| 农户正规借贷的博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 洪名勇,代则光.农户正规借贷的博弈分析[J].贵州大学学报(农业与生物科学版),2010,29(5):445-450. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 洪名勇 代则光 |
| |
| 作者单位： | [1]贵州大学人文社科处,贵州贵阳550025 [2]贵州大学管理学院,贵州贵阳550025 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 贵州大学研究生创新基金 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 通过运用博弈理论,对农户与正规金融之间的借贷行为进行博弈分析,并建立博弈模型。根据模型,得出完全信息和不完全信息下博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡、混合战略纳什均衡、精炼贝叶斯均衡。结果表明：农户必须主动与正规金融合作,提高自身的信用等级,才能实现农户与正规金融的双赢。
|
| 关 键 词： | 农户 正规金融 博弈 完全信息 不完全信息 |
Analysis on Game of Regular Debit and Credit of Farmers |
| |
| HONG Ming-yong,DAI Ze-guang.Analysis on Game of Regular Debit and Credit of Farmers[J].Journal of Mountain Agriculture & Biology,2010,29(5):445-450. |
| |
| Authors: | HONG Ming-yong DAI Ze-guang |
| |
| Institution: | 1.Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,Guizhou University,Guiyang Guizhou 550025,China;2.College of Management,Guizhou University,Guiyang Guizhou 550025,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Based on the Game theory,the debit and credit behavior between farmers and the formal finance were analyzed in the present work.According to the model,the sub-game of perfect Nash equilibrium,mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium were obtained under complete information and incomplete information.The results showed that farmers should forwardly cooperate with the formal finance,and improve their credit rating in order to achieve a mutual benefit between two sides. |
| |
| Keywords: | farmers regular finance Game theory complete information incomplete information |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
