric Information in Venture Capital

The relationship of investors and venture capitalists is an important part in venture capital. Based on asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the principal agent relationship between investors and venture capitalists with game theory. And this paper mainly discusses the choosing, controlling and incentive problem. It suggests that only the capable and self confident venture capitalists could accept the terms of the limited partnership. It also indicates that recompense mechanism which holds the interest of investors and that of venture capitalists tightly is the center of the limited partnership. Rate of yield is the key of recompense mechanism, it not only reflects the incentive on venture capitalists, also reflects the share of risk between investors and venture capitalists. At last, the market credit play an important role in venture capital.     

Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information

Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.     

当前农民“偏好”非法律方式解决纠纷的成因探析

20世纪80年代以来，随着中国法制化进程的推进，法律在人们解决纠纷过程中的作用越来越大。然而在农村社区，人们“偏好”非法律方式解决纠纷，是一种普遍的现象。笔者认为，农民这种“偏好”不能简单地归结于农民法律意识不高和愚昧落后，而应当从行为主体和制度文化两个层面进行全面的分析。     

Game of Hospital-tient Relationship Under Asymmetric Information

The hospital and patient are in the state of asymmetric information in the medical market, which could lead to moral hazard, adverse selection, and low market efficiency. By the game model, we analyze the game process and equilibrium between the hospital and patient under the condition of asymmetric information. The analyzing result suggest that asymmetric information in the medical market is harmful to the patient's benefit and the development of the medical market. Therefore, it's necessary to set up medical information opening system and strengthen the communication between the hospital and the patient so as to relieve the asymmetric information between hospital and patient.     

Game Analysis Between Center Bank and Commercial Banks Under Asymmetric Information

Modern economy depends on money,but money is created by the bank system.So,as the main body of finance institution in one state,banks have the importance influence upon the economy of one country.Center bank constitutes the money policy and executes the money policy in one country,then it is the core of the whole financial system.But the validity for the money policy must rely on the activity of commercial banks to the money policy.Being based on the money policy transmitting mechanism,this Article analyzes how to establish a kind of bargain relation between Center bank and commercial bank so that commercial bank may work hard toward the aim of the money policy for the center bank under the asymmetric information,which was the bases of the Commercial Banks' innovation.     

河南省农村信息化水平研究

本文在研究国内农村信息化水平评价方法的基础上,根据河南省第二次农业普查数据及《河南统计年鉴2008》资料,采用层次分析法与层次聚类法,准确、全面、有效的实现了对河南省农村信息化水平的评价。该评价对于全面掌握河南省农村信息化基本情况,研究制订农村信息化发展规划和科学决策,更好地推进河南省社会主义新农村建设具有十分重要的意义。     

基于DEA的天水市农村信息化效益评价

通过建立天水市农村信息化系统投入产出评价指标体系,采用数据包络分析（DEA）的C2R模型,以天水市5 县2 区作为评价单元对其信息化效率进行测度分析,获得投入产出调整方案。研究结果表明：（1）麦积区、秦州区、秦安县和甘谷县农村信息化效率为DEA有效,武山县、清水县、张家川县农村信息化效率为非DEA有效;（2）麦积区、秦州区、秦安县和甘谷县为规模收益不变,武山县、清水县和张家川县为规模收益递增;（3）非DEA有效的武山县、清水县和张家川县通过模型修正得知,减少一定量的投入,可以有相应比例的产出,以达到相对平衡的最佳效益点。     

Analysis of the Moral Risk Model during Construction Process under Asymmetric Information

During construction process,there is a "principal-agent" relation between clients and constraints.Between the two parties,there exists moral risk under asymmetric information.This paper builds a "moral risk model" between clients and constraints during the construction process by applying "principal-agent theory" in the information economics theory.On the basis of quantitative analysis of the model,this paper draws some conclusions,which is benefitial to the enhancement of the level of project management.At last,this paper proposes some advice on reducing the moral hazard of the constraints.     

Analysis of Management Performance between Owner and Supervisor under Asymmetric Information

The situation of asymmetric information makes a certain benefit conflict between owner and supervisor in the case of project supervision, and the owner undertakes the loss risk caused by information asymmetry. This paper has analyzed the management performance of the owner to the supervisor during the project supervision entrusting by a model.     

Analysis of Incentive and Supervisory Control for Project Supervision under Asymmetric Information

Under the asymmetric information,the owner undertakes moral risk,which is caused by supervisor in the case of project supervision.This paper analyzes the benefit conflict while entrusting because of asymmetric information,discusses how to bring incentive and supervisory control mechanism into project supervision entrust-contract by mathematics model.Then,the design and improvement of the supervision reward in contract are discussed.