基于环境税的两部门政策与农业面源污染规制

在面源污染经济规制方面,现有文献对于环境税、财政补贴、环保罚款等政策的研究取得了丰富的理论成果,但对于多种经济规制工具的结合研究,特别是对基于环境税的两部门规制政策(two-part instruments)的研究仍有较大的空间.两部门规制政策既具备最优庇古税(first-best Pigouvian tax)的特征,同时对于监管和执行的信息需求可以实现最小化.该文在一个局部均衡框架下,比较研究了5种不同情境下,基于环境税的两部门政策对农业面源污染的规制效应.结果表明:基于环境税的两部门规制政策会诱导道德风险,因为面源污染不仅与污染性要素投入本身有关,而且与要素投入的使用方式关联.实现社会最优面源污染排放的政策组合至少有2种:①对污染性要素投入征税,对耕地的使用进行补贴的政策组合;②对农业产出和高污染、低成本的粪肥使用行为征税,而对非污染性要素投入和低污染、高成本的粪肥使用行为进行补贴的政策组合.

Two-Part Policy Based on Environmental Tax and Regulation of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution

In the area of economic regulation of non-point source pollution, abundant theoretical achievements on environmental tax, financial subsidies, environmental penalties and other policies have been reported in literature, but there remains much room for the research on the combination of various economic regulation tools, especially on the two-part instruments based on environmental tax. The two-part regulatory policy has most of the properties of the first-best Pigouvian tax, while the information demand for monitoring and enforcement can be minimized. Under a partial equilibrium framework, this paper compares and studies the regulatory effects of two-part policies based on environmental tax on agricultural non-point source pollution in five different situations. The results showed that the two-part regulation policy based on environmental tax will induce a moral hazard, because non-point source pollution is not only related to the input of polluting factors itself, but also to the mode of the use of the input factors. There are at least two policy combinations to realize the optimal non-point source pollution discharge in society-one is to levy taxes on the input of polluting factors and subsidize the use of cultivated land; the other is to levy taxes on agricultural output and the use of manure with high pollution and low cost, and subsidize the input of non-polluting factors and the use of manure with low pollution and high cost.