A low-threshold test ban is feasible

At present, nuclear explosions are limited by treaty to underground testing with yields of no more than 150 kilotons, and recently there have been renewed calls for further test restrictions. As part of these discussions, the U.S. Congress is considering bills that would legislate new limits to testing,whereas the Reagan Administration opposes such constraints. The editors of Science have asked two groups of participants in the debate to present their arguments for or against new limits to testing. Feiveson, Paine, and von Hippel argue for a treaty of indefinite duration between the United States and the Soviet Union, which includes the following provisions: (i) a ban on all testing outside a desiqnated site having known seismic properties; (ii)verification by means of on-site inspection and in-country seismic monitoring; (iii) unlimited testing below 1 kiloton at the special site; and (iv) an average of one test per year with a yield of up to 15 kilotons for ensuring reliability of the nuclear stockpile. MiUer, Brown, and Nordyke argue that a lowering of the present 150-kiloton threshold would be undesirable, and that new test bans would divert attention from a comprehensive approach to negotiated reductions in the nuclear and conventional arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.     

Facing nuclear reality

Nuclear weapons that are safe and secure, reliable, survivable, and effective will be a critical element of this nation's deterrent for the foreseeable future. The existence of these weapons reflects the tension that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear test bans will not reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons or this tension. Imprudent nuclear test bans, however, could impair the viability of this vital element of U.S. security. New, more restrictive test limitations would not enhance our national security. They do not address the two most important issues-namely, major reductions in strategic and conventional forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and a widespread lessening of tension between our two countries. In fact, it is conceivable that the diversion of political attention from arms reduction efforts and the distrust generated by test-ban verification problems could actually increase tensions between the two countries. We believe that more restrictive test limitations or a nuclear test ban should be considered only as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to arms control. We must reduce the numbers of the most destabilizing weapons and the overall size of the strategic arsenals through negotiations. A restrictive test ban may be a proper last step in our quest for nuclear arms control and a stable peace, but it would, in our opinion, be an imprudent first step. Further test limitations will be consistent with increased stability and decreased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union only if they are instituted after major stabilizing reductions are made in the strategic nuclear and conventional forces of both countries.     

Seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban

The capabilities of in-country seismic monitoring systems for verifying the absence of underground nuclear explosions are compared against challenges posed by possible clandestine testing schemes. Although analysis indicate that extensive networks of in-country seismic arrays are needed to verify a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, such networks cannot ensure that all underground nuclear explosions will be identified. Political and military judgments will determine the level of risk acceptable to each nation.     

Uranium power and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons

Only a few nonnuclear weapons states with uranium-fueled power plants have kept the weapons option open, and none has evidenced activities intended for diverting fissionable material from its civilian system. Analysis of alternative strategies shows that acquisition of nuclear weapons material would probably depend on military production facilities rather than diversion. Horizontal proliferation is primarily a political issue and is related only marginally to uranium power development. Restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act on the supply of equipment and fuel by the United States appear to have induced, in some nonnuclear weapons states, the building of small-scale facilities that can be modified for production of weapons material. More attention should be given to the international political, economic, and military factors that persuade such states to abjure nuclear weapons.     

Iraq and the future of nuclear nonproliferation: the roles of inspections and treaties

In the aftermath of the GulfWar, revelations about Iraq's extensive program to develop nuclear weapons challenge the future of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Until inspections sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council began, Iraq's violations of its obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its related safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency went undetected. The ultimate impact of Iraq's behavior on the regime cannot yet be determined, but there is now an opportunity to improve safeguards and other aspects of the regime, including strengthening export controls and proliferation intelligence collection and sharing and the development of appropriate response capabilities.     

New approaches to nuclear proliferation policy

Nuclear proliferation is not one but a complex of problems. One relates to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its effect on the spread of nuclear weapons and knowledge. Second, Iraq's violation of its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligation has exposed certain weaknesses in the traditional regime of multilateral nonproliferation institutions and treaties. Third, Pakistan's achievement of a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1980s brings the postproliferation question to the forefront in South Asia. There is no single solution to this complex set of problems, but the beginning of wisdom is to build upon the successes of the past, add new policy procedures, and, above all, increase the priority given to the issue. Otherwise, we may be faced with the ironic outcome that the widely welcomed end of the Cold War may increase the prospect of nuclear use.     

Perceived risk, trust, and the politics of nuclear waste

The Department of Energy's program for disposing of high-level radioactive wastes has been impeded by overwhelming political opposition fueled by public perceptions of risk. Analysis of these perceptions shows them to be deeply rooted in images of fear and dread that have been present since the discovery of radioactivity. The development and use of nuclear weapons linked these images to reality and the mishandling of radioactive wastes from the nation's military weapons facilities has contributed toward creating a profound state of distrust that cannot be erased quickly or easily. Postponing the permanent repository and employing dry-cask storage of wastes on site would provide the time necessary for difficult social and political issues to be resolved.     

An upheaval in u.s. Strategic thought

Early this year, the U.S. land-based force of nuclear missiles became vulnerable to a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union, as the Soviets deployed a large number of highly accurate warheads on their own missiles. They first demonstrated this capability in 1977. Since then, U.S. missile vulnerability has come to assume great importance in superpower relations. Western observers have portrayed the Soviet achievement as a sign of aggression, and made missile vulnerability into a symbol of declining American military strength. The government has proposed a vast military buildup of nuclear weapons, supposedly made necessary by this new threat. But the public is increasingly skeptical, and support for some form of arms control is growing. The first article in this series examines how the United States learned of the Soviet accuracy, and why it caused such great alarm. The next article will examine the Reagan Administration's response to this threat.     

Dispelling myths about verification of sea-launched cruise missiles

It is widely believed that an arms control limit on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would be nearly impossible to verify. Among the reasons usually given are: these weapons are small, built in nondistinctive industrial facilities, deployed on a variety of ships and submarines, and difficult to distinguish from their conventionally armed counterparts. In this article, it is argued that the covert production and deployment of nuclear-armed sealaunched cruise missiles would not be so straightforward. A specific arms control proposal is described, namely a total ban on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. This proposal is used to illustrate how an effective verification scheme might be constructed.     

PHYSICS: Will Livermore Laser Ever Burn Brightly?

The National Ignition Facility (NIF), a superlaser being built here at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in an effort to use lasers rather than nuclear explosions to create a fusion reaction, is supposed to allow weapons makers to preserve the nuclear arsenal--and do nifty fusion science, too. But a new report that examines its troubled past also casts doubt on its future. Even some of NIF's scientific and political allies are beginning to talk openly of a scaled-down version of the original 192-laser design.     

Science in europe/the antinuclear movement takes hold

Five months after the announcement of President Carter's nonproliferation policy, the common wisdom in this country is that Europe has hardly wavered in its rush toward nuclear power. The cry that "Europe will do what it wants whether the United States builds a breeder or not" is often heard from American nuclear interests, with apparent justification as the State Department has shown little visible progress in negotiating new agreements and some signs of retreating from its original goals. But popular protest against nuclear power has reached a pitch in Europe that would be barely imaginable today in this country, and the political strength of the antinuclear forces has become formidable, not only in Sweden where nuclear power was a pivotal issue last year, but across the continent. West Germany's research minister recently predicted that that country's two ruling coalition parties will vote for a complete moratorium on nuclear construction when they meet this fall, and some observers predict that any moratorium contingent on creation of a waste disposal site could last up to 12 years. Beyond public opposition, the plutonium breeder is running into trouble in Germany for many of the same reasons it has in the United States; program delays, safety concerns, and cost overruns threaten to undermine the claim that it can one day become an economically competitive energy source. Nuclear opposition is far from being a single-issue movement in Europe, as groups of many political persuasions embrace it for their own reasons. But as the following report by Nigel Hawkes details, the Carter administration policy is not the only thing holding back nuclear power in Europe.-W.D.M.     

Underground nuclear explosions and the control of earthquakes

Underground nuclear explosions trigger significant earthquake activity for at least 32 hours afterward and to distances up to at least 860 kilometers. The proposed Amchitka test may be used to study the feasibility of employing high-yield underground nuclear explosions to release stresses accumulating in the lithosphere. Periodical explosions along active fault zones may be used to prevent disastrous earthquakes.     

Technology Creep and the Arms Race: ICBM Problem a Sleeper

In three articles, Science will discuss how the creep of technology affects the arms race. The first two articles will deal with the most important current example: first, how ICBM modernization is giving both sides a destabilizing, first-strike capability, and second, how arms control seems to be dealing inadequately with this pressing problem. The third article will describe other cases of incremental technical improvements affecting arms control, such as antisatellite research and ballistic missile defense research, which are bringing both sides closer to the antiballistic missile capability they forswore in a 1972 treaty.     

Underground nuclear explosions: tectonic utility and dangers

The tectonic strain energy released by several underground nuclear explosions has been calculated through an analysis of seismic surface waves. The proportionally great amount of energy released in certain events suggests the possible uses for, as well as the hazards of, underground testing.     

餐饮业的竞争与毛泽东军事思想

毛泽东军事思想是人类思想的瑰宝。毛泽东提出的一系列包括人民战争、以弱胜强等思想不仅在革命战争时期是克敌制胜的法宝,而且在市场经济条件下同样具有现实意义。     

Nuclear Pulse (II): Ensuring Delivery of the Doomsday Signal

Defense strategists today assume that a single Soviet warhead detonated 200 miles above Nebraska would knock out unprotected communications equipment all across the United States. The reason is electromagnetic pulse (EMP), a by-product of high-altitude nuclear explosions that blankets huge tracts of the earth with peak fields of 50,000 volts per meter. The first installment of this three-part series described how EMP was discovered and why its potentially chaos-producing effects were overlooked for more than a decade. The second part examines the ongoing debate in the Pentagon over how to cope with the EMP threat. The third part will discuss questions EMP raises about waging a limited nuclear war.     

Origin of Tektites

A comet of the size recently postulated by H. C. Urey would leave a large crater. It is shown, from aerodynamic theory, from observations of distribution around terrestrial impact craters, and from experimental nuclear explosions, that the observed distribution of tektites cannot be the result of impact on the earth, whether cometary or meteoritic. It is further shown, from aerodynamic theory, from observation of a meteor shower, and from study of the breakup of artificial satellites, that the distribution of tektites can be accounted for as a result of fusion stripping of a satellite, as originally suggested by Suess.     

Fallout plutonium in an alkaline, saline lake

Plutonium isotopes, derived from global fallout following atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, have been measured in the water and sediments of a natural alkaline, saline lake. The activities of fallout plutonium in the water column are about two orders of magnitude greater than in most freshwater lakes, where these nuclides are found predominantly in the sediments.     

Safeguardsing our military space systems

The vulnerability military space systems depends on their orbits, functions, and other characteristics. The high-altitude satellites needed for warning and communications in particular could be vulnerable to prompt destruction by certain space-based systems and, in the future, possibly by ground-based high power lasers. A combination of passive countermeasures and arms control agreements could give these satellites some protection against such attack. Deployment of strategic defensive systems with the capability to reach far into space would invalidate this approach.     

Nuclear explosions and distant earthquakes: a search for correlations

An apparent correlation between nuclear explosions and earthquakes has been reported for the events between September 1961 and September 1966. When data from the events between September 1966 and December 1968 are examined, this correlation disappears. No relationship between the size of the nuclear explosions and the number of distant earthquakes is apparent in the data.