政府介入农业有害生物风险防控的博弈分析

为探究有效防控农业有害生物的思路,从有害生物风险防控主体入手,将政府介入作为研究重点,运用博弈分析方法,探讨政府、外包公司、农户间的利益关系。首先,本研究分别对三方主体的两两博弈行为进行研究;而后,将三方主体置于一个框架进行分析,探究政府介入有害生物风险防控体系的重要性。结果表明:1)非政府参与下,外包公司与农户的调节速度相对较慢,难以达到理想状态,有必要引入政府规制;2)政府可以通过规制手段,补贴或惩罚外包企业,使其形成符合有害生物防控规范的市场行为;3)政府需要通过对农户培训、对生物农药的宣传,提升农户使用现代化防控措施的积极性;4)在三方共同博弈的前提下,各方的防控成本同时下降。最后,本研究提出了完善农业有害生物防控中的政府规制模式的政策建议。

Game analysis of government intervention in agricultural pest risk prevention and control

To provide ideas for the effective prevention and control of agricultural pests, this research starts with the main bodies of pest risk prevention and control, takes government elements as the research focus, and uses game theory to explore the interest relationship between the government, outsourcing companies, and farmers. This research firstly studies the pairwise game behavior of the three bodies and then puts the three bodies into a framework to explore the importance of government intervention in the pest risk prevention and control system. The results show that: 1)With non-government participation, the adjustment speed of outsourcing companies and farmers is relatively slow, and it is difficult to reach the ideal state. It is necessary to introduce government supervision; 2)The government can subsidize or punish outsourcing companies through regulatory means to make them form Market behavior in compliance with pest prevention and control regulations; 3)The government needs to raise farmers'' enthusiasm in using modern prevention and control measures through training on farmers and the promotion of biological pesticides; 4)The costs of prevention and control of all parties on the premise of a joint game between the three parties have also fallen. In conclusion, this research puts forward policy recommendations to improve the government regulation model in the prevention and control of agricultural pests.