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贯休、齐己与石霜庆诸——禅宗灯史上的一桩公案
引用本文:胡大浚.贯休、齐己与石霜庆诸——禅宗灯史上的一桩公案[J].湖南农业大学学报(自然科学版),2015(3):31-36.
作者姓名:胡大浚
作者单位:(1. 湖南涉外经济学院商学院,湖南 长沙410205;2. 湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南 长沙410079)
摘    要:研究市场需求和生产成本同时扰动时非线性需求供应链的最优应对策略.首先在稳定条件下提出供应链的收益共享协调合约;生产成本和需求扰动会导致原有的收益共享合约不再协调,提出了供应链在一体化决策时应对双因素同时发生扰动的最优策略;进一步提出了改进的收益共享合约协调分散化决策的供应链系统.最后运用数值实验对模型进行了验证.

关 键 词:供应链管理  收益共享  突发事件  协调合约  博弈论

Research on Coordination by Revenue Contract under Multi-factors Simultaneously Disruption
HU Da-jun.Research on Coordination by Revenue Contract under Multi-factors Simultaneously Disruption[J].Journal of Hunan Agricultural University,2015(3):31-36.
Authors:HU Da-jun
Abstract:The optimal policies of supply chain players with nonlinear demand were considered to reply to production cost and demand simultaneous disruptions. It was proved that a revenue sharing contract can be used to coordinate the supply chain under normal environment. The coordination schemes of revenue sharing contract may be broken off by demand and cost disruptions, and the optimal policies that the centralized decision-making supply chain replied to the disruptions were proposed. It was further proved that an improved revenue sharing contract can coordinate the decentralized decision-making supply chain. Finally, a numerical experiment was adopted to validate the models.
Keywords:supply chain management  revenue sharing  disruption management  coordination contract  game theory
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